Linux kernel : logging to a specific file - linux

I am trying to edit the linux kernel. I want some information to be written out to a file as a part of the debugging process. I have read about the printk function. But i would like to add text to a particular file (file other from the default files that keep debug logs).
To cut it short: I would kind of like to specify the "destination" in the printk function (or at least some work-around it)
How can I achieve this? Will using fwrite/fopen work (if yes, will it work without causing much overhead compared to printk, since they are implemented differently)?
What other options do i have?

Using fopen and fwrite will certainly not work. Working with files in kernel space is generally a bad idea.
It all really depends on what you are doing in the kernel though. In some configurations, there may not even be a hard disk for you to write to. If however, you are working at a stage where you can have certain assumptions about the running kernel, you probably actually want to write a kernel module rather than edit the kernel itself. For all you care, a kernel module is just as good as any other part of the kernel, but they are inserted when the kernel is already up and running.
You may also be thinking of doing so for debugging, or have output of a kernel-level application (e.g. an application that you are forced to run at kernel level for real-time constraints etc). In that case, kio may be of interest to you, but if you want to use it, do make sure you understand why.
kio is a library I wrote just for those "kernel-level applications", which makes a kernel module see a /proc file as if it's a user of it (rather than a provider). To make it work, you should have a user-space application also opening that virtual file and redirect it to wherever you want to write your log. Something along the lines of opening the file with kopen in write mode and in user space tell cat /proc/your_file > ~/log_file.
Note: I still recommend printk unless you really know what you are doing. Since you are thinking of fopen in kernel space, I don't think you really know what you are doing.

Related

How can a program change a directory without using chdir()?

I can find a lot of documentation on using chdir() to change a directory in a program (a command shell, for instance). I was wondering if it is possible to somehow do the same thing without the use of chdir(). Yet, I can't find any documentation or examples of code where a person is changing directories without using chdir() to some capacity. Is this possible?
In Linux, chdir() is a syscall. That means it's not something a program does in its own memory, but it's a request for the OS kernel to do something on the program's behalf.
Granted, it's one of two syscalls that can change directories -- the other one is fchdir(). Theoretically you could use the other one, though whether that's what your professor actually wants is very much open to interpretation.
In terms of why chdir() and fchdir() can't be reimplemented by an application but need to be leveraged: The current working directory is among the process state maintained by the kernel on a program's behalf; the program itself can't access kernel memory without asking the kernel to operate on its behalf.
Things are syscalls because they need to be syscalls -- if something could be done in-process, it would be done that way (crossing the boundary between userspace and kernelspace involves a context-switch penalty; it's not without performance impact). In this case, letting the kernel do accurate bookkeeping as to what a process's working directory is ensures that the working directory is maintained when a new executable is loaded (with execve()), and helps to ensure the integrity of the kernel's records (making sure a program can't pretend to have its current working directory be a directory it doesn't actually have access to).

How do I open a file in a kernel module if calling process is in user space?

I am trying to create a character device driver that dumps /etc/shadow when read from as a non-privileged user. This is for purely academic purposes of course.
I was reading about how reading/writing files in kernel space opens a system to possible exploits. I am trying to implement this in practice.
Please spare me the "don't touch the filesystem in kernel mode" talk. I am precisely trying to exploit the nuances of doing so.
Problem is that the only way I have found so far that works to open a file in kernel mode is filp_open, which is currently producing EACCESS when I read from the device file as a non-privileged user. This was confounding at first as I assumed that I can do anything in kernel space.
For example, when I cat the device file I have created as a non-root user, filp_open produces EACCESS in kernel space???
Further investigation has led me to believe that filp_open checks the capabilities of the calling process. This would make sense as it is used internally by open(), but I am in kernel mode here! There must be a way!
I am very new to programming in kernel space. I have extensive application C experience, but I am finding it difficult to navigate the kernel documentation for precisely what I am looking for. Additionally, it seems that more and more symbols within the kernel are not exported for use in modules. As I am developing an exploit proof of concept, I would like it to work without recompiling the kernel. I am finding a lot of code (vfs and syscalls) that is deprecated as the symbols are no longer exported to kernel modules.
Is what I am trying to do a thing that is specifically engineered against? Loading a kernel module requires root to begin with, so I would see this more in the lens of a persistence focused attack rather than an access one.
Also, I got the proof of concept working by just reading from the file when the module is loaded, but this is no fun! Any pointers here are much appreciated.
After some rethinking and digging I have found two solutions to my problem. Thank you to Tsyvarev and stark for the pointers.
Solution 1
The first solution is to elevate the privileges of the calling process before making a call of filp_open. This is also basically making a rootkit, so not as interesting.
Here is a link to the guide that I found on the subject.
https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-rootkits-getting-your-hands-dirty/1485
Solution 2
The module will have an init function that by nature must be run with elevated privs when the module is loaded. So you can open the file pointer there and just close it when the module is unloaded. Caveats are that you have the file pointer open the whole time, so all of the gotchas there are still present. Better to only read, writing is where things can get a bit tricky. This is the solution I chose in the interim, as I didn't want this thing to be a full rootkit.
Another direction is workqueue or to spawn a thread. Probably the most tricky but also the most inline with what my original vision of this demo was. I did not test this direction but it probably is the best solution.

Linux: How to prevent a file backed memory mapping from causing access errors (SIGBUS etc.)?

