We're attempting to setup a Content-Security-Policy on a website that has a lot of Google Tag Manager tags and custom scripts and other random things on it. We're frequently receiving CSP reports like the following:
{
"csp-report":{
"document-uri":"https://www.example.com/variouspages.php",
"referrer":"",
"violated-directive":"img-src",
"effective-directive":"img-src",
"original-policy":"[...] img-src 'self' px.ads.linkedin.com [...]",
"disposition":"enforce",
"blocked-uri":"https://px.ads.linkedin.com/collect?v=2&fmt=js&pid=0000000&time=1626965954064&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.example.com%2Fmy-account%2Fvariouspages.php",
"status-code":0,
"script-sample":""
}
}
And I'm very confused by this. When I visit the page, I see the LinkedIn pixel added without a problem, and with CSP warnings - which is what I expect since its domain is in the img-src directive.
What could potentially be causing this to be blocked and reported by so many users? I'm at a loss here.
Pay attention to blocked domain name: px.ADS.linkedin.com. What you observe is the result of work of ads blockers (uBlock / Adblock browser extensions).
Technical details why it's looks that allowed domain is blocked, are explained in this post.
Related
I am trying to add CSP to our web site, using report-only (to report-uri.com).
It seems to work as expected for most cases, but google related sites gets reported even if the URL is added to the header.
Here´s the relevant part of header as it appears in developer tools:
connect-src 'self' https://stats.g.doubleclick.net
I am still getting this violation:
"blocked-uri": "https://stats.g.doubleclick.net/j/collect"
I have experienced similar issues with other Google related sites as well.
The problem is that we're using Google tags and analysis, so I cannot block the sites out.
This particular problem seems to come from Chrome only.
In addition to blocked-uri, note in the reports on the original-policy field - is there your CSP with the connect-src 'self' https://stats.g.doubleclick.net rule or not.
Looks like some ISPs, in violation of RFCs, cache site responses along with HTTP headers. At least after the changes in the CSP, within 2 weeks there is violation reports having the old CSP in the original-policy field.
And it feels like you changed the rules in connect-src directive recently.
List of sources connect-src 'self' https://stats.g.doubleclick.net is not complete for Google Analytics, you can insert own Google Analytics ID and check. Here is comprehensive test of Content Security Policy for GTM.
Here is initial CSP for GA + GTM. The initial because though GTM you can embed a lot of third-party scripts from vary sources.
When implementing csp-header, I have specified my policy as:
default-src 'self'; script-src www.gstatic.com; Since I have not declared script-src-elem directive in my csp policy, as stated in this mdn documentation, I was expecting policy defined for script-src to be used for script-src-elem directive as well. However, I see violation being reported as "violated-directive":"script-src-elem" "blocked-uri":"https://www.gstatic.com/blah/blah".
Any idea why this behavior is happening?
After seeing this exact same pattern in some of my applications, I finally got to the root of this!
The weirdness we were seeing was that CSP reports were coming in for a hostname which was definitely in the script-src directive; and we know that script-src-elem is supposed to fall back to those directives. From that perspective, it should have been literally impossible for these reports to happen.
Here's what we found: the users these reports were coming from were using the PrivacyBadger browser extension, which was leading to false positive CSP reports for the hosts (Google) that it blocked. I didn't dig too far into it, but here's my theory on how that happens:
The Content Security Policy performs a pre-request check for the JavaScript include on the page (eg. gstatic.com or google-analytics.com). The pre-request check passes, because the hostname is allowed in the policy.
The browser initiates a request for the resource
PrivacyBadger intercepts the request via the browser's onBeforeRequest API (see PrivacyBadger source and Chrome documentation)
ProvacyBadger returns a surrogate data blob for the asset. It does this to ensure that code which relies on the real javascript (eg. window.ga) won't break.
The browser then performs a post-request check against the returned base64 blob
The post-request check fails - because the policy does not allow data: for script-src
The browser sends a CSP report for the blocked asset.
This seems like it might be a browser bug - because the report reflects the original asset's third party hostname; while the blocked content is actually a data: blob that was returned via the intercepted request.
From the documentation you linked to: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/script-src-elem
The HTTP Content-Security-Policy (CSP) script-src-elem directive specifies valid sources for JavaScript elements, but not inline script event handlers like onclick.
Without seeing the rest of your code it is a safe assumption that you are seeing this error as a result of an inline event handler and will need to define script-src-elem in your CSP policy.
script-src-elem definitely does fallback to script-src in browsers on the Chromium engine. Check the Chrome console, the warn will looks like:
... Note that 'script-src-elem' was not explicitly set, so 'script-src' is used as a fallback.
Gecko-browsers does not support script-src-elem and use script-src directly.
The CSP2-browsers in violation reports sends a violatied directive resulting after all fallback chain. But CSP3-browsers send a "theoretically" violated directive and than perform fallback if directive was omitted. This introduces some confusion.
script-src-elem have nothing to do with inline event handler like onClick() -this is noted in MDN docs. script-src-elem controls only <script>...</script> and <script src='...'> elements (and javascript-navigation).
