I understand that an Operating System forces security policies on users when they use the system and filesystem via the System Calls supplied by stated OS.
Is it possible to circumvent this security by implementing your own hardware instructions instead of making use of the supplied System Call Interface of the OS? Even writing a single bit to a file where you normally have no access to would be enough.
First, for simplicity, I'm considering the OS and Kernel are the same thing.
A CPU can be in different modes when executing code.
Lets say a hypothetical CPU has just two modes of execution (Supervisor and User)
When in Supervisor mode, you are allowed to execute any instructions, and you have full access to the hardware resources.
When in User mode, there is subset of instructions you don't have access to, such has instructions to deal with hardware or change the CPU mode. Trying to execute one of those instructions will cause the OS to be notified your application is misbehaving, and it will be terminated. This notification is done through interrupts. Also, when in User mode, you will only have access to a portion of the memory, so your application can't even touch memory it is not supposed to.
Now, the trick for this to work is that while in Supervisor Mode, you can switch to User Mode, since it's a less privileged mode, but while in User Mode, you can't go back to Supervisor Mode, since the instructions for that are not permitted anymore.
The only way to go back to Supervisor mode is through system calls, or interrupts. That enables the OS to have full control of the hardware.
A possible example how everything fits together for this hypothetical CPU:
The CPU boots in Supervisor mode
Since the CPU starts in Supervisor Mode, the first thing to run has access to the full system. This is the OS.
The OS setups the hardware anyway it wants, memory protections, etc.
The OS launches any application you want after configuring permissions for that application. Launching the application switches to User Mode.
The application is running, and only has access to the resources the OS allowed when launching it. Any access to hardware resources need to go through System Calls.
I've only explained the flow for a single application.
As a bonus to help you understand how this fits together with several applications running, a simplified view of how preemptive multitasking works:
In a real-world situation. The OS will setup an hardware timer before launching any applications.
When this timer expires, it causes the CPU to interrupt whatever it was doing (e.g: Running an application), switch to Supervisor Mode and execute code at a predetermined location, which belongs to the OS and applications don't have access to.
Since we're back into Supervisor Mode and running OS code, the OS now picks the next application to run, setups any required permissions, switches to User Mode and resumes that application.
This timer interrupts are how you get the illusion of multitasking. The OS keeps changing between applications quickly.
The bottom line here is that unless there are bugs in the OS (or the hardware design), the only way an application can go from User Mode to Supervisor Mode is through the OS itself with a System Call.
This is the mechanism I use in my hobby project (a virtual computer) https://github.com/ruifig/G4DevKit.
HW devices are connected to CPU trough bus, and CPU does use to communicate with them in/out instructions to read/write values at I/O ports (not used with current HW too much, in early age of home computers this was the common way), or a part of device memory is "mapped" into CPU address space, and CPU controls the device by writing values at defined locations in that shared memory.
All of this should be not accessible at "user level" context, where common applications are executed by OS (so application trying to write to that shared device memory would crash on illegal memory access, actually that piece of memory is usually not even mapped into user space, ie. not existing from user application point of view). Direct in/out instructions are blocked too at CPU level.
The device is controlled by the driver code, which is either run is specially configured user-level context, which has the particular ports and memory mapped (micro-kernel model, where drivers are not part of kernel, like OS MINIX). This architecture is more robust (crash in driver can't take down kernel, kernel can isolate problematic driver and restart it, or just kill it completely), but the context switches between kernel and user level are a very costly operation, so the throughput of data is hurt a bit.
Or the device drivers code runs on kernel-level (monolithic kernel model like Linux), so any vulnerability in driver code can attack the kernel directly (still not trivial, but lot more easier than trying to get tunnel out of user context trough some kernel bug). But the overall performance of I/O is better (especially with devices like graphics cards or RAID disc clusters, where the data bandwidth goes into GiBs per second). For example this is the reason why early USB drivers are such huge security risk, as they tend to be bugged a lot, so a specially crafted USB device can execute some rogue code from device in kernel-level context.
So, as Hyd already answered, under ordinary circumstances, when everything works as it should, user-level application should be not able to emit single bit outside of it's user sandbox, and suspicious behaviour outside of system calls will be either ignored, or crash the app.
If you find a way to break this rule, it's security vulnerability and those get usually patched ASAP, when the OS vendor gets notified about it.
Although some of the current problems are difficult to patch. For example "row hammering" of current DRAM chips can't be fixed at SW (OS) or CPU (configuration/firmware flash) level at all! Most of the current PC HW is vulnerable to this kind of attack.
Or in mobile world the devices are using the radiochips which are based on legacy designs, with closed source firmware developed years ago, so if you have enough resources to pay for a research on these, it's very likely you would be able to seize any particular device by fake BTS station sending malicious radio signal to the target device.