I want to write a wrapper for memory mapped file io, that either fails to map a file or returns a mapping that is valid until it is unmapped. With plain mmap, problems arise, if the underlying file is truncated or deleted while being mapped, for example. According to the linux man page of mmap SIGBUS is received if memory beyond the new end of the file is accessed after a truncate. It is no option to catch this signal and handle the error this way.
My idea was to create a copy of the file and map the copy. On a cow capable file system, this would impose little overhead.
But the problem is: how do I protect the copy from being manipulated by another process? A tempfile is no real option, because in theory a malicious process could still mutate it. I know that there are file locks on Linux, but as far as I understood they're either optional or don't prevent others from deleting the file.
I'm asking for two kinds of answers: Either a way to mmap a file in a rock solid way or a mechanism to protect a tempfile fully from other processes. But maybe my whole way of approaching the problem is wrong, so feel free to suggest radical solutions ;)
You can't prevent a skilled and determined user from intentionally shooting themselves in the foot. Just take reasonable precautions so it doesn't happen accidentally.
Most programs assume the input file won't change and that's usually fine
Programs that want to process files shared with cooperative programs use file locking
Programs that want a private file will create a temp file, snapshot or otherwise -- and if they unlink it for auto-cleanup, it's also inaccessible via the fs
Programs that want to protect their data from all regular user actions will run as a dedicated system account, in which case chmod is protection enough.
Anyone with access to the same account (or root) can interfere with the program with a simple kill -BUS, chmod/truncate, or any of the fancier foot-guns like copying and patching the binary, cloning its FDs, or attaching a debugger. If that's what they want to do, it's not your place to stop them.

intercepting file system system calls

I am writing an application for which I need to intercept some filesystem system calls eg. unlink. I would like to save some file say abc. If user deletes the file then I need to copy it to some other place. So I need unlink to call my code before deleting abc so that I could save it. I have gone through threads related to intercepting system calls but methods like LD_PRELOAD it wont work in my case because I want this to be secure and implemented in kernel so this method wont be useful. inotify notifies after the event so I could not be able to save it. Could you suggest any such method. I would like to implement this in a kernel module instead of modifying kernel code itself.
Another method as suggested by Graham Lee, I had thought of this method but it has some problems ,I need hardlink mirror of all the files it consumes no space but still could be problematic as I have to repeatedly mirror drive to keep my mirror up to date, also it won't work cross partition and on partition not supporting link so I want a solution through which I could attach hooks to the files/directories and then watch for changes instead of repeated scanning.
I would also like to add support for write of modified file for which I cannot use hard links.
I would like to intercept system calls by replacing system calls but I have not been able to find any method of doing that in linux > 3.0. Please suggest some method of doing that.
As far as hooking into the kernel and intercepting system calls go, this is something I do in a security module I wrote:
https://github.com/cormander/tpe-lkm
Look at hijacks.c and symbols.c for the code; how they're used is in the hijack_syscalls function inside security.c. I haven't tried this on linux > 3.0 yet, but the same basic concept should still work.
It's a bit tricky, and you may have to write a good deal of kernel code to do the file copy before the unlink, but it's possible here.
One suggestion could be Filesystems in Userspace (FUSE.) That is, write a FUSE module (which is, granted, in userspace) which intercepts filesystem-related syscalls, performs whatever tasks you want, and possibly calls the "default" syscall afterwards.
You could then mount certain directories with your FUSE filesystem and, for most of your cases, it seems like the default syscall behavior would not need to be overridden.
You can watch unlink events with inotify, though this might happen too late for your purposes (I don't know because I don't know your purposes, and you should experiment to find out). The in-kernel alternatives based on LSM (by which I mean SMACK, TOMOYO and friends) are really for Mandatory Access Control so may not be suitable for your purposes.
If you want to handle deletions only, you could keep a "shadow" directory of hardlinks (created via link) to the files being watched (via inotify, as suggested by Graham Lee).
If the original is now unlinked, you still have the shadow file to handle as you want to, without using a kernel module.

how to monitor the syslog(printk) in a LKM

deal all,
i am a newbie for writing Linux Kernel Module.
i used printk function in linux kernel source code (2.4.29) for debugging and display messages.
now, i have to read all the messages i added via httpd.
i tried to write the messages into a file instead of printk function, so i can read the file directly.
but it's not work very well.
so, i have a stupid question...
is it possible to write a LKM to monitor the syslog and rewrite into another file??
i mean is that possible to let a LKM the aware the messages when each time the linux kernel execute "printk"??
thanks a lot
That is the wrong way to do it, because printk already does this : it writes in the file /proc/kmsg.
What you want is klogd, a user space utility dealing with /proc/kmsg.
Another options is to use dmesg, which will output the whole content of the kernel buffers holding the printk messages, but I suggest you first read the linked article
You never, ever, ever want to try to open a file on a user space mounted block file system from within the kernel. Imagine if the FS aborted and the kernel was still trying to write to it .. kaboom (amongst MANY other reasons why its a bad idea) :) As shodanex said, for your purposes, its much better to use klogd.
Now, generally speaking, you have several ways to communicate meaningful data to userspace programs, such as:
Create a character device driver that causes userspace readers to block while waiting for data. Provide an ioctl() interface to it which lets other programs find out how many messages have been sent, etc.
Create a node in /proc/yourdriver to accomplish the same thing
Really, the most practical means is to just use printk()

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