I'm used to use GCP's secret manager. There, we can create a secret and give a specific READ permission for one specific service account.
I mean, let's say we create a secret ABC and a service account "getsecretaccount", I can give the read permission for this SA called getsecretaccount to access the ABC secret. This getsecretaccount will not have access to any other secret there.
Can I achieve this scenario in Azure Key Vault?
Thx!!
Authorization
Key vault offer two different Authorizations: older Vault access policy and newer Azure role-based access control
Vault access policy
BrunoLucasAzure already explained how this works. Personally I don't recommend using vault access policy unless you have some specific reason to use it:
resource re-deployment will reset existing authorization defined in key vault properties. ref: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/templates/microsoft.keyvault/vaults?pivots=deployment-language-bicep#resource-format
passing [] to accessPolicies will clear access policy list
passing null or not using accessPolicies in template will generate error
of course you can read value of accessPoliciesbefore re-deployment and then re-use existing value when re-deploying resource. TBH that kind of hacks should not be required by resource.
For more information: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/key-vault/general/assign-access-policy-portal
Azure role-based access control
Azure role-based access control based key vault authorization uses Azure RBAC assignments for key vault data layer access control.
There is multiple ready-made RBAC roles for key vault data layer:
Key Vault Administrator
Key Vault Secrets Officer
Key Vault Secrets User
Key Vault Reader
etc
Documentation only mentions thins Azure RBAC for key vault also provides the ability to have separate permissions on individual keys, secrets, and certificates
=> you can add RBAC roles into individual key/secret/certificate
Note that key/secret/certificate must be created before you can add RBAC to it.
For more information: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/key-vault/general/rbac-guide?tabs=azure-cli
The answer
You can use both methods:
if you use older vault access policy, you need to create one key vault per service principal
if you use RBAC based access control, you can manage access control on individual secret level
if you have 1 azure vault with multiple secrets and you create an access policy for a user and select permission like "get" and/or "list", that user will be able to see all secrets under that vault. no option for separated permission per individual secret
Related
I work at an organization that uses Azure and I need to set up an ETL process that will pull data from an API. Based on my research, everywhere on the internet says I should use Azure Key Vault to store the credentials rather than hard code them into Data Factory. I created a "secret" within a key vault that I created and configured the settings to only grant access to my windows login. However, my Azure subscription is part of an enterprise/multi-tenant subscription and I had a colleague (who has never used Azure before) screen-share with me, and he was able to access the credentials in the key vault I created simply by changing the access settings to "public" (he is able to see them in plain text after modifying the Network/Security settings).
Is this the expected behavior? I can see the benefit of allowing other user to modify the setting for a Key Vault (if I leave the company for example), but I'm not sure if there is a way around this, because I would assume if my co-worker (who is not admin-level) can see these credentials, than the IT department and/or higher-ranking people would be able to access these credentials quite easily...
Pretty much everything I find online says I should store credentials in Azure Key Vault, but if my whole organization has the ability to access the secrets, doesn't that seem like a major security issue?
Access Policy settings - Application is an Azure Data Factory instance which I created, User is my login/account
Networking settings - Private endpoint option is selected, but currently no private endpoints are on the access list. Co-worker was able to change this to "All networks", ultimately granting him access to view secrets.
Your colleague is probably having Owner or Contibutor role on subscription level. So he can change Key Vault settings and grant access to himself. This behaviour is by design.
It is explained in Microsoft article about Key Vault security:
If a user has Contributor permissions to a key vault management plane, the user can grant themselves access to the data plane by setting a Key Vault access policy. You should tightly control who has Contributor role access to your key vaults. Ensure that only authorized persons can access and manage your key vaults, keys, secrets, and certificates.
People say not to store API Keys and passwords config files and instead to use a Secrets vault. eg. AWS or Azure.
But to access these you need a clientId and clientSecret. These need to be stored somewhere on the app. eg app.config. So I really don't understand what problem this solves if the hacker can use the clientId and clientSecret in the app the get the passwords or api keys anyway?
it seems even worse than the original problem storing one api key, since if they get access to the secrets manager they will have ALL THE KEYS and ALL the passwords.
AWS offers few different services to store your secrets. Let's say if you have a database password in an application configuration file, you can use either AWS Secret manager or AWS Parameter store to store them as secret.
To retrieve these values securely, you do not have to store another secret stored in your application. You can use a mechanism called role-based access in AWS.
If you running your application on an ec2 instance, you can configure an AWS role/profile and assign it to the ec2 instance which is linking the secret manager and the ec2 machine securely and your application has connectivity to decrypt the secret and use it inside the application.
If you are using Azure, the answer is to use Managed Identities.
