background:
I have such a command below to call some number, such as caller=12345, callee=54321 ,and when 54321 is answered, my_script.lua will be executed, thus to control session in my lua script .
But then when 54321 is hanguped by itself, in my lua script, session.ready() is always true, so it will be executed continued, this is not corrected.
originate {execute_on_answer='lua my_script.lua',hangup_after_bridge=true,origination_caller_id_number=12345}sofia/gateway/gw/54321 &echo
my question is :
how to recognize session is hanguped in lua script when callee hangup by itself ？ thks.
I change the command and then it works.
originate {hangup_after_bridge=true,origination_caller_id_number=12345}sofia/gateway/gw/54321 &lua(robot/robot.lua 12345)
Related
There is quite a common issue in unix world, that is when you start a process with parameters, one of them being sensitive, other users can read it just by executing ps -ef. (For example mysql -u root -p secret_pw
Most frequent recommendation I found was simply not to do that, never run processes with sensitive parameters, instead pass these information other way.
However, I found that some processes have the ability to change the parameter line after they processed the parameters, looking for example like this in processes:
xfreerdp -decorations /w:1903 /h:1119 /kbd:0x00000409 /d:HCG /u:petr.bena /parent-window:54526138 /bpp:24 /audio-mode: /drive:media /media /network:lan /rfx /cert-ignore /clipboard /port:3389 /v:cz-bw47.hcg.homecredit.net /p:********
Note /p:*********** parameter where password was removed somehow.
How can I do that? Is it possible for a process in linux to alter the argument list they received? I assume that simply overwriting the char **args I get in main() function wouldn't do the trick. I suppose that maybe changing some files in /proc pseudofs might work?
"hiding" like this does not work. At the end of the day there is a time window where your password is perfectly visible so this is a total non-starter, even if it is not completely useless.
The way to go is to pass the password in an environment variable.
I like to process piped commands from within my Node.js commandline app like myapp.babel app.es6 | mynodecmdlineapp. To build a refresh mechanism I need to access the previous terminal commandline text. The place where terminal history is saved varies depending on the shell. Is there a node way to read this out?
Maybe a silly answer, but, if you are constructing the entire chain of commands, you could construct it to also pass the first command that you execute as a first argument to mynodecmdlineapp.
You could then access argv in your mynodecmdlineapp. See,
https://nodejs.org/docs/latest/api/process.html#process_process_argv
An example call would look like this:
myapp.babel app.es6 | mynodecmdlineapp "myapp.babel app.es6"
process.argv[2] would then contain "myapp.babel app.es6" but this assumes that you are constructing the command and able to call it this way. Otherwise, I thought you might be able to leverage "!!" to send the last command, but that would send the last command in history -- not in that command's pipe sequence.
I am somewhat familiar with various ways of calling a script from another one. I don't really need an overview of each, but I do have a few questions. Before that, though, I should tell you what my goal is.
I am working on a perl/tk program that: a) gathers information and puts it in a hash, and b) fires off other scripts that use the info hash, and some command line args. Each of these other scripts are available on the command line (using another command-line script) and need to stay that way. So I can't just put all that into a module and call it good.I do have the authority to alter the scripts, but, again, they must also be usable on the command line.
The current way of calling the other script is by using 'do', which means I can pass in the hash, and use the same version of perl (I think). But all the STDOUT (and STDERR too, I think) goes to the terminal.
Here's a simple example to demonstrate the output:
this_thing.pl
#!/usr/bin/env perl
use strict;
use warnings;
use utf8;
use Tk;
my $mw = MainWindow->new;
my $button = $mw->Button(
-text => 'start other thing',
-command => \&start,
)->pack;
my $text = $mw->Text()->pack;
MainLoop;
sub start {
my $script_path = 'this_other_thing.pl';
if (not my $read = do $script_path) {
warn "couldn't parse $script_path: $#" if $#;
warn "couldn't do $script_path: $!" unless defined $read;
warn "couldn't run $script_path" unless $read;
}
}
this_other_thing.pl
#!/usr/bin/env perl
use strict;
use warnings;
use utf8;
print "Hello World!\n";
How can I redirect the STDOUT and STDIN (for interactive scripts that need input) to the text box using the 'do' method? Is that even possible?
If I can't use the 'do' method, what method can redirect the STDIN and STDOUT, as well as enable passing the hash in and using the same version of perl?
Edit: I posted this same question at Perlmonks, at the link in the first comment. So far, the best response seems to use modules and have the child script just be a wrapper for the module. Other possible solutions are: ICP::Run(3) and ICP in general, Capture::Tiny and associated modules, and Tk::Filehandle. A solution was presented that redirects the output and error streams, but seems to not affect the input stream. It's also a bit kludgy and not recommended.
Edit 2: I'm posting this here because I can't answer my own question yet.
Thanks for your suggestions and advice. I went with a suggestion on Perlmonks. The suggestion was to turn the child scripts into modules, and use wrapper scripts around them for normal use. I would then simply be able to use the modules, and all the code is in one spot. This also ensures that I am not using different perls, I can route the output from the module anywhere I want, and passing that hash in is now very easy.
To have both STDIN & STDOUT of a subprocess redirected, you should read the "Bidirectional Communication with Another Process" section of the perlipc man page: http://search.cpan.org/~rjbs/perl-5.18.1/pod/perlipc.pod#Bidirectional_Communication_with_Another_Process
Using the same version of perl works by finding out the name of your perl interpreter, and calling it explicitly. $^X is probably what you want. It may or may not work on different operating systems.
