Inline install doesn't work on new extension - google-chrome-extension

Does anybody have the same problem? New extension with verified domain and enabled inline install after clicking on button with chrome.webstore.install();cause redirect to chromestore with get parameter ?utm_source=inline-install-disabled

I recently received the following email from Chrome Web Store Developer Support:
In addition to the existing extension-level protection, our expanded
enforcement will also use machine learning to evaluate each inline
installation request for signals of deceptive, confusing, or malicious
ads or webpages. When we find those signals, we'll selectively disable
that one inline installation request and redirect the user to the
extension's page on the Chrome Web Store. This selective enforcement
will not impact inline installation of that extension from other,
non-deceptive sources. Developers will not be notified of this
enforcement, as it happens on an as-needed basis.
Are you serving any ads on your site or doing anything else that might be perceived as a grey area by ML?
If you're being blatantly deceptive, it would appear that you've been found out. If not, and you're genuinely confused, a possible first step would be to scrape your site of any ads or injected content altogether to see if you're able to regain Google's trust.

Related

Security Implications in Electron as a Web Browser

I asked this question a little over a week ago on the Atom forums (link below), and didn't receive a response, so I am reposting it here in the hopes that someone may be able to provide insight on my problem.
Recently, I have taken up an open source project which uses Electron as it’s front-end. This project has two requirements: it must be cross-platform, and it must have an embedded web browser (which should be able to browse the web and render content like a typical browser). Considering the rather large footprint Electron has already netted my application, it seems like a bad idea to attempt to use another embedded web framework alongside it. So, in the interest of simplifying my project and retaining the UI built on top of Electron, I am looking into using Electron itself as the web browser. Here’s where I’ve come into a problem.
In a security page for Electron’s documentation, it is explicitly stated that,
it is important to understand … Electron is not a web browser
This quote comes within the context that Electron–or rather the code running on top of it–carries the unique ability to interact with the user’s operating system, unlike typical web applications. The page goes on to say,
displaying arbitrary content from untrusted sources poses a severe security risk that Electron is not intended to handle
At this point, I was tempted to give up on the idea of using Electron as an inbuilt browser, but further down on that same page, you can find another very interesting tidbit:
To display remote content, use the <webview> tag or BrowserView , [and] make sure to disable the nodeIntegration and enable contextIsolation
Link: https://electronjs.org/docs/tutorial/security#isolation-for-untrusted-content
First, in regard to using webviews, Electron’s own documentation recommends outright avoiding them:
Electron’s webview tag is based on Chromium’s webview , which is undergoing dramatic architectural changes. This impacts the stability of webviews , including rendering, navigation, and event routing. We currently recommend to not use the webview tag and to consider alternatives, like iframe , Electron’s BrowserView , or an architecture that avoids embedded content altogether.
Link: https://electronjs.org/docs/api/webview-tag
Seeing as though I cannot avoid embedded content, I opted to look into using a BrowserView, but what I found was not very motivating either. The advice, as it stands, is to do two things:
disable nodeIntegration
enable contextIsolation
After looking at the security and best-practices page, I will also append the following steps:
deny session permission requests from remote content (webcam, microphone, location, etc.)
catch webview elements in creation and strip default privileges
disable the creation of new windows
disable the remote module
That is a fair amount of steps to undergo in securing external content. Not to mention, there were several additional warnings scattered through the best practices page such as the following:
(On verifying webview options before creation)
Again, this list merely minimizes the risk, it does not remove it. If your goal is to display a website, a browser will be a more secure option.
Link: https://electronjs.org/docs/tutorial/security#11-verify-webview-options-before-creation
(On disabling the remote module)
However, if your app can run untrusted content and even if you sandbox your renderer processes accordingly, the remote module makes it easy for malicious code to escape the sandbox and have access to system resources via the higher privileges of the main process.
Link: https://electronjs.org/docs/tutorial/security#15-disable-the-remote-module
Not to mention, upon navigation to the BrowserView page, the whole class is listed as experimental.
This all isn’t even to mention the added attack surface created by Electron, such as a vulnerability in the webview component just last year: CVE-2018-1000136
Now, taking into account all of the above, numerous developers have still opted to create web browsers that routinely consume external and uncontrolled content using Electron.
Browser’s using Electron (linked directly from Electron’s website):
https://electronjs.org/apps/wexond
https://electronjs.org/apps/dot
https://electronjs.org/apps/beaker-browser
To me, it seems irresponsible to submit users to the above security implications as a trade-off for convenience.
That being said, my question is: can you safely, to the point at which you could ensure the integrity of your users, implement web browsing capabilities for uncontrolled content using Electron?
Thank you for your time.
Link to the original post:
https://discuss.atom.io/t/security-implications-in-electron-as-a-web-browser/70653
Some ideas that don't fit into a comment box:
[the project] must have an embedded web browser
So I presume then that this project isn't just a web browser. There's other content there that may have access to Node, but you just want the embedded-web-browser portion of it to be sandboxed appropriately, right?
Regarding the comments about <webview>, yes, it is considered unstable and Electron recommends using a BrowserView instead. I don't think that the fact that it's marked as "experimental" should necessarily deter you from using it (especially considering that the Electron team is recommending it [though maybe as the best of two evils]).
Experimental doesn't imply it's unstable. It can just mean that the Electron team is experimenting with this approach, but this approach may change in the future (at which point I would expect Electron to provide a transition path forward). Though this is one possible interpretation and ultimately Electron would have to comment on this.
The advice... is to do two things:
disable nodeIntegration
enable contextIsolation
I would also make use of the sandbox option inherited from BrowserWindows. BrowserView's docs on the constructor options say:
webPreferences Object (optional) - See BrowserWindow.
which tells me that BrowserView accepts the same options as BrowserWindow.
You would set it up like so:
new BrowserView({ webPreferences: {
sandbox: true,
nodeIntegration: false,
contextIsolation: true,
preload: "./pathToPreloadScript.js"
}});
See more information about this approach here. The preload script is what would expose some Node IPC APIs to the sandboxed content you're loading. Note the Status section at the bottom, which says:
Please use the sandbox option with care, as it is still an experimental feature. We are still not aware of the security implications of exposing some Electron renderer APIs to the preload script
If the content you're loading in the BrowserView never needs to communicate back to the application, then you don't need a preload script at all and can just sandbox the BrowserView.
After looking at the security and best-practices page, I will also append the following steps:
deny session permission requests from remote content (webcam, microphone, location, etc.)
catch webview elements in creation and strip default privileges
disable the creation of new windows
disable the remote module
Sure, those sound reasonable. Note that if your embedded browser needs to be able to open new windows (via window.open or <a target="_blank" />) then you'd have to allow popups.
That is a fair amount of steps to undergo in securing external content.
Sure, but is your main concern with the security of the app, or with how much work it takes to make it secure? Browser developers need to consider similar things to ensure webpages can't get access to the OS. It's just part of the game.
Again, this list merely minimizes the risk, it does not remove it. If your goal is to display a website, a browser will be a more secure option.
This is just saying that if all you're trying to do is display a website, then just use a browser since that's what they're there for.
If you need to do other things, well then you can't use a browser, so you'll have to make your own app, making sure it's reasonably secure.
I think that if you follow what's recommended in the Security document and keep up to date with new Electron releases, then you're doing the best you can do.
As for whether that's good enough, I can't say. It depends on what you're developing and what you're trying to protect against.
However, my thoughts can't substitute the more expert opinions of those on the Electron team. This question could certainly use some guidance from them.

