How can I make my website display a green label in the address bar of the browser:
Do I need to just use https or is it a more complex process?
Just using HTTPS (HTTP over SSL/TLS) does not give you the green address bar. You need an extended validation certificate, where the CA verifies your identity, and not just your domain ownership.
EV certificates are more expensive than simple domain validated certificates.
On security.SE we have a related question: What are the advantages of EV Certificate?
For example, the EV certificate at http://www.paypal.com/ will make the browser show a green bar and display "PayPal, Inc." next to it. This is designed not only to link the certificate to the domain owner (like standard domain-validated certificates do), but also link it to a more physical institution (here, PayPal, Inc.). To do this, the CA must verify that the named institution is indeed the one owning the domain.
You do need to make it HTTPS (which uses SSL or secure socket layer. ) This basically encrypts the data that goes to and from your website. This can be a lengthy process depending on your web host but usually involves purchasing a certificate from your host.
Yes the Green "Favicon" comes and differs from browser to browser and signalises the https connection
I would advice you not to try to implement this if you dont need it for security reasons
Related
I've seen this question around here on the forums only what I wish to know slightly differs from the ones I already read I suppose.
I will give you an example of the problem I am facing:
Let's say a hacker has managed to infiltrate the system and is able to spoof a DNS. Now if this hacker would clone a website, let's say this website is facebook, what I have read so far he would be making a HTTP website, because HTTPS would show up as faulty.
Now what I'm wondering is that with modern SSL it would seem like everyone is able to get his own certificate for his website. So if someone would connect to that website it would say the connection is trusted because it's SSL with a legit connection.
So what if this hacker would add a certificate to his cloned/spoofed phishing website? Wouldn't this mean that me as a user would go to his facebook page, and in the search bar it would say the connection is legitimate ( Because he added a certificate ) ? Because if that would be the point it would be necessary to check the certificate of every website I open at all times to see if it's actually the certificate that belongs to facebook (For example.)
Please let me know if anyone has any knowledge about this I am very curious to see how this works!
Provided that
Let's say a hacker has managed to infiltrate the system and is able to
spoof a DNS.
means that the attacker has control over the records for the name facebook.com (in orther words, he can point www.facebook.com to an IP of his choice) then yes, your scenario is correct.
He would
redirect www.facebook.com to site of his
buy a certificate for www.facebook.com
Someone going to that site would then see (www.facebook.com would be the domain)
This means that the traffic to access to this site is correctly secured between the browser and that site, and nothing else. Specifically, this does not tell if the site actually belongs to Facebook.
There are some sites which go one step further, with Extended Validation Certificates, where the issuer does some checks to "ensure" that the certificate is delivered to the actual owner of the service. You the see something like
As you can see, the owner of the site is visible right on the toolbar. Other browsers usually use a bright green toolbar to signal such sites.
Not sure if that is what you're asking, but you have trusted CAs imported to your browser (by default).
The attacker would need to have a key signed by trusted authority for this particular domain. I do not expect that to happen.
Another option would be breaking the key - very unlikely with current technology/regular updates made by major browser providers.
Major browsers providers are deprecating vunerable alghorighms to make sure you're OK.
For instance - Recently for that reason SHA1 got depreceated.
See here for more details on SHA1:
https://blogs.windows.com/msedgedev/2016/11/18/countdown-to-sha-1-deprecation/#pjXdGbOji3itBI7v.97
https://security.googleblog.com/2016/11/sha-1-certificates-in-chrome.html
https://www.google.com.au/search?q=firefox+sha1+deprecation&rlz=1C5CHFA_enAU714AU715&oq=firefox+sha1&aqs=chrome.1.69i57j0l5.2293j0j4&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
)
To summarize - your browser will let you know that there is 'something wrong' with the site (warning instead of green box).
Simply check the green box (and domain). Keep your browser updated.
Also for more information about SSL handshake see here: https://www.ssl.com/article/ssl-tls-handshake-overview/
We are a startup from India, yet to register as a company.
However, in order to launch , we need to put up SSL certificate on our platform as we deal with critical info. Though the main concern is to have a Green Bar so that most of the browsers let the users in without a warning or anything. Is it possible to get a Domain Validated SSL Certificate that comes with a Green Bar?
The Green Bar will only happen with EV (Extended Validation) certificates, not with DV (Domain Validated). There is nothing you can do against this because this behavior is built into the browsers itself.
As Steffen points out, the green bar is a feature of Extended Validation certificates. These require additional validation of you're business by the certificate supplier, and tend to be significantly more expensive than domain validation certificates (probably to pay the additional staff required to do checks).
There's no way to get the green bar with domain validated certificates. If you could, it would entirely invalidate the existence of the EV certs.
This is very simple, you have to purchase a ssl certificate from your hosting provider and then copy the code in the ssl certificate manager into your hosting and put that code into your index page. To redirect the site from http: to https: ask to the hosting provider to redirect it and they will give you the redirection code.
If you site is built on a CMS platform, let me know. It has a different method I can help you if you still need help.
I have a single site in IIS with a blank host header and 50+ unqiue domains that all point to this one site. Is there a catch-all or wildcard SSL available that I can install on the site so it will work with each domain? I know wildcard certs exist but I think they're limited to a single TLD.
I was hoping to install multiple certs on a single site since each domain already has a cert purchased but that isn't going to happen.
I had a look at IIS 7 SSL for multiple sites with a single IP which points to http://www.sslshopper.com/article-ssl-host-headers-in-iis-7.html which says I need a unified communications certificate http://www.sslshopper.com/unified-communications-uc-ssl-certificates.html
Any ideas? Will the unified cert work?
