Disable client-side Scripting (like Greasemonkey) on a web site? - security

I would like to know if there is a way to prevent the use of userscripts on my browser game site?
Many use Greasemonkey to have advantages over other players, and I would like a way to disable these scripts.
I found this old article, "How To Disable Greasemonkey On Your Web Site", but it's from 2005 and doesn't seem to work.

Combating a smart scripter is tough. They have the upper hand since their script can touch the page before your server does, and can block or replace just about anything. See this answer to a very similar question.
Your smartest, and most cost-effective countermeasure is to sanction the users who are "gaming" the game. Attack the burglar, not the lock-pick.
If you insist in a tech war with your users, nothing you do will block everybody, but you can make them work for it.
Here are some things you can do make life harder for scripters:
Frequently change the structure of the page, especially element ID's and CSS class names. If you can, periodically insert or remove elements, so that the key <div> is not always the 3rd one in the second <table>, for example.
Every time you make a change, monitor your logs for users who get a sudden decrease in performance or usage -- for however many hours or days it takes them to adapt their scripts.
Likewise, frequently change your javascript filenames, and change the names of any variables or functions that the scripter may use.
Write your click and keyboard event-handlers to only work for trusted events, for browsers that support it.
You can put key text, including countdown timers, in images with unpredictable names. Making it hard for the script to detect key events. Needing to do OCR ramps up the skill-level required by a Greasemonkey scriptwriter, considerably. (At least for now.)
If you move the key game action into Flash, it becomes an order of magnitude harder to script for. They may even have to reverse engineer your flash and replace it with one that has scriptable hooks. Switching to Flash will annoy and drive off users (like me), though.
See that answer for more but, again, the best and most cost-effective approach is to sanction the offending user(s). Be sure that your Terms of Service specifically forbids what they are doing, though.

As addition to Brock Adams' own answer, here's couple methods for finding a possible scripter.
Timed function that checks DOM tree and search for added elements that are not your code's creation, or look for missing elements.
Primarily finds scripter who alters UI, yet haven't read/understood the game's js-source.
Client-side.
"Missing element"-search may get false positives from people who use something like AdBlock Plus. Not really false positive, if aim is to rank them out, too.
Inspect cookie content and look for hints of user added content.
If scripter has to transfer information from page/session to another, and has/knows no other method, he may attempt to use cookies for this.
Inspect query/hash in URL for content not added by your code.
It's possible to try to transfer information to other pages by altering links.
Hash-content (# in URL) is accessible only client-side.
Inspect session/localStorage.
Client-side.
Disable access thru anonymizing services, like anonym.to.
Circumventable, but makes life harder for people using unwanted online-tools.
Allow access to game-page only if referer is correct, otherwise redirect to login-page.
Another method to limit access to game-pages from outside sources.
If you want to be a pain, kill active session when redirecting.
NOTE: All client-side functions can be circumvented by scripter who understands the code.
NOTE: Usage of these requires some wisdom and good planning. If doing things wrong, then with client-side stuff you risk of kicking users' browsers on knees or DDoSing your own server. Or you may end up banning least half of the userbase after an update on your own code, if you use too much automation.

Here's one of my scripts. It could definitely still use some work, but the framework is there (though you may need to wrap everything in a big function to make variables private)
var secureElements,secureTags,secureTagLoop,secureLoop,var secureReporter = secureAnalyzationFunction = 0;
function analyze(secureAnalyzation){
if(secureAnalyzation.indexOf("function ")!=-1){
secureAnalyzationFunction = secureAnalyzation.substring(secureAnalyzation.indexOf("function ")+9,secureAnalyzation.indexOf("()"));
secureAnalyzationFunction = secureAnalyzationFunction+"=undefined;";
eval(secureAnalyzationFunction);
}
}
function secure(){
var secureTags = ["script","link","meta","canvas"];
for(secureTagLoop=0;secureTagLoop!=secureTags.length;secureTagLoop++){
secureElements = document.getElementsByTagName(secureTags[secureTagLoop]);
for(secureLoop=0;secureLoop!=secureElements.length;secureLoop++){
if(secureElements[secureLoop].outerHTML.indexOf("verified")==-1){
analyze(secureElements[secureLoop].outerHTML);
secureElements[secureLoop].parentElement.removeChild(secureElements[secureLoop]);
secureLoop--;
secureReporter++;
console.log("Deleted "+secureReporter+" foreign elements.")
}
}
}
}
window.onload = function() {
secure();
setInterval(secure,1500);
};

