I am executing the code as given below for the shared memory, but now if i have to give the number of strings and string pattern from the command line, what should i do?? and sebsequently also i have to read the strings and string patterns from shared memory region.
Also if i have to reverse the strings and stored at the same location for that what should i do??
Please help me on this problem.
#define SHMSIZE 500 /*Shared Memory Size given by us */
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int shmid;
key_t key;
char *shm;
key = 5876;
shmid = shmget(key,SHMSIZE,IPC_CREAT| 0666); /*Creating Shared Memory */
if(shmid < 0)
{
perror("shmget");
exit(1);
}
shm = shmat(shmid,NULL,0); /* Shared Memory Attachment */
if(shm == (char *) -1)
{
perror("shmat");
exit(1);
}
printf("Memory attached at %X\n",(int) shm); /* Printing the address where Memory is attached */
sprintf(shm,"God is Great"); /* Write a string to the shared memory */
shmdt(shm); /* Deattach the shared memory segment */
shm = shmat(shmid,(void *) 0x50000000,0); /*Reattach the shared memory segment */
printf("Memory Reattached at %X\n",(int) shm);
printf("%s\n",shm); /* Print the desired string */
return 0;
}
In according to take input from user, you need to parse what passed through argv. Then copy the values into your code and write it over the shared memory region. From your code you can do the following:
sprintf(shm, argv[1]);
to parse the first parameter passed to your shared memory region. And to reverse the string, copy the string from shared memory into a variable, then reverse it and finally, write it into that shared memory region from your client code. Since, you've created shm with 666 permission this should allow client to write on that portion.
Take a look at here in case you need to understand the concept properly ( http://www.cs.cf.ac.uk/Dave/C/node27.html)
Related
I am trying to read /proc//pagemap in a kernel driver like this:
uint64_t page;
uint64_t va = 0x7FFD1BF46530;`
loff_t pos = va / PAGE_SIZE * sizeof(uint64_t);
struct file * filp = filp_open("/proc/19030/pagemap", O_RDONLY, 0);
ssize_t nread = kernel_read(filp, &page, sizeof(page), &pos);
I get error -22 in nread (EINVAL, invalid argument) and
"kernel read not supported for file /19030/pagemap (pid: 19030 comm: tester)" in dmesg.
0x7FFD1BF46530 is a virtual address in a user space process pid 19030 (tester). I assume that pos is the offset into the file like in lseek64.
Doing the precise same thing as sudo with same values in a user space process, i.e. reading /proc/19030/pagemap works fine and produces a correct physical address.
The actual thing I am trying to do here is to find the physical address of a user space virtual address. I need the physical address for a device DMA transfer operation and a user space app needs to access this memory. This app allocates 1GB DMA memory with anonymous mmap from THP (Transparent Huge Pages). And I am trying to avoid the need for sudo by reading /proc//pagemap in a kernel driver via ioctl instead.
I would be happy to allocate huge page DMA memory in the driver but don't know how to do that. dma_alloc_coherent is limited to max 4MB allocations. Is there a way to get those allocated as continuous physical memory? I need hundreds of MB or many GB of DMA memory.
Problem with anonymous mmap is that it can only allocate max 1GB huge page as physically continuous memory. Allocating more works but the memory is not physically continuous and unusable for DMA.
Any good ideas or alternative ways of allocating huge pages as DMA memory?
Tried reading file /proc//pagemap in a kernel driver. Expected same results as when reading the file in a user space application which works ok.
"kernel read not supported for file …"
Indeed, as we see in __kernel_read()
if (unlikely(!file->f_op->read_iter || file->f_op->read))
return warn_unsupported(file, "read");
it fails if f_op->read_iter isn't or f_op->read is wired up (implemented), which is both the case for a pagemap file.
You could try pagemap_read() instead. – not feasible for reasons in the comments
When I had the problem of getting the physical address for a virtual address in a driver, I included and copied some kernel code (not that I recommend this, but I saw no other solution); here's an extract.
static pte_t *huge_pte_offset(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr
, unsigned long sz)
{ return NULL; }
void p4d_clear_bad(p4d_t *p4d) { p4d_ERROR(*p4d); p4d_clear(p4d); }
#include "mm/pagewalk.c"
static int pte(pte_t *pte, unsigned long addr
, unsigned long next, struct mm_walk *walk)
{
*(pte_t **)walk->private = pte;
return 1;
}
/* Scan the real Linux page tables and return a PTE pointer for
* a virtual address in a context.
* Returns true (1) if PTE was found, zero otherwise. The pointer to
* the PTE pointer is unmodified if PTE is not found.
