Azure Key Vault best practices - azure

We are developing an Azure multi-tenant web service portal that calls external API services. Each called web service may have oAuth parameters such as end point, client Id, secret, etc. Currently, we 2 flavors of working code:
uses SQL to store these parameters; and
uses a json config file to maintain runtime parameters. I would like to offer a Azure Key Vault solution, but it seems unwise to have both a Client ID and Client Secret in the same Key Vault.
Additionally, we have many subscribers in our multi-tenant model, and each may have a specific config (for example: Solr collection name, SQL Db connection string; etc.) and I am wondering about comingling these runtime parameter verses allowing the customer to have their own Vault which of course requires that the customer share access with us as a SaaS vendor. We want to offer best practices security to our subscribers, many of which are Fintechs. Any advice is appreciated.

"but it seems unwise to have both a Client ID and Client Secret in the same Key Vault"
Why would you store these in the same database or JSON - far less secure.
Have you looked at Azure API Management, this is by far the best way to amalgamate services.
If you are too far down the road, use KeyVault. Use MSI (Managed Service Identity) to connect from your app service / function app, limit access Keys, Secrets, Get, List, Read, Write. Limit access via the firewall. Make sure all diagnostics are logged.
If you need a per-client model and not a multi-tenant, then deploy separate instances of the portal or API management for each. Per-client is more expensive and more tricky to maintain, but far more secure because you can enforce physical partitional on a number of fronts.

Related

How to handle a Custom Connector that uses header authentication in each API call?

I have an Azure logic app that uses a Custom Connector that I've made from importing a Postman Collection. The RESTful API that my connector calls require 3 authentication headers in each request: UserName, Secret, ApiIntegrationCode. Because it takes three specifically named parameters, I don't believe that any of the authentication presets will work for me.
I know that I can protect the inputs and outputs of various connectors. I have been entertaining the idea of storing the sensitive information in a SQL table that I query in each run and storing the values in variables that I pass to each of my custom connector's API calls.
Would this be a viable way of protecting sensitive data from being seen by people that may have access to my logic app? What is the most secure way I can pass these headers in each call?
There are not too many options within a (consumption) Logic App in this regard.
Your options with Logic Apps
A first step into the right direction is to put your sensitive information into an Azure Key Vault and use the corresponding connector in your Logic App to retrieve the data from there. This is easier to implement and more secure than querying a SQL table for this purpose.
The second thing you can do is to activate secure inputs for the connectors that make the API calls. This makes sure, that the sensitive information passed to these connectors is obfuscated in the run history of your logic App and in connected services like Azure Log Analytics.
The problem with this approach is, that anyone who has more than just read permissions to your Logic App can just go ahead and deactivate the secure inputs setting or create a step that dumps the content of your Key Vault. You can use RBAC to control access to your Logic App but that means of course administrative overhead.
Alternative: API Management Service
If you want by all means to allow other developers to change the Logic App without exposing API secrets to them, you might consider using some sort of middle tier to communicate with the API. Azure API Management Service (APIM) is one of the options here.
You would manage your sensitive information in a Key Vault and inject them via "Named Values" into your APIM instance. You can then add your API as a backend in APIM and expose it towards your Logic App.
The advantage here is that you can secure access to your API with APIM subscription keys that you can cycle frequently. You can also restrict the access to the original API to only those calls, that need to be available to the Logic App.
If APIM is something for you depends on your use case, as it comes at a price. Even the developer plan costs about $50/month: https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/api-management/
Alternative: Azure Function
You can use a simple Azure Function that serves as a middle tier between your Logic App and your API. This function can be configured to pull the sensitive data from a Key Vault and can also be secured via a function access key, that you can renew on a regular basis.
This is a dirt cheap option, if you are running the functions on a consumption plan: https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/functions/

Securing Resource Connection Data/Strings For Use by Microservices in Azure

Various microservices will need access to various Azure resources, each of which has various connection string/authentication key requirements.
I'm thinking that Azure Key Vault is the best way to store the connection information for each resource, with the microservices authenticating themselves in order to gain access to the connection information they need.
Is this a best-practice approach?
Yes, I think so. You can secure access to your key vaults by allowing only authorized applications and users. As you need access to various Azure resources, I think it is very convenient to use Azure key vault.
Besides, Azure Key Vault uses Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) by Thales. Special about HSMs is that they do not give you keys. You create or import a key into an HSM. Later on you give data to the HSM and the HSM is executing cryptographic operations on that data. E.g. encrypting, decrypting, hashing ect. By the way, those hardware devices are really expensive. With Azure Key Vault you are able to use this protection for a small price. That's one benefit using Azure Key Vault.
Reference:
Best practices to use Key Vault