Related

In ColdFusion How to Eliminate Vulnerable for Cross-Site Script

What is the best way to stop Cross-Site Scripting for ColdFusion?
Is there a setting to set in the CF Admin or is their code in you can put in Application.cfc?
Example Code:
http://test.com/file.cfm?center=fisCenter')" onmouseover="alert('Insert Hax Here.')" style="display:block;position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:10000px;height:10000px;z-index:100">
First things first: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet. OWASP has tons of resources to help devs better understand the problem. XSS isn't a CF problem, but a webdev problem.
That said, which version of CF are you working with? It's more difficult to deal with in CF9 or lower. Those versions have limited built-in functionality and may require falling back into Java methods, if able. But CF10 added a bunch of functionality.
HTTPOnly Cookies - while "available" well before CF10, CF10 added it as a setting in CF Administrator or by using this.sessioncookie.httponly=true in Application.cfc. You can still accomplish this in older versions through JVM settings or content headers. (https://www.petefreitag.com/item/764.cfm)
Content Secruity Policy - (https://content-security-policy.com/) I will admit that I'm not as familiar with CSP as I should be. It's not really CF, but it's still something to know about. It lets you establish the approved origin of the content in your site, which should hopefully prevent someone from injecting content that redirects a user's action to somewhere else. But be warned that it is browser-dependent.
scriptProtect is a CF Admin or Application.cfc setting. (http://help.adobe.com/en_US/ColdFusion/9.0/CFMLRef/WSc3ff6d0ea77859461172e0811cbec22c24-7d69.html) will help with a lot of XSS, but not all. It's a simple pattern-matching blacklist method instead of a whitelist (it pretty much looks only for object, embed, script, applet, and meta), so there are many ways to get around it. It should be used but not relied upon or expected to be 100% safe.
encodeFor*() - (https://helpx.adobe.com/coldfusion/cfml-reference/coldfusion-functions/functions-e-g/encodeforhtml.html). These have been much improved since the HTMLEditFormat() days. Make sure you use the appropriate encoding method.
Canonicalize() - (https://helpx.adobe.com/coldfusion/cfml-reference/coldfusion-functions/functions-c-d/Canonicalize.html) This function is great, but I believe there was a minor change between 10 and 11 that adds a little better handling. With the additional CF11 throwOnError flag, when you check for both multi- and mixed encoding, you can throw/catch an error if either are detected and log/block that user. There is pretty much no reason any legitimate user would ever hit those flags, so logging/blocking isn't a bad idea.
Also see Dave Epler's excellent writeup in http://learncfinaweek.com/week1/Cross_Site_Scripting__XSS_/. That will give you some good info on XSS in ColdFusion.
And finally, as you can see from some of my earlier links, Pete Freitag has some the best security resources I've found (https://www.petefreitag.com), and he tends to be the expert I trust for information about ColdFusion application security. Pete's Bank of Insecurity app (https://github.com/foundeo/cfml-security-training) will give you some great examples of how CF can be exploited.
The moral of my story is one of basic Defense In Depth, even for a single type of exploit. Some of my examples above involve code you write, some are page headers (not quite the same kind of code) and some are Server Administrator functions or settings. You can never be 100% safe, but it's a good idea to throw multiple roadblocks up in the way of a malicious user.
This seems to be the answer I was looking for so far.
<!--- In Application.cfc --->
<cfscript>
this.scriptprotect = "all";
</cfscript>
<!--- In OnRequestStart in Application.cfc --->
<cfscript>
sanitizeScope(url);
</cfscript>
<!--- CF10 Canonicalize --->
<cfscript>
/* This function decodes any particular scope values */
public void function sanitizeScope( struct scope )
{
for( var key in scope )
{
scope[key] = canonicalize(scope[key], false, false);
}
}
</cfscript>