"blocked-uri":"https://www.gstatic.com/blah/blah" says that https://www.gstatic.com host-source was blocked, not inline event handler.
Inline event handlers do lock in the script-src-attr directive and report will looks like "blocked-uri":"inline".
Looks like you edit a copy CSP, but server issues another as default. Please look the "original-policy" filed in the report's JSON. Is it contains you real CSP or some default one?
PS: To detail analyse what's going on it need to look a full violation report and a your full CSP (print screen of browser console messages will be very helpful). Because script-src www.gstatic.com; is totally enough for CSP3-browsers to allow any resources from 'https://www.gstatic.com'. (CSP2-browsers requires more rules but you shown violation report sent by CSP3-browser).
I know I'm late to this, but this thread brought me to the solution for my case:
Disable the NoScript-Addon in Chrome.
I have a CSP with the following line in it:
script-src 'nonce-{random}' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' 'strict-dynamic' https: http: https://static.cloudflareinsights.com https://mydomain.app/cdn-cgi/scripts/6c4dd986/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js;
and I can see that the CSP is correct in the response header for the page.
I am still getting a [Report Only] Refused to load the script https://mydomain.app/cdn-cgi/scripts/6c4dd986/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js error.
Cloudflare is auto-injecting this script tag and so I cannot rely on the strict-dynamic property to cover it for me, nor can I add a nonce.
Is this failing because of scrict-dynamic overriding the fixed url in the CSP? We need strict-dynamic within the app, but we also need to allow a custom whitelist url for these situations.
Any ideas?
Edit: Specifically I think the issue is cloudflare here. How is it possible to allow cloudflare to inject scripts, while at the same time having strict-dynamic set? You cannot give cloudflare a nonce, and strict-dynamic will not let you white-list so how is it possible to overcome this?
If you use strict-dynamic, it ignores the allow-listed domain. That's why that approach isn't working.
BTW, you can't use a full URL like http: https://static.cloudflareinsights.com https://mydomain.app/cdn-cgi/scripts/6c4dd986/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js anyway. You can only use https://static.cloudflareinsights.com https://mydomain.app/cdn-cgi/scripts/6c4dd986/cloudflare-static/.
BTW, you may find https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/ helpful for finding problems like that in your CSP. (I'm not affiliated with them. I just think it's useful.)
At the end of the day, Cloudflare is going to need to fix this on their side. They see your CSP in your response. They need to make use of your nonce. They do this sometimes. If you read https://developers.cloudflare.com/bots/reference/javascript-detections/, it says, "If your CSP uses a nonce for script tags, Cloudflare will add these nonces to the scripts it injects by parsing your CSP response header."
We want to secure our site with Content-Security-Policy, and even with the setting of allowing inline scripts (default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'), loading modernizr (2.6.2) produces 4 CSP violations:
I upgraded to the latest version (3.6.0), the develop version, and now it produces over 30 CSP violations:
I couldn't find any official statement on CSP on the modernizr site, it merely mentions that in 2012, they added a detect for Content Security Policy (https://modernizr.com/news/modernizr-262).
Reading various blogs and Stack Overflow questions, I find most up-to-date best-practice from 2017 to be:
If modernizr is injecting all that inline stuff than it seems like
your choices are to either (a) add all those hashes, (b) use
'unsafe-inline' (but which basically defeats the whole purpose of
CSP…), or (c) don’t use modernizr.
Although, the errors I am getting occur even when using unsafe-inline.
Has anyone found a workable solution to using both Content-Security-Policy and modernizr?
Try using this lenient CSP default-src * 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-dynamic' data: filesystem: about: blob: ws: wss: and start removing keywords until you start getting errors, with this method you can adjust your CSP to your needs.
It would be nice if there was some sort of CSP generator where you give it a website and it just knows which CSP you need in order to not keep erroring.
Remember that * means allow all domains, so replace this with all domains you intent to support.
This of course just fixes, or solves the issue, and it depends what it's at stake, what content does your website offer, and how vulnerable would users be if an XSS attack could be carried through. CSP protects merely against XSS attacks, this is just JavaScript that could be inserted by a third party, using HTTPS for example, will make it almost impossible for a MITM to inject arbitrary code.
I have been having problems with scripts not getting loaded because of problems with content security policy settings and was wondering if there was a way to set a content security policy so that it lets all websites be accessible for downloading scripts?
If you're not sure exactly what Content Security Policy you need, it's fine to start with a policy that's very permissive, (which is at least better than no policy at all) and refine it.
For example,
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src *
would allow you to include scripts from anywhere, but everything else, for example images, only from your own site.
I would also recommend you start with Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only, which reports errors but doesn't block the content. That way you can safely test and refine your policy before you enforce it.
See for example Scott Helme's blog article
https://scotthelme.co.uk/content-security-policy-an-introduction/