Passing a hash into a subprocess does not work easily. You can print the contents of the hash into a file, and have the subprocess read & parse it. You might get away without using a file, by using the STDIN channel between the two processes, or you could open a separate pipe() for this purpose. Anyway, printing & parsing the data back cannot be avoided when using subprocesses, because the two processes use two perl interpreters, each having its own memory space, and not being able to see each other's variables.
You might avoid using a subprocess, by using fork() + eval() + require(). In that case, no separate perl interpreter will be involved, the forked interpreter will inherit the whole memory of your program with all variables, open file descriptors, sockets, etc. in it, including the hash to be passed. However, I don't see from where your second perl script could get its hash when started from CLI.
If i give Linux command as a argument to Execute Command(robot framework keyword, for communicate with remote server), how can i verify given Linux command is run correctly or not?
The best way I have found to do this is to return the return code alongside stdout (and stderr if you require) from the "Execute Command" keyword. e.g.:
SSHLibrary.Open Connection hostname port
SSHLibrary.Login username password
${stdout} ${return_code}= SSHLibrary.Execute Command valid_command return_rc=True
${stdout} ${return_code}= SSHLibrary.Execute Command invalid_command return_rc=True
In this example the first call to execute command would return a ${return_code} value of 0 and the second a non-zero status code. So you could just perform a "Should Be Equals" or similar assertion on the return code.
I can't quite see the keyword you mentioned. Is that part of the standard library?
A quick check yields some keywords under OperatingSystem, which has some keywords that runs a command and returns the return code.
http://robotframework.googlecode.com/hg/doc/libraries/OperatingSystem.html?r=2.8.1#Run And Return Rc
This should tell you whether your command executed properly because many Linux commands are silent on success.
Is it safe to pass a key to the openssl command via the command line parameters in Linux? I know it nulls out the actual parameter, so it can't be viewed via /proc, but, even with that, is there some way to exploit that?
I have a python app that I want to use OpenSSL to do the encryption/description through stdin/stdout streaming in a subprocess, but I want to know my keys are safe.
Passing the credentials on the command line is not safe. It will result in your password being visible in the system's process listing - even if openssl erases it from the process listing as soon as it can, it'll be there for an instant.
openssl gives you a few ways to pass credentials in - the man page has a section called "PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS", which documents all the ways you can pass credentials into openssl. I'll explain the relevant ones:
env:var
Lets you pass the credentials in an environment variable. This is better than using the process listing, because on Linux your process's environment isn't readable by other users by default - but this isn't necessarily true on other platforms.
The downside is that other processes running as the same user, or as root, will be able to easily view the password via /proc.
It's pretty easy to use with python's subprocess:
new_env=copy.deepcopy(os.environ)
new_env["MY_PASSWORD_VAR"] = "my key data"
p = subprocess.Popen(["openssl",..., "-passin", "env:MY_PASSWORD_VAR"], env=new_env)
fd:number
This lets you tell openssl to read the credentials from a file descriptor, which it will assume is already open for reading. By using this you can write the key data directly from your process to openssl, with something like this:
r, w = os.pipe()
p = subprocess.Popen(["openssl", ..., "-passin", "fd:%i" % r], preexec_fn=lambda:os.close(w))
os.write(w, "my key data\n")
os.close(w)
This will keep your password secure from other users on the same system, assuming that they are logged in with a different account.
With the code above, you may run into issues with the os.write call blocking. This can happen if openssl waits for something else to happen before reading the key in. This can be addressed with asynchronous i/o (e.g. a select loop) or an extra thread to do the write()&close().
One drawback of this is that it doesn't work if you pass closeFds=true to subprocess.Popen. Subprocess has no way to say "don't close one specific fd", so if you need to use closeFds=true, then I'd suggest using the file: syntax (below) with a named pipe.
file:pathname
Don't use this with an actual file to store passwords! That should be avoided for many reasons, e.g. your program may be killed before it can erase the file, and with most journalling file systems it's almost impossible to truly erase the data from a disk.
However, if used with a named pipe with restrictive permissions, this can be as good as using the fd option above. The code to do this will be similar to the previous snippet, except that you'll need to create a fifo instead of using os.pipe():
pathToFifo = my_function_that_securely_makes_a_fifo()
p = subprocess.Popen(["openssl", ..., "-passin", "file:%s" % pathToFifo])
fifo = open(pathToFifo, 'w')
print >> fifo, "my key data"
fifo.close()
The print here can have the same blocking i/o problems as the os.write call above, the resolutions are also the same.
No, it is not safe. No matter what openssl does with its command line after it has started running, there is still a window of time during which the information is visible in the process' command line: after the process has been launched and before it has had a chance to null it out.
Plus, there are many ways for an accident to happen: for example, the command line gets logged by sudo before it is executed, or it ends up in a shell history file.
Openssl supports plenty of methods of passing sensitive information so that you don't have to put it in the clear on the command line. From the manpage:
pass:password
the actual password is password. Since the password is visible to utilities (like 'ps' under Unix) this form should only be used where security is not important.
env:var
obtain the password from the environment variable var. Since the environment of other processes is visible on certain platforms (e.g. ps under certain Unix OSes) this option should be used with caution.
file:pathname
the first line of pathname is the password. If the same pathname argument is supplied to -passin and -passout arguments then the first line will be used for the input password and the next line for the output password. pathname need not refer to a regular file: it could for example refer to a device or named pipe.
fd:number
read the password from the file descriptor number. This can be used to send the data via a pipe for example.
stdin
read the password from standard input.
All but the first two options are good.