PhalconPHP $di security concern with print_r on Resultset objects displays PDO password

Let's say I want to display all the records a particular SELECT statement returned. So I do something as simple as this:
<?php
$listings=ProductListings::find(array());//ProductListings is my model
foreach($listings as $listing)
{
echo '<pre>'.print_r($listing,true).'</pre>';
}
?>
But, instead of seeing a clean-looking output, like one unsavvy with Phalcon would expect, I see a massive screen splashing properties via di:protected including my config and the disturbing:
[db] => Phalcon\Db\Adapter\Pdo\Mysql Object
(
[_eventsManager:protected] =>
[_descriptor:protected] => Array
(
[host] => localhost
[username] => **myUsername**
[password] => **myPassword**
[dbname] => **myDatabaseName**
[charset] => utf8
)
I know somewhere down the line, I'm gonna find myself doing a print_r and the database information is gonna go public; or worse, a search engine will cache the page with my sensitive data in tact. Whether someone can make use of such information or not, that's not the point. I don't want such information displayed in the first place when I do a print_r. Security concerns aside, I don't wanna have to search pages and pages worth of clutter to find the data I'm interested in.
My question to you is, coming from a design point of view, what options do we have as Phalcon developers to add another layer of security to our applications, so these protected properties are less likely to expose our sensitive data with one wrong slip of a print_r when we're debugging? The same problem is evident with all Phalcon-related objects which store references to the di. I imagine I could do something with output buffering to scan the output every time for possible slips, but that would just be silly. Being considerate of Phalcon's architecture, what kind of countermeasures can we take in an effort to keep our applications secure?
Short answer: There is no way to get around this, I'm afraid.
Somewhat longer (but probably equally unsatisfying) answer:
Bear these two facts in mind:
print_r is, as you rightly said, a means of debugging. It will print out all the contents of a variable, regardless of how sensitive the information contained might be to you.
The concept of dependency injection does not work without a DI container. This container is designed to hold all relevant parts of your application like the database interface, the view engine etc., therefore making it the sacred core of your entire app.
Understand that what you're doing is exposing the inner sanctum of your app by using print_r($di) or on any component therein (because they also hold a reference to the DI). It's probably the worst thing you can do, because - as you correctly pointed out - if you forget to remove one of these debugging calls, it would be a worst case scenario in terms of security.
Conclusion:
You have to use another way of doing safer debug outputs. Never output your DI container in its entirety, never output more data than you really need for debugging.
I would recommend limiting that output to stuff like the current route, active controller and action, variables present in your view and possibly other less sensitive data.
If you would like to safely debug your SQL statements, I would recommend reading this part of the Phalcon documentation.
Try this
<?php
$listings=ProductListings::find(array());
foreach($listings as $listing)
{
echo '<pre>'.print_r($listing->toArray(), true).'</pre>';
}
?>