*/
int
get_pteptr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, pte_t **ptep, pmd_t **pmdp)
{
struct mm_walk walk = { .pte_entry = pte, .mm = mm, .private = ptep };
return walk_page_range(addr, addr+PAGE_SIZE, &walk);
}
/* Find physical address for this virtual address. Normally used by
* I/O functions, but anyone can call it.
*/
static inline unsigned long iopa(unsigned long addr)
{
unsigned long pa;
/* I don't know why this won't work on PMacs or CHRP. It
* appears there is some bug, or there is some implicit
* mapping done not properly represented by BATs or in page
* tables.......I am actively working on resolving this, but
* can't hold up other stuff. -- Dan
*/
pte_t *pte;
struct mm_struct *mm;
#if 0
/* Check the BATs */
phys_addr_t v_mapped_by_bats(unsigned long va);
pa = v_mapped_by_bats(addr);
if (pa)
return pa;
#endif
/* Allow mapping of user addresses (within the thread)
* for DMA if necessary.
*/
if (addr < TASK_SIZE)
mm = current->mm;
else
mm = &init_mm;
ATTENTION: I needed the current address space.
You'd have to use mm = file->private_data instead.
pa = 0;
if (get_pteptr(mm, addr, &pte, NULL))
pa = (pte_val(*pte) & PAGE_MASK) | (addr & ~PAGE_MASK);
return(pa);
}
I'm trying to access a variable created in kernel space. My purpose is to detect a interrupt flag. To do that, I created a ioctl and use copy_to_user() to pass variable pointer to user as kernel code below :
- I convert virtual address of 'irq_flag' to physical address and pass to user.
#define GET_FLAG _IOW('F', 0x27, int)
...
int irq_flag = 0; //Global variable
...
case GET_FLAG: //IOCTL
{
int my_value;
char *value_ptr;
value_ptr = virt_to_phys(&irq_flag);
my_value = value_ptr;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg,(void *)&my_value,
sizeof(irq_flag)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
User code: Get physical address from ioctl and map to virtual address
mem_fd = open("/dev/mem", O_RDWR);
fb_fd = open("/dev/fb", O_RDWR);
int temp;
int flag_addr;
int *flag;
temp = ioctl(fb_fd, FBIOGET_FLAG, &flag_addr);
flag = mmap(NULL, sizeof(int), PROT_WRITE | PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, mem_fd, flag_addr);
...//processing code
while(1){
*flag = 0; //my idea is that flag will be set to 1 in interrupt callback function and break the loop.
while(!*flag) { }
}
But it return Segmentation Fault, could you give me some idea where am i wrong or is it another way to map a pointer from kernel to user space. Sorry for my English.
Despite one can get physical address of kernel space object and send it to user space, one can not access to kernel space from user space othervise any malware would gain full access for reading any kernel structures.
You didn't check mmap() return value for MAP_FAILED value ((void *) -1) and then tried to access to this invalid memory address.
In my driver I have certain number of physically contiguous DMA buffers (e.g. 4MB long each) to receive data from a device. They are handled by hardware using the SG list. As the received data will be subjected to intensive processing, I don't want to switch off cache and I will use dma_sync_single_for_cpu after each buffer is filled by DMA.
To simplify data processing, I want those buffers to appear as a single huge, contiguous, circular buffer in the user space.
In case of a single buffer I simply use remap_pfn_range or dma_mmap_coherent. However, I can't use those functions multiple times to map consecutive buffers.
Of course, I can implement the fault operation in the vm_operations so that it finds the pfn of the corresponding page in the right buffer, and inserts it into the vma with vm_insert_pfn.
The acquisition will be really fast, so I can't handle mapping when the real data arrive. But this can be solved easily. To have all mapping ready before the data acquisition starts, I can simply read the whole mmapped buffer in my application before starting the acquisition, so that all pages are already inserted when the first data arrive.
Tha fault based trick should work, but maybe there is something more elegant? Just a single function, that may be called multiple times to build the whole mapping incrementally?
Additional difficulty is that the solution should be applicable (with minimal adjustments) to kernels starting from 2.6.32 to the newest one.
PS. I have seen that annoying post. Is there a danger that if the application attempts to write something to the mmapped buffer (just doing the in place processing of data), my carefully built mapping will be destroyed by COW?
Below is my solution that works for buffers allocated with dmam_alloc_noncoherent.