Etc... it's constant war between vendors with security researchers to patch all vulnerabilities, and hackers to find ideally zero day exploit, or at least picking up users who don't patch their devices/SW fast enough with known bugs.
Not normally. If it is possible it is because of an operating system software error. If the software error is discovered it is fixed fast as it is considered to be a software vulnerability, which equals bad news.
"System" calls execute at a higher processor level than the application: generally kernel mode (but system systems have multiple system level modes).
What you see as a "system" call is actually just a wrapper that sets up registers then triggers a Change Mode Exception of some kind (the method is system specific). The system exception hander dispatches to the appropriate system server.
You cannot just write your own function and do bad things. True, sometimes people find bugs that allow circumventing the system protections. As a general principle, you cannot access devices unless you do it through the system services.
i am trying to measure code performance (basically speed-up when using threads). So far i was using cygwin via windows or linux on separate machine. Now i have the ability to set up a new system and i am not sure whether i should have dual boot (windows and ubuntu) or a virtual machine.
My concern is whether i can measure reliable speed up and possibly other stuff (performance monitors) via a linux virtual machine or if i have to go with with normal booting in linux.
anybody have an opinion?
If your "threading" relies heavily on scheduling, I won't recommend you to use VM. VM is just a normal process from the host OS's point of view, so the guest kernel and its scheduler will be affected by scheduling by the host kernel.
If your "threading" is more like parallel computation, I think it's OK to use VM.
For me, it is much safer to boot directly on the system and avoid using a VM in your case. Even when you don't use a VM, it is already hard to have twice the same results in multi-threading because the system being used for OS tasks, so having 2 OS running in the same time as for VM even increases the uncertainty on the results. For instance, running your tests 1000 times on a VM would lead to, let's say, 100 over-estimated time, while it would maybe be only 60 on a lonely OS. It is your call to know if this uncertainty is acceptable or not.
How much percentage of time CPU spends in user mode vs privilege mode for different programs/operations.
Different Operations could be:
- running application without I/O interaction.
- application with I/O interaction like copying a file to USB
I know for a fact that Network operating system spends most of the time in interrupt context. Does this hold true for general purpose OS like Ubuntu/Windows?
I'm not much of an OS expert but I imagine it will depend a great deal on what background processes are running on the system. On any OS you might or might not be running some system (i.e. non-user) processes that are heavy resource users. Or you might have put some effort into stripping the system down so that very little CPU time is being used by the system for background maintenance.
If your question is how things compare for "clean" installations of these operating systems then all I can tell you is that on my laptop running Ubuntu right now (running top from the command line to look at resource usage) only about 5-10% of CPU time is being used by non-user processes; in my case Xorg and compiz are the main ones. I don't really know how that compares to Windows, but I think most linux users have a knee jerk reaction that Windows is greedier for system resources than most linux distros.
So, I guess the short answer is that I doubt there is a short answer to your question.
I have access to a machine to which I can ssh. How to determine if my OS is running in fully-virtualized (where VMM does binary translation), para-virtualized or non-virtualized environment? I have some idea of how to go about it (some operations like accessing a memory page/disk will take longer time in a virtualized environment) but don't know how to proceed.
It does depends on the VMM you are running on top of. If it's a Xen or Microsoft VM, I believe CPUID with EAX value of 0x40000000 will give you a non-zero value in EAX. Not sure if that works on VMWare, VirtualBox or KVM. I expect that it will work there too...
Measuring access time is unlikely to ALWAYS show you the truth, since in a non-VM system those can vary quite a lot as well, and there is no REAL reason that you'd see a huge difference in an efficient implementation. And of course, you don't know if your VM is running with a REAL hard-disk controller passed through via the PCI, or if your NFS mounted disks are connected via a REAL network card passed through to the VM, or if they are accessed through a virtual network card.
A good VMM shouldn't show you much difference as long as the application is behaving itself.
I've been reading into virtualization security and came across Blue Pill, a malicious thin hypervisor (project website is down, archived version here: http://web.archive.org/web/20080418123748/http://www.bluepillproject.org/).
My question is: could a custom malicious hypervisor modify execution flow, inject and execute arbitrary code, look at private information in RAM of the VM or anything else?
I'm not asking whether this would be practical from a malware point of view (to implement these features, it may turn into a large and impractical backdoor). I'm interested in whether the malicious hypervisor would have complete control over every aspect of the virtualized machine.
Would there be any difference for this when it comes to a program like VirtualBox - could the Host OS execute arbitrary code inside the guest at any time it choses?
Any thoughts would be highly appreciated!
Thanks in advance,
r3mo
Yes, the hypervisor is running at a higher privilege level than the guest VM so it could easily modify the execution flow and read arbitrary parts of the VM.
The same is true for VirtualBox. The host OS can alter the guest provided that you have full access/permissions on the host OS.