The way it works is that you assign an identity to the resources (VMs, WebApps etc.) that need access to Key Vault. That way the resource becomes like a user in your Azure AD (much like a Service Principal or any other user). Then you can make use of Key Vault Access Policies to assign appropriate access to keys and secrets in your Key Vault to these Managed Identities. Doing this would not require you to specify a Client Id/Client Secret to access the Key Vault.
While the Managed Identity is something you assign to a resource, it could become cumbersome if you have many resources. That's where User Assigned Managed Identity comes into picture. A User Assigned Managed Identity is a resource in your Azure Subscription. The process is very much similar: you create such identity and then assign appropriate access to this identity on your Key Vault resources.
Now wherever you need to access Key Vault in your applications, you will specify the id of this identity. The application using appropriate SDK will get an access token on behalf of this identity and connect to Key Vault using that access token.
You can learn more about these identities here: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/managed-identities-azure-resources/overview.
But to access these you need a clientId and clientSecret. These need to be stored somewhere on the app. eg app.config
You can use runtime permissions to access the secrets and parameters. In Azure it is called Managed Identities, in AWS there are service roles. I am more familiar with AWS, so I will use its terminology, but every larger cloud provider has similar approach with different names.
Basically you can assign the compute resource where your code runs (EC2/VM server, Lambda function, ECS container,...) a role - you can consider it as set of permissions. Using AWS API you can access the secrets or parameters from the code without storing any client credentials.
if they get access to the secrets manager they will have ALL THE KEYS and ALL the passwords.
That's why we all need to use principle of the least privileges, the defined runtime identity should have only permissions it really needs.
We are managing our customers' azure subscriptions using Microsoft Partner Centre >> and using a username I create a new Azure Vault for a customer>> but when I tried to create a new Secret inside the Azure Vault , I got this error:-
The operation "Set" is not enabled in this key vault's access policy.
now when I access the Key Vault >> Access Policy >> I am unable to add the login username which I used to create the Key Vault inside the Key Vault access policy, where I am only able to add the office 365 admin:-
so any advice why i am able to create a new Key Vault, while i am unable to add Secrets inside it?
When you create the Key vault, you should add the CSP access policy rather than normal access policy.
After you click on it, you can specify CSP security group (it has shown the steps to get the group id).
Then the CSP user can create secret in this key vault after it's created.
If I give owner access to an app on subscription level, do I still need to add the app on access policy in key vault so that the app can retrieve the secret value from azure key vault through http GET method?
The answer is yes, if you use the Vault access policy permission model.
However, the answer is no, if you use the Azure role-based access control permission model - but then you would have to assign an appropriate RBAC role since the Owner role would not have access.
Reference: Provide access to Key Vault keys, certificates, and secrets with an Azure role-based access control (preview)
I'm trying to give a team the least privileged access to manage the keys, secrets and certs in their key vault, AND the ability to manage access policies.
Per these docs, the keys, secrets, and certs are handled in the data plane via access policies, and the ability to manage access policies is handled in the management plane via RBAC. So, we got the data access (keys, secrets, and certs) handled via an access policy. But we can't seem to get the permissions right to grant them the ability to manage access policies.
I created a custom role with the following permissions:
*/read
Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/read
Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/accessPolicies/write
Microsoft.Authorization/policyDefinitions/delete
Microsoft.Authorization/policyDefinitions/write
Microsoft.Authorization/policyDefinitions/read
Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/delete
Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/write
Microsoft.Authorization/policyAssignments/read
Even with these permissions, the users cannot add access policies. What are we doing wrong?
Also, I'm thinking that only the 'accessPolicies/write' permission (under Microsoft.Keyvault) is the only permission in the list that even relates to the ability to manage key vault access policies. Is that right? (are the policyDefinition and policyAssignment permissions irrelevant to this issue?)
Thanks!
are the policyDefinition and policyAssignment permissions irrelevant to this issue?
Yes, it is irrelevant to this issue.
Why are these Azure permissions not working?
To manage access policies, the Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/accessPolicies/write action is not enough, assigen the custom role with this action to a user, then use the user account to test powershell command Set-AzKeyVaultAccessPolicy, obviously it needs Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/write action.
Set-AzKeyVaultAccessPolicy -VaultName joytest123 -ResourceGroupName joyRG -ObjectId xxxxxx -PermissionsToKeys create,import,delete,list -BypassObjectIdValidation
So at least you need to use the Actions like below in your custom role.
"Actions": [
"Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/read",
"Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/write",
]
And if you don't want the users to create new keyvaults, just need to assign the user with the custom role at the specific keyvault scope(select a keyvault -> Access control (IAM)), then he will not be able to do that.
Why would you not give the users keyvault administrator role to their key vault instead of creating a separate custom role? What access would they get if you assigned them that role on in the key vault that they wouldn't have otherwise?
Also, I would start with testing a built in role, like key vault administrator, then go backwards if you really wanted to remove specific permissions.