Allocation of the buffers:
[...]
for(i=0;i<DMA_NOFBUFS;i++) {
ext->buf_addr[i] = dmam_alloc_noncoherent(&my_dev->dev, DMA_BUFLEN, &my_dev->buf_dma_t[i],GFP_USER);
if(my_dev->buf_addr[i] == NULL) {
res = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
//Make buffer ready for filling by the device
dma_sync_single_range_for_device(&my_dev->dev, my_dev->buf_dma_t[i],0,DMA_BUFLEN,DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
}
[...]
Mapping of the buffers
void swz_mmap_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
}
void swz_mmap_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
}
static int swz_mmap_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
long offset;
char * buffer = NULL;
int buf_num = 0;
//Calculate the offset (according to info in https://lxr.missinglinkelectronics.com/linux+v2.6.32/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem.c#L1195 it is better not ot use the vmf->pgoff )
offset = (unsigned long)(vmf->virtual_address - vma->vm_start);
buf_num = offset/DMA_BUFLEN;
if(buf_num > DMA_NOFBUFS) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Access outside the buffer\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
offset = offset - buf_num * DMA_BUFLEN;
buffer = my_dev->buf_addr[buf_num];
vm_insert_pfn(vma,(unsigned long)(vmf->virtual_address),virt_to_phys(&buffer[offset]) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
}
struct vm_operations_struct swz_mmap_vm_ops =
{
.open = swz_mmap_open,
.close = swz_mmap_close,
.fault = swz_mmap_fault,
};
static int char_sgdma_wz_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
vma->vm_ops = &swz_mmap_vm_ops;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO | VM_RESERVED | VM_CAN_NONLINEAR | VM_PFNMAP;
swz_mmap_open(vma);
return 0;
}
From what I understand, a typical buffer overflow attack occurs when an attack overflows a buffer of memory on the stack, thus allowing the attacker to inject malicious code and rewrite the return address on the stack to point to that code.
This is a common concern when using functions (such as sscanf) that blindly copy data from one area to another, checking one for a termination byte:
char str[8]; /* holds up to 8 bytes of data */
char *buf = "lots and lots of foobars"; /* way more than 8 bytes of data */
sscanf(buf, "%s", str); /* buffer overflow occurs here! */
I noticed some sysfs_ops store functions in the Linux kernel are implemented with the Linux kernel's version of the sscanf function:
static char str[8]; /* global string */
static ssize_t my_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t size)
{
sscanf(buf, "%s", str); /* buf holds more than 8 bytes! */
return size;
}
Suppose this store callback function is set to a writable sysfs attribute. Would a malicious user be able to intentionally overflow the buffer via a write call?
Normally, I would expect guards against buffer overflow attacks -- such as limiting the number of bytes read -- but I see none in a good number of functions (for example in drivers/scsi/scsi_sysfs.c).
Does the implementation of the Linux kernel version of sscanf protect against buffer overflow attacks; or is there another reason -- perhaps buffer overflow attacks are impossible given how the Linux kernel works under the hood?
The Linux sscanf() is vulnerable to buffer overflows; inspection of the source shows this. You can use width specifiers to limit the amount a %s is allowed to write. At some point your str must have had copy_from_user() run on it as well. It is possible the user space to pass some garbage pointer to the kernel.
In the version of Linux you cited, the scsi_sysfs.c does have a buffer overflow. The latest version does not. The committed fix should fix the issue you see.
Short answer:
sscanf, when well called, will not cause buffer overflow, especially in sysfs xxx_store() function. (There are a lot sscanf in sysfs XXX_store() examples), because Linux kernel add a '\0' (zero-terminated) byte after the string (buf[len] = 0;) for your XXX_store() function.
Long answer:
Normally, sysfs are defined to have a strict formatted data. Since you expect 8 bytes at most, it's reasonable to limit the size you get like this:
static char str[8]; /* global string */
static ssize_t my_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t size)
{
if (size > 8) {
printk("Error: Input size > 8: too large\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
sscanf(buf, "%s", str); /* buf holds more than 8 bytes! */
return size;
}
(Note: use 9 rather than 8, if you expect a 8-bytes string plus '\n')
(Note that you do reject some inputs such as those with many leading white spaces. However, who would send a string with many leading white spaces? Those who want to break your code, right? If they don't follow your spec, just reject them.)
