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What does the selector (parameter sel) in the "ip xfrm state add" command achieve?
The source and destination addresses (and additional parameters like ports and protocol) are set in the ID section, but the selector contains a supplementary set of these. Example:
ip xfrm state add src 10.0.0.1 dst 10.0.0.2 proto esp spi 123456 sel src 10.0.0.3 dst 10.0.0.4 enc blowfish 0xaabbccddee
This leads to the following result:
src 10.0.0.1 dst 10.0.0.2
proto esp spi 0x0001e240 reqid 0 mode transport
replay-window 0
enc cbc(blowfish) 0xaabbccddee
sel src 10.0.0.3/32 dst 10.0.0.4/32
Setkey seemingly does not have the opportunity to add such a selector value. It also does not show selectors in the output. The xfrm command from above produces the following "setkey -D" output:
10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2
esp mode=transport spi=123456(0x0001e240) reqid=0(0x00000000)
E: blowfish-cbc aabbccdd ee
seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature
created: Nov 26 01:25:39 2013 current: Nov 26 01:26:07 2013
diff: 28(s) hard: 0(s) soft: 0(s)
last: hard: 0(s) soft: 0(s)
current: 0(bytes) hard: 0(bytes) soft: 0(bytes)
allocated: 0 hard: 0 soft: 0
sadb_seq=0 pid=6959 refcnt=0
So what does the IPsec subsystem eventually do with this selector?
It is probably straight from the IPsec standard (RFC 4301: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol).
Probably is because the standard describes "nominal model" i.e. implementations do not have to be exactly as described.
In Section 4.4.2. Security Association Database (SAD):
For each of the selectors defined in Section 4.4.1.1, the entry for an inbound SA in the SAD MUST be initially populated with the value or values negotiated at the time the SA was created. ... For a receiver, these values are used to check that the header fields of an inbound packet (after IPsec processing) match the elector values negotiated for the SA. Thus, the SAD acts as a cache for checking the selectors of inbound traffic arriving on SAs. For the receiver, this is part of verifying that a packet arriving on an SA is consistent with the policy for the SA.
In Section 5.2. Processing Inbound IP Traffic (unprotected-to-protected):
IPsec MUST perform the following steps:
...
3a. If the packet is addressed to the IPsec device and AH or ESP is specified as the protocol, the packet is looked up in the SAD. ... If the packet is found in the SAD, process it accordingly (see step 4).
4. Apply AH or ESP processing as specified, using the SAD entry selected in step 3a above. Then match the packet against the inbound selectors identified by the SAD entry to verify that the received packet is appropriate for the SA via which it was received.
5. If an IPsec system receives an inbound packet on an SA and the packet's header fields are not consistent with the selectors for the SA, it MUST discard the packet.
In short for your example
ip xfrm state add src 10.0.0.1 dst 10.0.0.2 proto esp spi 123456 sel src 10.0.0.3 dst 10.0.0.4 enc blowfish 0xaabbccddee
when IPsec (ESP in this case) packet arrives at the server, then probably the following happens:
the part src 10.0.0.1 dst 10.0.0.2 proto esp spi 123456 is used to find the corresponding SA.
The SA is used to decrypt the packet's payload.
Payload in transport mode IPsec is another IP packet.
the part sel src 10.0.0.3 dst 10.0.0.4 is the selector from the SP which was used to create our SA.
This selector is applied to the inner IP packet to verify that it is consistent with the SP.
Selector is used in tunnel mode. i.e. networks that are (inter)connected by tunnel.
Related
I'm trying to pentest some IPSEC implementation for a uni project, and following this guide I'm stuck at:
Step 1 (common): Forging an ICMP PTB packet from the untrusted network The attacker first has to forge an appropriate ICMP PTB packet (a single packet is sufficient). This is done by eavesdropping a valid packet from the IPsec tunnel on the untrusted network. Then the attacker forges an ICMP PTB packet, specifying a very small MTU value equal or smaller than 576 with IPv4 (resp. 1280 with IPv6). The attacker can use 0 for instance. This packet spoofs the IP address of a router of the untrusted network (in case the source IP address is checked), and in order to bypass the IPsec protection mechanism against blind attacks, it includes as a payload a part of the outer IP packet that has just been eavesdropped. This is the only packet an attacker needs to send. None of the following steps involve the attacker.
I know what MTU is, but what does the bold statement mean?
How do I set the MTU size of a packet with scapy?
It means that I have to set the size of a IP packet less than 576 bytes?
It's already set to 140 B,at least it shows this with len command.
There's something that I didn't get right, maybe I have to set the fragmentation?
