Is showing TCM ID on the SiteEdit instruction on the public website a security issue? My thoughts are it should not be an issue since Tridion is behind the firewall. I want to know the experts opinion.
I think you're asking the wrong question here. It is not important whether those SiteEdit instructions are a security risk, they should only be present on the publishing target(s) where you use SiteEdit. On any other target they just needlessly increase the size and expose implementation details that are not relevant to the visitors of that target.
So unless you enable SiteEdit on your public web site (highly unlikely), the SiteEdit instructions should not be in the HTML.
It depends on the level of security you require. In principle, your security should be so good that you don't rely on "security by obscurity". You should have modelled every threat, and understood it, and designed impregnable defences.
In real life, this is a little harder to achieve, and the focus is more on what is usually described as "security in depth". In other words, you do your best to have impregnable defences, but if some straightforward disciplines will make it more difficult for your attacker, you make sure that you go to that effort as well. There is plenty of evidence that the first step in any attack is to try to enumerate what technology you are using. Then if there are any known exploits for that technology, the attacker will attempt to use them. In addition, if an exploit becomes known, attackers will search for potential victims by searching for signatures of the compromised technology.
Exposing TCM URIs in your public-facing output is as good as telling an attacker that you are using Tridion. So, for that matter, is exposing SiteEdit code. If you use Tridion, it is utterly unnecessary to do either of these things. You can simply display a web site that gives no clues about its implementation. (The ability to avoid giving these clues will be a hard requirement for many large organisations choosing a WCMS, and Tridion's strength in this regard may be one of the reasons why the organisation you work for chose to use it.)
So while there is nothing in a TCM URI which of itself causes a security problem, it unnecessarily gives information to potential attackers, so yes, it is a security issue. Financial institutions, government organisations, and large corporations in general, will expect you to do a clean implementation that gives no succour to the bad guys.
I would argue that it does not really present an issue. If there are holes in the firewall that can be breached, an attacker may find a way to get through regardless. The fact that there is a Tridion CMS installation behind the firewall is somewhat irrelevant.
Whether you have the URIs in your source code or not, your implementation should be secured well enough that the knowledge gained by knowing that you have a Tridion CMS is of no value to a hacker.
Related
This maybe a very newbie question, but exactly what do I need so that I can say my network is considered "secure"?
To be more specific, if I have a website that deals with login/signup and lots of money transactions, what do I need to protect it?
So far I know I need EV SSL certificate, login system protections like brute force login protection, hashing the password, key stretching. Is there anything I missed?
Besides, is firewall really necessary in my case? I just feel like everything I want to do can be accomplished by the server itself, so is there really a need to get a software/hardware firewall?
To be completely blunt, you should probably hire a security professional to assess and make recommendations about your site. Alternatively, a part or full-time network administrator with security experience/certifications might be a good hire.
I recommend the "don't do-it-yourself" approach not because I want to increase work for my peers, or that I don't believe you are a fully competent individual. Rather, I recommend it because security is really, really hard to get right, and any site that handles money is an ideal target for any attacker out there. From a professional perspective, you would be best served by getting an expert to secure your network, perhaps on an ongoing basis; this is a situation that security professionals are very used to, and very well equipped to handle. From a legal perspective, getting an expert opinion on such a sensitive matter is essential due diligence, and trying to do it entirely on your own opens you to significant liability if your system gets breached and attackers are able to carry off your customer's data. Which, as your business grows and you gain more visibility online, only more and more likely to happen without ongoing, professional help.
Lets say I knew an ethical hacker that I wanted to hire to do a penetration test, but trust was an issue. Could I duplicate my system but have its sensitive data removed, and have it untraceable to the company that owns it?
If just the structure and security measures remained, could this duplicate be hacked to see if certain areas can be accessed? I'm guessing it could be done similarly to the 'missions' on hackthissite.org. I could then be informed of the exploits. What would the test site look like?
Could it actually be completely untraceable to its company? How hard would this be?
You generally cannot go around distributing the code for your employers sites.
With their permission, though, what you could do is setup a staging environment (most development environments should have these anyway) and in that sense you can point relevant people to that site (with no real data) for the purposes of providing a penetration test. Of course, it may limit the scope of the validity of their attacks, but not generally so, because you're already basically saying "attack this web infrastructure", and the data they see is kind of irrelevant (as long as it has the same structure); that is the aim of exposing weaknesses in the sites function is independent of data.
You could do that, but there are nuances. Just make sure that the structure is not changed. That is, remove non behavioral procedures and create a clone and allow him to test that only.
Bear in mind, though, that even if you remove the sensible data, you can still be hacked. A security flaw can be such that does not rely on behavior, but services and such (which is most times the case).