Note that Linux kernel purposely inserts a '\0' at offset len (i.e. buf[len] = 0;) when the user write len bytes to sysfs purposely for safe sscanf, as said in a comment in kernel 2.6: fs/sysfs/file.c:
static int
fill_write_buffer(struct sysfs_buffer * buffer, const char __user * buf, size_t count)
{
int error;
if (!buffer->page)
buffer->page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer->page)
return -ENOMEM;
if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
count = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
error = copy_from_user(buffer->page,buf,count);
buffer->needs_read_fill = 1;
/* if buf is assumed to contain a string, terminate it by \0,
so e.g. sscanf() can scan the string easily */
buffer->page[count] = 0;
return error ? -EFAULT : count;
}
...
static ssize_t
sysfs_write_file(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct sysfs_buffer * buffer = file->private_data;
ssize_t len;
mutex_lock(&buffer->mutex);
len = fill_write_buffer(buffer, buf, count);
if (len > 0)
len = flush_write_buffer(file->f_path.dentry, buffer, len);
if (len > 0)
*ppos += len;
mutex_unlock(&buffer->mutex);
return len;
}
Higher kernel version keeps the same logic (though already completely rewritten).
Is there any API for determining the physical address from virtual address in Linux operating system?
Kernel and user space work with virtual addresses (also called linear addresses) that are mapped to physical addresses by the memory management hardware. This mapping is defined by page tables, set up by the operating system.
DMA devices use bus addresses. On an i386 PC, bus addresses are the same as physical addresses, but other architectures may have special address mapping hardware to convert bus addresses to physical addresses.
In Linux, you can use these functions from asm/io.h:
virt_to_phys(virt_addr);
phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
virt_to_bus(virt_addr);
bus_to_virt(bus_addr);
All this is about accessing ordinary memory. There is also "shared memory" on the PCI or ISA bus. It can be mapped inside a 32-bit address space using ioremap(), and then used via the readb(), writeb() (etc.) functions.
Life is complicated by the fact that there are various caches around, so that different ways to access the same physical address need not give the same result.
Also, the real physical address behind virtual address can change. Even more than that - there could be no address associated with a virtual address until you access that memory.
As for the user-land API, there are none that I am aware of.
/proc/<pid>/pagemap userland minimal runnable example
virt_to_phys_user.c
#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 700
#include <fcntl.h> /* open */
#include <stdint.h> /* uint64_t */
#include <stdio.h> /* printf */
#include <stdlib.h> /* size_t */
#include <unistd.h> /* pread, sysconf */
typedef struct {
uint64_t pfn : 55;
unsigned int soft_dirty : 1;
unsigned int file_page : 1;
unsigned int swapped : 1;
unsigned int present : 1;
} PagemapEntry;
/* Parse the pagemap entry for the given virtual address.
*
* #param[out] entry the parsed entry
* #param[in] pagemap_fd file descriptor to an open /proc/pid/pagemap file
* #param[in] vaddr virtual address to get entry for
* #return 0 for success, 1 for failure
*/
int pagemap_get_entry(PagemapEntry *entry, int pagemap_fd, uintptr_t vaddr)
{
size_t nread;
ssize_t ret;
uint64_t data;
uintptr_t vpn;
vpn = vaddr / sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
nread = 0;
while (nread < sizeof(data)) {
ret = pread(pagemap_fd, ((uint8_t*)&data) + nread, sizeof(data) - nread,
vpn * sizeof(data) + nread);
nread += ret;
if (ret <= 0) {
return 1;
}
}
entry->pfn = data & (((uint64_t)1 << 55) - 1);
entry->soft_dirty = (data >> 55) & 1;
entry->file_page = (data >> 61) & 1;
entry->swapped = (data >> 62) & 1;
entry->present = (data >> 63) & 1;
return 0;
}
/* Convert the given virtual address to physical using /proc/PID/pagemap.
*
* #param[out] paddr physical address
* #param[in] pid process to convert for
* #param[in] vaddr virtual address to get entry for
* #return 0 for success, 1 for failure
*/
int virt_to_phys_user(uintptr_t *paddr, pid_t pid, uintptr_t vaddr)
{
char pagemap_file[BUFSIZ];
int pagemap_fd;
snprintf(pagemap_file, sizeof(pagemap_file), "/proc/%ju/pagemap", (uintmax_t)pid);
pagemap_fd = open(pagemap_file, O_RDONLY);
if (pagemap_fd < 0) {
return 1;
}
PagemapEntry entry;
if (pagemap_get_entry(&entry, pagemap_fd, vaddr)) {
return 1;
}
close(pagemap_fd);
*paddr = (entry.pfn * sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE)) + (vaddr % sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE));
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t pid;
uintptr_t vaddr, paddr = 0;
if (argc < 3) {
printf("Usage: %s pid vaddr\n", argv[0]);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
pid = strtoull(argv[1], NULL, 0);
vaddr = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 0);
if (virt_to_phys_user(&paddr, pid, vaddr)) {
fprintf(stderr, "error: virt_to_phys_user\n");
return EXIT_FAILURE;
};
printf("0x%jx\n", (uintmax_t)paddr);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
GitHub upstream.