I know nothing about the subject, but some quick searching seems to indicate that it's referring to an IPv6 ICMP packet with a type of 2 ("packet too big").
Then from some poking around scapy, this appears to be how you'd create one:
from scapy.layers.inet6 import ICMPv6PacketTooBig
icmp_ptb = ICMPv6PacketTooBig(mtu=0)
Of course though, you'll need to do some testing to verify this.
Is there any kernel side/space API to know the ip address of an interface , given it's name?
I think you're looking for rtnetlink (man page)
Rtnetlink allows the kernel's routing tables to be read and altered.
It is used within the kernel to communicate between various
subsystems, though this usage is not documented here, and for
communication with user-space programs. Network routes, IP addresses,
link parameters, neighbor setups, queueing disciplines, traffic
classes and packet classifiers may all be controlled through
NETLINK_ROUTE sockets.
According to strace, tt's the api ip addr show dev XXX uses:
strace ip addr sh dev lo 2>&1 | grep sendmsg
sendmsg(4, {msg_name={sa_family=AF_NETLINK, nl_pid=0, nl_groups=00000000}, msg_namelen=12, msg_iov=[{iov_base={{len=48, type=RTM_GETLINK, flags=NLM_F_REQUEST, seq=1596838225, pid=0}, {ifi_family=AF_UNSPEC, ifi_type=ARPHRD_NETROM, ifi_index=0, ifi_flags=0, ifi_change=0}, [{{nla_len=8, nla_type=IFLA_EXT_MASK}, 9}, {{nla_len=7, nla_type=IFLA_IFNAME}, "lo"}]}, iov_len=48}], msg_iovlen=1, msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 48
sendmsg(3, {msg_name={sa_family=AF_NETLINK, nl_pid=0, nl_groups=00000000}, msg_namelen=12, msg_iov=[{iov_base={{len=40, type=RTM_GETLINK, flags=NLM_F_REQUEST, seq=1596838225, pid=0}, {ifi_family=AF_UNSPEC, ifi_type=ARPHRD_NETROM, ifi_index=if_nametoindex("lo"), ifi_flags=0, ifi_change=0}, {{nla_len=8, nla_type=IFLA_EXT_MASK}, 9}}, iov_len=40}], msg_iovlen=1, msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0}, 0) = 40
However, it looks like a non-trivial api so if you don't need it often, it might be easier to just run ip addr sh dev XXX and parse the response.
Edit:
Looks like it's also possible using netdevice (man page), specifically, the SIOCGIFADDR ioctl:
SIOCGIFADDR, SIOCSIFADDR
Get or set the address of the device using ifr_addr. Setting the interface address is a privileged operation. For compatibility, only
AF_INET addresses are accepted or returned.
There's example code here
Could not figure out if linux kernel 4.4 supports IPSEC AH transport with AES GMAC.
Trying various combination of "ip xfrm state" command but no luck. Is this implemented ?
Try 1 sudo ip xfrm state add src 192.168.0.1 dst 192.168.0.2 proto ah spi 100 mode transport auth "rfc4106(gcm(aes))" 0x010203047aeaca3f87d060a12f4a4487d5a5c335 RTNETLINK answers: Function not implemented
Try 2 sudo ip xfrm state add src 192.168.0.1 dst 192.168.0.2 proto ah spi 100 reqid 100 mode transport aead "rfc4543(gcm(aes))" 0x010203047aeaca3f87d060a12f4a4487d5a5c335 128 ALGO-TYPE values "enc", "aead", and "comp" are invalid with XFRM-PROTO value "ah"
Based on the code, it does support the algorithm under the cipher name rfc4543(gcm(aes)) for ESP, but I'm not sure if it does for AH. I guess technically this is considered an AEAD, meaning it is an encryption cipher (for ESP, not AH which is only authentication without encryption) even though it is NULL encryption.
I'm writing a network bridge that reassembles and analyzes TCP flows on the fly. I have a pair of multi-queue NICS and I use netmap to capture packets from each rx queues on different threads and than pass them on to the other NIC for transmission. The problem is, packets from the same flow do not land on the same queue on the two NICs, due to the source and destination addresses and port being reversed.
I tried ethtool to change the tuple the hash of which is used for distributing packets. Running this:
# ethtool --show-nfc p1p1 rx-flow-hash tcp4
results in:
TCP over IPV4 flows use these fields for computing Hash flow key:
IP SA
IP DA
L4 bytes 0 & 1 [TCP/UDP src port]
L4 bytes 2 & 3 [TCP/UDP dst port]
Repeating the above command for the other NIC results in the same queue. I thought I could change the order for one of the rings by running ethtool --config-nfc p1p1 rx-flow-hash tcp4 dsfn but that doesn't change the order of the fields used in the hash. It seems that both sdfn and dsfn result in the same tuple. The same is true for ds and sd.