Azure:limit the access of ARM PaaS services to certain storage accounts

I have a security question related to Azure that I could really do with some guidance on the art of what is possible.
I would like to know if it is possible to restrict what services can be called (i.e what storage account endpoints can be used to write data to) from PaaS services such as service fabric or web apps (ASE). i.e. if I have a web app that writes to storage and someone maliciously altered the code to write to a third party storage account on Azure; is this something I could mitigate in advance by saying this application (i.e. this web app or this SF cluster) can only talk to a particular set of storage accounts or a particular database. So that even if the code was changed to talk to another storage account, it wouldnt be able to. I.e can I explicitly define as part of an environment what storage items an application can talk to; Is this something that is possible?
Azure Storage Accounts have Access Keys and Shared Access Keys that are used to authenticate REST calls to read / write data to them. Your app will be able to perform read / write operations against the Azure Storage Account that it has an access key and connection string for that it uses to connect to it with.
It's not possible to set any kind of firewall rule on an Azure App Service app to prevent it from communicating with certain internet or Azure endpoints. You can set NSG firewall rules with App Service Environment, but you still can only either open or close access; not restrict on certain DNS names or IP Addresses.
Perhaps you should look for a mitigation to this threat in the way applications are deployed, connection strings are managed and code is deployed:
Use Azure Role Based Access control to limit access to the resource in Azure, so unauthorized persons cannot modify deployments
Use a secure way of managing your source code. Remember it is not on the PaaS service, because that only holds the binaries.
Use SAS tokens for application access to storage accounts, not the full access keys. For example, a SAS key could be given write access, not read or list access to a storage account.
If, as a developer, you don't trust the person managing the application deployment, you could even consider signing your application parameters/connection strings. That only protects against tampering though, not against extraction of the connection string.

how to share Azure mobile service tokens across different web app instances

I am planning to have multiple azure mobile service instances, so the first requirement I have is to share the access token of authenticated user across different app instances. I found this article https://cgillum.tech/2016/03/07/app-service-token-store/ that states that right now we can not share the tokens as it is stored locally on machine, and placing it to blob storage is not recommended for production apps. What is the possible solution I have at this time?
I have read the blog you mentioned about App Service Token Store. As mentioned about where the tokens live:
Internally, all these tokens are stored in your app’s local file storage under D:/home/data/.auth/tokens. The tokens themselves are all encrypted in user-specific .json files using app-specific encryption keys and cryptographically signed as per best practice.
I found this article https://cgillum.tech/2016/03/07/app-service-token-store/ that states that right now we can not share the tokens as it is stored locally on machine.
As Azure-runtime-environment states about the Persisted files that an Azure Web App can deal with:
They are rooted in d:\home, which can also be found using the %HOME% environment variable.
These files are persistent, meaning that you can rely on them staying there until you do something to change them. Also, they are shared between all instances of your site (when you scale it up to multiple instances). Internally, the way this works is that they are stored in Azure Storage instead of living on the local file system.
Moreover, Azure app service would enable ARR Affinity to keep a client subsequent requests talking to the same instance. You could disable the session affinity cookie, then requests would be distributed across all the instances. For more details, you could refer to this blog.
Additionally, I have tried to disable ARR Affinity and scale my mobile service to multiple instances, then I could always browser https://[my-website].azurewebsites.net/.auth/me to retrieve information about the current logged-in user.
Per my understanding, you could accomplish the authentication/authorization by yourself to use auth middle-ware into your app. But, this requires more works to be done. Since the platform takes care of it for you, I assume that you could leverage Easy Auth and Token Store and scale your mobile service to multiple instances without worrying about anything.

Does Windows Azure have the equivalent of AWS Identity Access Management?

So I have a mobile app that uses AWS's IAM infrastructure that effectively allows me to provide temporary access tokens to anonymous mobile devices, so that they can run queries against AWS services directly from the mobile device.
Does anyone know if Windows Azure has a drop in replacement for this sort of thing too? I've read about Windows Azure Access Control but all examples seem to focus on allowing authentication via the likes of Facebook, Twitter or Windows Live etc. In my case, I don't want the mobile user to have to "log-in" anywhere, I just want them to be able to access Azure services such as table storage, without having to go via my server.
Thanks!
You do have the ability to create Signed Access Signatures for all three Windows Azure Storage services (BLOBs, Queues and Tables) as well as for Windows Azure Service Bus Brokered Messages (Queues, Topics & Subscriptions). These SAS urls are temporary and you can create them ad-hoc with expiration times. After that time expires the device would have to request a new one, likely from your server. This reduce the load as they aren't coming back all the time, but you do still have to run something that will gen these SAS uris for the devices. You can generate SAS manually against the REST API direct, or you can use one of the SDKs to generate them for you (which also hit the REST API).
Note that when you create a SAS you have the option of doing so as a Policy, or adhoc. A policy allows you to revoke a SAS at a later time, but you can only have so many of these defined at a time (likely too big of a restriction for a mobile scenario if you are doing by device). The adhoc approach allows you pretty much as many as you need (I think), but you don't have the ability to revoke it, it just has to expire.
Another option is to look at Windows Azure Mobile Services. This service runs on servers managed by Microsoft and you can use it to get at just about anything you want. You'd want to look at the "Custom API" feature. Also, make sure you understand the pricing model of mobile services (or really, that stands for any option you decide to go with).
It's called managed identities in Azure

Resources