Usage:
sudo ./virt_to_phys_user.out <pid> <virtual-address>
sudo is required to read /proc/<pid>/pagemap even if you have file permissions as explained at: https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/345915/how-to-change-permission-of-proc-self-pagemap-file/383838#383838
As mentioned at: https://stackoverflow.com/a/46247716/895245 Linux allocates page tables lazily, so make sure that you read and write a byte to that address from the test program before using virt_to_phys_user.
How to test it out
Test program:
#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 700
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum { I0 = 0x12345678 };
static volatile uint32_t i = I0;
int main(void) {
printf("vaddr %p\n", (void *)&i);
printf("pid %ju\n", (uintmax_t)getpid());
while (i == I0) {
sleep(1);
}
printf("i %jx\n", (uintmax_t)i);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
The test program outputs the address of a variable it owns, and its PID, e.g.:
vaddr 0x600800
pid 110
and then you can pass convert the virtual address with:
sudo ./virt_to_phys_user.out 110 0x600800
Finally, the conversion can be tested by using /dev/mem to observe / modify the memory, but you can't do this on Ubuntu 17.04 without recompiling the kernel as it requires: CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=n, see also: How to access physical addresses from user space in Linux? Buildroot is an easy way to overcome that however.
Alternatively, you can use a Virtual machine like QEMU monitor's xp command: How to decode /proc/pid/pagemap entries in Linux?
See this to dump all pages: How to decode /proc/pid/pagemap entries in Linux?
Userland subset of this question: How to find the physical address of a variable from user-space in Linux?
Dump all process pages with /proc/<pid>/maps
/proc/<pid>/maps lists all the addresses ranges of the process, so we can walk that to translate all pages: /proc/[pid]/pagemaps and /proc/[pid]/maps | linux
Kerneland virt_to_phys() only works for kmalloc() addresses
From a kernel module, virt_to_phys(), has been mentioned.
However, it is import to highlight that it has this limitation.
E.g. it fails for module variables. arc/x86/include/asm/io.h documentation:
The returned physical address is the physical (CPU) mapping for
the memory address given. It is only valid to use this function on
addresses directly mapped or allocated via kmalloc().
Here is a kernel module that illustrates that together with an userland test.
So this is not a very general possibility. See: How to get the physical address from the logical one in a Linux kernel module? for kernel module methods exclusively.
As answered before, normal programs should not need to worry about physical addresses as they run in a virtual address space with all its conveniences. Furthermore, not every virtual address has a physical address, the may belong to mapped files or swapped pages. However, sometimes it may be interesting to see this mapping, even in userland.
For this purpose, the Linux kernel exposes its mapping to userland through a set of files in the /proc. The documentation can be found here. Short summary:
/proc/$pid/maps provides a list of mappings of virtual addresses together with additional information, such as the corresponding file for mapped files.
/proc/$pid/pagemap provides more information about each mapped page, including the physical address if it exists.
This website provides a C program that dumps the mappings of all running processes using this interface and an explanation of what it does.
The suggested C program above usually works, but it can return misleading results in (at least) two ways:
The page is not present (but the virtual addressed is mapped to a page!). This happens due to lazy mapping by the OS: it maps addresses only when they are actually accessed.
The returned PFN points to some possibly temporary physical page which could be changed soon after due to copy-on-write. For example: for memory mapped files, the PFN can point to the read-only copy. For anonymous mappings, the PFN of all pages in the mapping could be one specific read-only page full of 0s (from which all anonymous pages spawn when written to).
Bottom line is, to ensure a more reliable result: for read-only mappings, read from every page at least once before querying its PFN. For write-enabled pages, write into every page at least once before querying its PFN.
Of course, theoretically, even after obtaining a "stable" PFN, the mappings could always change arbitrarily at runtime (for example when moving pages into and out of swap) and should not be relied upon.
I wonder why there is no user-land API.
Because user land memory's physical address is unknown.
Linux uses demand paging for user land memory. Your user land object will not have physical memory until it is accessed. When the system is short of memory, your user land object may be swapped out and lose physical memory unless the page is locked for the process. When you access the object again, it is swapped in and given physical memory, but it is likely different physical memory from the previous one. You may take a snapshot of page mapping, but it is not guaranteed to be the same in the next moment.
So, looking for the physical address of a user land object is usually meaningless.