Is there a way to make the packets in one flow always land on the same queue (and the same thread) on both NICs whether using ethtool to configure the NICs or otherwise another method or tool?
I'm looking for a detailed documentation about content of files /proc/net/nf_conntrack and/or /proc/net/ip_contrack on Linux systems.
Yes, I know, there are many utilities which can show me the content of these files in human readable format, but... I'd like to do it on a SOHO router, with Tomato USB firmware (by Shibby).
The optware AFAIK deprecated and the entware doesn't contain any of these utilities, so I'd like to write a script instead of them, but I didn't find a detailed description of these files :(
The format of a line from /proc/net/ip_conntrack is the same as for /proc/net/nf_conntrack, except the first two columns are missing.
I'll try to summarize the format of the latter file, as I understand it from the net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c, net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_acct.c and the net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_*.c kernel source files. The term layer refers to the OSI protocol layer model.
First column: The network layer protocol name (eg. ipv4).
Second column: The network layer protocol number.
Third column: The transmission layer protocol name (eg. tcp).
Fourth column: The transmission layer protocol number.
Fifth column: The seconds until the entry is invalidated.
Sixth column (Not all protocols): The connection state.
All other columns are named (key=value) or represent flags ([UNREPLIED], [ASSURED], ...). A line can contain up to two columns having the same name (eg. src and dst). Then, the first occurrence relates to the request direction and the second occurrence relates to the response direction.
Meaning of the flags:
[ASSURED]: Traffic has been seen in both (ie. request and response) direction.
[UNREPLIED]: Traffic has not been seen in response direction yet. In case the connection tracking cache overflows, these connections are dropped first.
Please note that some column names appear only for specific protocols (eg. sport and dport for TCP and UDP, type and code for ICMP). Other column names (eg. mark) appear only if the kernel was built with specific options.
Examples:
ipv4 2 tcp 6 300 ESTABLISHED src=1.1.1.2 dst=2.2.2.2 sport=2000 dport=80 src=2.2.2.2 dst=1.1.1.1 sport=80 dport=12000 [ASSURED] mark=0 use=2 belongs to an established TCP connection from host 1.1.1.2, port 2000, to host 2.2.2.2, port 80, from which responses are sent to host 1.1.1.1, port 12000, timing out in five minutes. For this connection, packets have been seen in both directions.
ipv4 2 icmp 1 3 src=1.1.1.2 dst=1.1.1.1 type=8 code=0 id=32354 src=1.1.1.1 dst=1.1.1.2 type=0 code=0 id=32354 mark=0 use=2 belongs to an ICMP echo request packet from host 1.1.1.2 to host 1.1.1.1 with an expected echo reply packet from host 1.1.1.1 to host 1.1.1.2, timing out in three seconds.
The response destination host is not necessarily the same as the request source host, as the request source address may have been masqueraded by the response destination host.
Please note that the following information might not be up-to-date!
Fields available for all entries:
bytes (if accounting is enabled, request and response)
delta-time (if CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_TIMESTAMP is enabled)
dst (request and response)
mark (if CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK is enabled)
packets (if accounting is enabled, request and response)
secctx (if CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK is enabled)
src (request and response)
use
zone (if CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_ZONES is enabled)
Fields available for dccp, sctp, tcp, udp and udplite transmission layer protocols:
dport (request and response)
sport (request and response)
Fields available for icmp transmission layer protocol:
code (request and response)
id (request and response)
type (request and response)
Fields available for gre transmission layer protocol:
dstkey (request and response)
srckey (request and response)
stream_timeout
timeout
Allowed values for the sixth field:
dccp transmission layer protocol
CLOSEREQ
CLOSING
IGNORE
INVALID
NONE
OPEN
PARTOPEN
REQUEST
RESPOND
TIME_WAIT
sctp transmission layer protocol
CLOSED
COOKIE_ECHOED
COOKIE_WAIT
ESTABLISHED
NONE
SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT
SHUTDOWN_RECD
SHUTDOWN_SENT
tcp transmission layer protocol
CLOSE
CLOSE_WAIT
ESTABLISHED
FIN_WAIT
LAST_ACK
NONE
SYN_RECV
SYN_SENT
SYN_SENT2
TIME_WAIT
The file ip_conntrack contains only ipv4 specific conntrack entries whereas nf_conntrack includes both ipv4 and ipv6 protocol conntrack entries.
nf_conntrack file is registered with proc file system using code in
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
whereas ip_conntrack file is registered with proc file system through the code in
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4_compat.c