Can content inside a sandboxed iframe be read/spied by browser extensions? if not should I use iframe to secure user credentials?

Apart from all the other typical security best practices I'm wondering about this, since I lately read some articles talking about how browser extensions can spy anything their user does. So that we shouldn't trust them.
Therefore in order to give users and additional layer of protection should I process all users credential and sensitive info inside an iframe inside my webpages?
Can content inside a sandboxed iframe be read/spied by browser
extensions?
Yes
Could I use iframe to secure user credentials?
Quick answer, no.
When a user installs a chrome extension the extension can do basically anything in the website to access the user credentials. The extension has also access to the iframes that the page generates.
My proposed solutions to overcome this two issues and keep the website feel "secure" are the following:
If the end goal is to secure the content that your user will put in the website, and by no mean you want to let the user put content if there are other kind of extensions running in the page, what you can put is some kind of pop up in the page blocking the access to the user until he is accessing the website without extensions.
Another solution you could propose to the user is to go incognito mode, as there are many options to disallow extensions in incognito without having to force him to uninstall all of the extensions that he has on his browser. This could also make less users leave your page, as if you force him to uninstall of the extensions on his browser it might make him leave your page if it's not a clear enough reason for him.
If you do know which are the extensions that shouldn't be blocked or prevented because they are harmful or known to have some kind of shady behaviour, what you can do is checkout if the user has them installed with this solution Checking if user has a certain extension installed and then print a message to him saying he can't continue until he uninstalls those extensions.

How do third party installer install addons in our browser?