The tester can easily not report a vulnerability and leave this open as a backdoor to your real application.
I know SO isn't traditionally used this way (or maybe it is), but I've been learning about webapp security and was thinking it would be nice and encouraging to hear from SO experts what they think of this article (I'm reading it now, it's on session security).
http://carsonified.com/blog/dev/how-to-create-bulletproof-sessions/
Maybe we can have a discussion of some kind, point out what the author misstated/forgot and what better practices are there?
For example when it comes to a different security topic like sql injections, many people recommend things like mysql_real_escape_strings, but the experts will tell you that nothing beats prepared statements. From the comments, this article seems to have its problems, so I'm wondering how far on the good or bad side his content is.
I think the article is quite nice, however these are just the basic concepts and if somebody seriously tries to make a serious security aware application, things like this will be addressed. In other words, the level of the article is quite low.
Issues like a man-in-the-middle attack are not addressed here (although i can imagine that something like this is usually outside the scope of the application layer). Another possible vulnerability can be random number generation. So depending on the implementation of session key generation, the entropy of the session keys could be much lower as the maximum possible entropy which may or may not make brute force attacks feasible.
So it really depends on the security requirements you have how the solution will be, there is no single security solution that works in all cases. To apply the latter, imagine that you've got a valid session id and you know to which ip the session is bound. Also assume that the target in this example is a bank. Now i can perform a request to transfer money to my account, and make this work by spoofing my ip-address and providing the stolen session. Ok, the reply of my request will never arrive since the IP address is spoofed, but who cares, I got the money since the server accepted my request.
The point is that depending on the context, your security requirements and thus your security solution(s) may greatly vary.
we know that each executable file can be reverse engineered (disassembled, decompiled). No mater how strong security you will implement, anyway if crackers want to, they do crack!!! Just that is a question of time.
What about websites? May we say that website can be completely safe from attacks of hackers (we assume that hosting is not vulnerable)? If no, than what is the reason?
Yes it is always possible to do. There is always a way in.
It's like my grandfather always said:
Locks are meant to keep the honest
people out
May we say that website can be completely safe from attacks of hackers?
No. Even the most secure technology in the world is vulnerable to social engineering attacks, for one thing.
You can easily write a webapp that is mathematically proven to be secure... But that proof will only hold as long as the underlying operating system, interpreter|compiler, and hardware are secure, which is never the case.
The key thing to remember is that websites are usually part of a huge and complex system and it doesn't really matter if the hacker enters the system through the web application itself or some other part of the entire infrastructure. If someone can get access to your servers, routers, DNS or whatever, they can bring down even the best web application. In my experience a lot of systems are vulnerable in some way or another. So "completely secure" means either "we're trying really hard to secure the platform" or "we have no clue whatsoever, but we hope everything is okay". I have seen both.
To sum up and add to the posts that precede:
Web as a shared resource - websites are useful so long as they are accessible. Render the web site unaccessible, and you've broken it. Denial of service attacks add up to flooding the server so that it can no longer respond to legitimate requests will always be a factor. It's a game of keep away - big server sites find ways to distribute, hackers find ways to deluge.
Dynamic data = dynamic risk - if the user can input data, there's a chance for a hacker to be a menance. Today the big concepts are cross-site scripting and SQL injection, but once one avenue for cracking is figured out, chances are high that another mechanism will rise. You could, conceivably, argue that a totally static site can be secure from this, but then how many useful sites fit that bill?
Complexity = the more complex, the harder to secure - given the rapid change of technology, I doubt that any web developer could say with 100% confidence that a modern website was secure - there's too much unknown code. Taking the host aside (the server, network protocols, OS, and maybe database), there's still all the great new libraries in Java EE and .Net. And even a less enterprise-y architecture will have some serious complexity that makes knowing all potential inputs and outputs of the code prohibitively difficult.
The authentication problem = by definition, the web site lets a remote user do something useful on a server that is far away. Knowing and trusting the other end of the communication is an old challenge. These days server side authenitication is relatively well implemented an understood and (so far as I know!) no one's managed to hack PKI. But getting user authentication ironed out is still quite tricky. It's doable, but it's a tradeoff between difficulty for the user and for configuration, and a system with a higher risk of vulnerability. And even a strong system can be broken when users don't follow the rules or when accidents happen. All this doesn't apply if you want to make a public site for all users, but that severely limits the features you'll be able to implement.
I'd say that web sites simply change the nature of the security challenge from the challenges of client side code. The developer does not need to be as worried about code replication, but the developer does need to be aware of the risks that come from centralizing data and access to a server (or collection of servers). It's just a different sort of problem.