IIS 7.5
Wildcard SSL certs are for a single domain. For your situation you'd have to have a certificate that worked for every domain, which, err, wouldn't be that safe, you could, for example, spoof hotmail.com
However there is an attribute in X509 called Subject Alternative Name (SAN). That allows for a fixed list of domains for which the certificate may be used on, but the list is fixed at issuance time. Your link says it uses that method, but I'm confused why they say they're primarily for UC server, they work fine as plain old HTTPS certificates. I'm using one right now on a development box.
In case you think they're specialised Verisign do them too,as does Entrust
In principle, each server (meaning whatever program on the server side answers to the client's request) can send only one certificate. It also will send a chain of certificates up to the root certificate.
With plain SSL/TLS, the handshake is done before the client has a chance to indicate for which domain it wants a page (this is done in the HTTP header), thus you have no chance here to offer the right certificate.
A common solution is that the server has several IP-addresses (one for each domain, or at least one for each SSL-certificate), and thus can recognize by the IP address, which certificate should be used. (I don't know how IIS handles this, though.)
Assigning new IP-addresses gets more problematic with the increasing scarceness of IPv4 addresses, for this and other reasons RFC 6066 (and its predecessors) defines the server name TSL extension (extension-ID 0), which allows the client to include the wanted server name in the ClientHello message (which starts the handshake), allowing the server to select the right certificate for .
No serious certification agency will give you a wildcard certificate for *.com or similar, since with such a certificate you can pretend to be almost anyone. A certificate can list multiple domain names, but I have no idea if there is an upper limit in the number of those (both for IIS and the usual clients).
I'm using gmail from work, but I need to enter a password for a proxy when accesing the first web page. The password is asked from inside the browser. I receive a certificate from the proxy which I must accept in order to make the Internet connection work.
Can my HTTPS connection, between gmail and browser, be tracked in this situation?
Fiddler describes it like this:
Q: The HTTPS protocol was designed to prevent traffic viewing and tampering. Given that, how can Fiddler2 debug HTTPS traffic?
A: Fiddler2 relies on a "man-in-the-middle" approach to HTTPS interception. To your web browser, Fiddler2 claims to be the secure web server, and to the web server, Fiddler2 mimics the web browser. In order to pretend to be the web server, Fiddler2 dynamically generates a HTTPS certificate.
Fiddler's certificate is not trusted by your web browser (since Fiddler is not a Trusted Root Certification authority), and hence while Fiddler2 is intercepting your traffic, you'll see a HTTPS error message in your browser, like so:
tracked? Well even though https encrypts the traffic you still know the ip address of both parties (gmail and the browser). HTTPS doesn't solve this problem, but a different blend of crypto has created The Onion Router(TOR) which does make impossible to locate both servers and clients.
Under "normal" conditions when an attacker is trying to MITM HTTPS your browser should throw a certificate error. This is the whole point of SSL backed by a PKI. HOWEVER in 2009 Moxie Marlenspike gave a killer Blackhat talk in which he was able to MITM HTTPS without warning. His tools is called SSLStrip, and I highly recommend watching that video.
A good solution to SSLStrip was developed by Google. Its called STS, and you should enable this on all of your web applications. Currently sts is only supported by Chrome, but Firefox is working on their supporting this feature. Eventually all browsers should support it.
Yes they can. You can see this for yourself by downloading Fiddler and using it to decrypt https traffic. Fiddler issues its own certificate and acts a man in the middle. You would need to view the certificate in your browser to see whether it is actually issued by gmail.
It seems that the renegotiation is a weak spot in the TSLv1 (see TLS renegotiation attack. More bad news for SSL).
As pointed out by other answers (read also here) for this to work really "in the middle" (i.e. excluding the cases in which the capturing occurs at one of the end-points, inside the browser or inside the web server), some kind of proxy must be set, who speaks to your browser and to the server, pretending to both to be the other side. But your browser (and ssl) is smart enough to realize that the certificate that the proxy sends you ("saying: I am gmail") is illegal, i.e. is not signed by a trusted Root Certification authority. Then, this will only work if the user explicitly accepts that untrusted certificate, or if the CA used by the proxy was inserted into the trusted CA registry in his browser.
In summary, if the user is using a clean/trusted browser installation, and if he refuses certificates issued by untrusted authorities, an man "in the middle" cannot decrypt an https communication.
It cannot be tracked between the gmail webserver and your pc, but once it is inside the pc, it can be tracked. I dont understand how two people claim that https can be tracked with mitm since the whole purpose of https is to prevent such attacks.
The point is that all HTTP level messages are encrypted, and mac-ed. Due to the certificate trust chain, you cannot fake a certificate, so it should not be possible to perform a man in the middle.
The ones who claim it is possible, can you please give details about how and why it is possible and how the existing countermeasures are circumvented?
my question is related to hypertext protocol.
what is the requirements from my side to be able to use HTTPS instead of HTTP in the areas where a user will enter confident information or when there is a registration process.
Thank you.
You need a certificate (you can buy one, which are usually identified by browsers, or create a self-signed certificate, which will trigger a warning on browsers) and a server able to run HTTPS. HTTPS capable servers allow you to define which pages are served via HTTP and which via HTTPS.
HTTPS IS NOT authentication, by the way, it only encrypts communications to prevent eavesdroppers reading what's being sent between the server and client.
You can use any authentication method over HTTPS, but you need to provide it (be it HTTP Auth or something in your application.)
There isn't much more to say given your ambiguous question.
Primarily, you need to configure your webserver to use https; this in turn requires that you have a server certificate. You can either create your own server certificate, or you can buy one from one of the Certificate Authorities. The latter will cause browsers to trust that your site is genuine (whereas in the case of one that you created yourself, a man-in-the-middle or phishing attack might happen from the viewpoint of the browser).
How to configure your server precisely should be discussed on serverfault.