My question is how do third party installer installs addons in the browser like toolbars and able to set homepage and other browser properties??
I want to make an addon which get installed in browser in same way..
is it possible??
In principle, installing extensions along with other software is possible. I'm describing the procedure for Windows.
The following conditions have to be met:
You must be able to write to the HKLM registry subtree (needs Admin rights)
The extension must be published on Chrome Web Store
The machine must be able to download the extension from Web Store
If those conditions are met, you can do it according to the procedure described here. Basically, the installer must create a registry key that will trigger Chrome to download the extension on next launch.
That said, Google has gone to great pains to prevent silent installs and avoid browser settings hijack. Such setting overrides are a weapons race and Chrome is tightening its defenses. Ask yourself whether it's ethical to install your extension this way.
It will probably annoy your users and will flag your extension for more meticulous checks by Google. Remember that Google can disable any extension hosted by the Web Store if it violates its policies.
Also, be mindful of the single purpose policy. A toolbar that also overrides search/homepage/settings will be frowned upon. At a minimum it should be separated into several extensions, at a maximum - don't do it.
An extension can override, say, a homepage, but it's very restrictive. The extension must be in the Web Store as above, and any override pages must be verified for ownership for the Web Store developer account. All in the name of security and comfort of the users.

How to Bypass Output Cache in SharePoint 2007 Publishing Internet site

We're building a mobile-friendly site to work in tandem with our client's MOSS 2007 internet site. We need to be able to redirect users who hit the home page and are using a mobile device.
Our original intention was to add a custom control to the home page page layout that would detect the current user's device and redirect to the mobile site accordingly. We quickly realised that this would not work as we are using the Output Caching functionality provided by SharePoint/Asp.Net. This means that the detection code will only run for the first visitor to the home page until the cache expires.
Our next idea was to build a custom HTTP Module and process the detection there. However, we are finding that the Output Caching is not allowing that either. If the cache is set while a mobile device is visiting all browsers are subsequently redirected to the mobile site (until the cache expires).
If we turn off output caching it works just fine - but we cannot turn output caching off, especically for the home page. We did investigate Substitution (Donut) Caching but this is not working due to the fact we are filtering the Asp.Net response within another HTTP Module that tidies up the rendered HTML for XHTML compatiblity reasons. I've also experimented with the output cache profile by setting it to vary-by-header property to "User-Agent" but I am getting mixed results and am also concerned at the memory implications of caching multipel versions of pages (we already have memory issues now and then).
It's possible we could run the redirection code in JavaScript but then we risk not detecting a lot of devices that don't have JavaScript enabled. This is a government website so the usage of JavaScript has to abide by accessibility guidelines.
Does anyone have any other ideas as to how we can solve this issue. Has anyone done this before? Perhaps in a different way?
Hope you can help, thanks.
p.s. I have also asked this question on SharePoint.SE but wanted to get as many eyes on this as possible.
I would suggest you to try ISAPI filters
I've actually solved this one I think. I've pretty much followed this article here - http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms550239.aspx. We have updated the code in that article to build a cache key based on whether the current page is the home page, whether the current user is using a mobile device and whether or not a cookie exists forcing the user to the full site. I will probably write this up as a blog post. When I do I will update this answer providing a link.

Always using google chrome frame meta tag for standard compliant page, is good idea?

I was thinking to add meta tag always in all the websites.
That will trigger google chorme frame to load for users who already installed. I can see the benefits but is there any concerns or facts that I should know before I do that?
Testing in google chrome is enough or testing in google chrome frame explicitly required?
Thanks
Note: please do not mention current know problems "print" and "download" issue. I'm sure those will get fixed soon :)
The only argument against chrome frame that I have seen so far is Microsoft's - "Google Chrome Frame running as a plugin has doubled the attach area for malware and malicious scripts."
Also, you may run into problems with frames. If you have chrome frame on your page and someone has that page iframed on their site you may run into some problems. More info:
http://groups.google.com/group/google-chrome-frame/browse_thread/thread/d5ffe442658bc60e/e6d7a4c1c179c931?lnk=gst&q=iframe
You should only need to test in Chrome Frame for (X)HTML, CSS, and JavaScript...basic stuff. If you are using AJAX (while trying not to break the back button), worried about caching, cookies (accessed via javascript), or other potentially browser-specific browser interactions I suggest testing on the IE+CF platform...at least until the CF team announces 100% interoperability between CF and IE.
Check out the CF Google group for more issues.
Are there any concerns or facts you should know? Yes: Not everyone has Google Chrome Frame installed.
You are adding a new user agent that you will need to test and debug against, without removing the need to test and debug the user experience for other browsers (notably plain IE by itself).
If you don't make the IE user experience equivalent to the Google Chrome experience, then you are alienating a significant percentage of users. Depending on your website and its expected users, the impact of this may range from undesirable to unacceptable. If you do make the user experience equivalent, then there is no point in adding the meta tag.

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