Possible security risks in localization messages

If a web application allows users to contribute translation messages in order to localize the application to a given language or locale, then what are the potential security risks involved in this. [Apart from social engineering which is an obvious one]
These translation messages are usually a collection of key-value pairs in some kind of format depending on the language/library etc. For example, PHP array files as in many OSS PHP applications, getetxt .po files for apps using gettext, Yaml files in Rails, and many others.
Such translation data is then used to provide a new locale in the list of locales available for a site.
As soon as you relinquish control of the content, you are effectively allowing any "authorized" content provider to add whatever they want to your UI. Even if you prevent execution of potential code included in the content, you cannot prevent display of inappropriate text (or images) to users unless you screen that text at its entry point into your system.
One way to address this is via service contracts with the content providers that specify their obligations for content verification. Depending on who the providers are, this may be enough to make you confortable with relinquishing control. Otherwise, there's pretty much no substitute for a human with the application's owner organization approving all submitted content before it is approved for publication.
To be honest this is kind of a strange question. I will assume that you have read and understand the OWASP top 10. I assume you know how to protect your own server from attack.
That being said in my mind the most obvious attack against this translation system is persistent XSS which would allow an attacker to deface every website using this dataset. Just saying "oah we htmlencode the values" isn't enough. If you are supplying these data sets to a 3rd party you can't expect all of them to sanitize the data properly. To make matters worse, XSS is an output problem, you can't HTML encode the entire data set and expect it to be 100% safe because you have no idea how the data is going to be used within the HTML document. The problem is the data may end up within a script tag or event, and then the protection from html-encoding could be nullified entirely. I always chuckle when I see someone using strip_tags() to try and stop xss, this is just the wrong approach.
In summation there really isn't a 100% solution to the problem, but this will prevent most xss:
$var=htmlspecialchars($var,ENT_QUOTES,"UTF-8");
$var=rtrim($var,"\\");
Obviously the rtrim() is used to help prevent xss within a script tag. If the string ends with a backslash you can break out of a quoted string, backslashes are equally as dangerous as quote marks.
I think it's safe to say that HTML elements in the "new" string can only be those that were in the old string, minus a few specific attributes such as title and alt.
Example:
English string: <strong title="Just a test">Hover this message</strong>
Dutch translation: <strong title="Gewoon een test">Hang hier met de muis boven</strong> - will be marked as safe
Dutch translation: <strong onmouseover="window.location='something';">Hang hier met de muis boven</strong> will be invalidated by the filter
You would have to write a rather strong filter though, and always verify that no attributes were added, removed, and no HTML elements were added or removed. Also, always be careful with " and '.

Block all content on a web page for people using an Adblock-type browser add-on/extension?

I wish to block ALL my content from any users using an ad-blocking browser extension (ie. Adblock Plus for Firefox, Adthwart for Chrome).
How can I acheive this? Is there a server-side solution? Client-side?
Edit 1
This question regards the detection of ad-blocking browser extensions:
Detecting AdBlocking software?
I'm concerned with post-detection action.
Edit 2
A duplicate question was asked after mine, so I thought I'd link to it here:
Prevent Adblock Users from Accessing Website?
To detect if the user is blocking ads, all you have to do is find a function in the ad javascript and try testing for it. It doesn't matter what method they're using to block the ad. Here's what it looks like for Google Adsense ads:
if(typeof(window.google_render_ad)=="undefined")
{
//They're blocking ads, do something else.
}
This method is outlined here: http://www.metamorphosite.com/detect-web-popup-blocker-software-adblock-spam
It's like trying to block users from reading your contents while standing rather then while sitting. It's silly, and it's likely to drive visitors off your site. The last time i saw a "you're using adblock, that hurt web developing bla bla" i jst blocked that div with the element hiding helper. It was fun i admit. Most sites are almost unreadable as now, with flashing ads and pale contents. A good quantity of ads are, also, malevolent, disguised as part of the site they're in takes the user to bad places.
That's why you should not. If you still want to, bad news, you can't. As long as i can write $('.ad').hide() in my console, nobody can stop me from adblocking something. I sometimes give up when ads divs have a very generic class, id, or they haven't any, so that it's difficult to target them with the adblock element hiding helper (of course if they are not in the lists, in that case i dont even know they exists). So the best you can do probably is give to ads a class of .content or something you use also in other parts of the site. It's not much, but it' all you can do. And just because you can, it does not mean you should. The web marketing model have to change, and it will.
That I know of this is not directly possible. Most add blockers work by locking at the URLs that are being "requested" and either blocking directly, or looking at the content/mime-type and blocking based on that.
You might be able to do something by looking for signs of the adblocker, but this will be difficult at best.
Although I love my adblocker, it's about answering questions. You could check if an url that would normally be blocked by an adblocker is reachable, and continue only if that image/bla in question is loaded. otherwise, you just don't.

How can we restrict the user from saving a web page?

How can we restrict a user from saving the page?
Please provide some tips to disable File->Save and View Source options
EDIT: Obviously it can't be done, and probably shouldn't be attempted. But possibly a more interesting variant on this question is how can we make is sufficiently hard for a user to save a page in a usable format such that it is not worth their while doing so? The question doesn't pose a value, but say we were protecting an article subscription site where the user is paying a few hundred dollars per annum for continued access to text.
Since the page has been sent to the client, there will always be a way to get that information. Trying to stop a user from doing this will only frustrate them.
The only way to have a user not be able to save a file is to not send it to them.
While the best answer is "Don't do this," there are ways to make it more difficult for them. And since the point of this site is actually answer the question even if it's bad, here is the best way:
First you'll need to have the page open in a new window where you turn off the address bar and toolbar and everything else. That will make it so the user can't easily get to the File menu at all. To do this you'll need a "splash" page that the user loads to and then when they click a link, it opens the popup that serves the main content of your page. Details on how to create popups without things like the toolbar are here:
http://blazonry.com/javascript/windows.php
Then you'll want to add some javascript to each page that prevents the user from right clicking. Here is one method:
http://javascript.about.com/library/blnoright.htm
Finally, if it's your Javascript code that you don't want to be seen, then obfuscating your code is a pretty effective way to do that. They can still see the code if they have much know-how, but the obfuscated code would be a gigantic pain to actually interpret. There are lots of obfuscators out there; here is a free web-based one:
http://www.javascriptobfuscator.com/
This is far from foolproof. It will stop all "casual" users, but any power user will probably be able to easily figure out a way around it. Still if the idea is to at least prevent a good majority of it then this should suffice.
Update for updated question:
To address your new expanded question, I would say the best way to accomplish what you're saying is to use a format that supports DRM. Adobe Acrobat would probably be the best choice because almost everyone has the reader installed. You can prevent PDF files from being saved to the computer so that they can only be loaded from the webpage by a logged in user. The user could still do a screen capture of the document itself which I don't believe is preventable (unless Adobe Reader has some security in place for this, which they might) but it should be sufficient security for most uses.
Don't do it.
Seriously, if the user can see the page in their browser they can see the source code and/or save it to their computer.
You are fighting a losing battle here.
What about the browser's cache? It can be saved from there.
What about a print screen? That could also save the page.
The only way to prevent a user from saving something is to not show it to them in the first place.
It's really a waste of time and resources to try and do this in html as any method you use can be trivially circumvented.
Instead I would use some other technology to display the data - you can never get around a screen capture. but if you're for instance displaying text and you want to make it hard for the use to save that text for use elsewhere then possible options include
PDF - which can disable save and print. There are extensions to most popular web languages that will write a pdf on the fly. Indeed you might be as well just to go down the DRM route with Adobe and embed a document
Flash - most probably via Flex which could be used to write a general-purpose app to display text and images. The advantage of Flash is that it's easier to set up links than pdf.
Or something else, a custom java applet, or even a vrml plugin and display the text in 3D!
In all cases you could display text against a disruptive background to make OCR more difficult, and images could be watermarked. However nothing is going to stop a determined and resourceful viewer, although you can possibly make it sufficiently hard that it's not worth their time.
The least you can do is... the content is generated dynamically by Javascript. In that way, they cannot simply save it. Of course, in FX, they can still view the generated code and then copy&paste. however, normally people cannot save the page.
It shouldn't be an issue, but if you really don't want a user from seeing your code (javascript, css or html) for some reason, than you could use some obfuscation tool which makes the code less readable.
Try javascript "encoding" and obfuscation.
Something like
if(document.location == 'mydomain.com') {
content = getAjax('mycontent.xml');
// content will hold something like 72, 94, 81, 99, ... - encoded ASCII codes
document.write(String.fromCharCode(content));
}
It will always be possible to save the page, but for non-technical guys it will be harder to make it work.
There are 2 protections
domain name
converting ASCII
It's only pseudocode, but I think you get the idea.
add these to code sets in script tag
document.addEventListener('contextmenu', function (e) {
e.preventDefault();
});
document.onkeydown = function (e) {
return false;
};
I'd like to add one more method which, imho, is hard to circumvent: Ctrl+S! (for me, Apple+S)
how can we make is sufficiently hard for a user to save a page in a usable format such that it is not worth their while doing so
Nothing hard: add on every page: "Personal property of John Stealer, company Zetabeta, paid with credit card 756890987654, billing address ..., subscription expires 12/20".
This is an "extended text format" that I just invented... it has an amazing property: though it looks like a regular text, user is much less willing to print it out and give to others...

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