Websites suffer greatly from injection and cross site scripting attacks
Cross-site scripting carried out on
websites were roughly 80% of all
documented security vulnerabilities as
of 2007
Also part of a website (in some web sites a great deal) is sent to the client in the form of CSS, HTML and javascript, which is the open for inspection by anyone.
Not to nitpick, but your definition of "good hosting" does not assume the HTTP service running on the host is completely free from exploits.
Popular web servers such as IIS and Apache are often patched in order to protect against such exploits, which are often discovered the same way exploits in local executables are discovered.
For example, a malformed HTTP request could cause a buffer overrun on the server, leading to part of its data being executed.
It's not possible to make anything 100% secure.
All that can be done is to make something hard enough to break into, that the time and effort spent doing so makes it not worth doing.
Can I crack your site? Sure, I'll just hire a few suicide bombers to blow up your servers. Or... I'll blow up those power plants that power up your site, or I do some sort of social engineering, and DDOS attacks would quite likely be effective in a large scale not to mention atom bombs...
Short answer: yes.
This might be the wrong website to discuss that. However, it is widely known that security and usability are inversely related. See this post by Bruce Schneier for example (which refers to another website, but on Schneier's blog there's a lot of interesting readings on the issue).
Assuming the server itself isn't comprimised, and has no other clients sharing it, static code should be fine. Things usually only start to get funky when there's some sort of scripting language involved. After all, I've never seen a comprimised "It Works!" page
Saying 'completely secure' is a bad thing as it will state two things:
there has not been a proper threat analysis, because secure enough would be the 'correct' term
since security is always a tradeoff it means that the a system that is completely secure will have abysmal usability and the site will be a huge resource hog as security has been taken to insane levels.
So instead of trying to achieve "complete security" you should;
Do a proper threat analysis
Test your application (or have someone professional test it) against common attacks
Apply best practices, not extreme measures
The short of it is that you have to strike a balance between ease of use and security, much of the time, and decide what provides the optimal level of both for your purposes.
An excellent case in point is passwords. The easy way to go about it is to just have one, use it everywhere, and make it something easy to remember. The secure way to go about it is to have a randomly generated variable-length sequence of characters across the encoding spectrum that only the user himself knows.
Naturally, if you go too far on the easy side, the user's data is easy to pick off. If you go too far on the side of security, however, practical application could end up leading to situations that compromise the added value of the security measures (e.g. people can't remember their whole keychain of passwords and corresponding user names, and therefore write them all down somewhere. If the list is compromised, the security measures that had been put into place are for naught. Hence, most of the time a balance gets struck and places ask that you put a number in your password and tell you not to do anything stupid like tell it to other people.
Even if you remove the possibility of a malicious person with the keys to everything leaking data from the equation, human stupidity is infinite. There is no such thing as 100% security.
May we say that website can be completely safe from attacks of hackers (we assume that hosting is not vulnerable)?
Well if we're going to start putting constraints on the attacker, then of course we can design a completely secure system: we just have to bar all of the attacker's attacks from the scenario.
If we assume the attacker actually wants to get in (and isn't bound by the rules of your engagement), then the answer is simply no, you can't be completely safe from attacks.
Yes, it's possible for a website to be completely secure, for a reasonable definition of 'complete' that includes your original premise that the hosting is not vulnerable. The problem is the same as with any software that contains defects; people create software of a complexity that is slightly beyond their capability to manage and thus flaws remain undetected until it's too late.
You could start smaller and prove all your work correct and safe as you construct it, remaking any off-the-shelf components that haven't been designed to that stringent degree of quality, but unfortunately that leaves you at a massive commercial disadvantage compared to the people who can write 99% safe software in 1% of the time. Therefore there's rarely a good business reason for going down this path.
The answer to this question lies close to the ideas about computational theory that arise from considering the halting problem. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem To wit, if you could with clarity say you'd devised a way to programmatically determine if any particular program was secure, you might be close to disproving the undecidability of the halting problem on the class of machines you were working with. Since the undecidability of the halting problem has been proven, we can know that over turing machines you would be unable to prove securability since the problem of security reduces to the halting problem. Even for finite machines you might be able to decide all of the states of the program, but Minsk would tell us that the time required for a complete state tree for even simplistic modern day machines and web servers would be huge. You probably know a lot about a specific piece of code, but as soon as you changed the code, or updated it, a complete retest would be required. Fundamentally this is interesting because it all boils back to the concept of information and meaning. Read about Automated theory proving to understand more about the limits of computational systems. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automated_theorem_proving
The fact is hackers are always one step ahead of developers, you can never ever consider a site to be bullet proof and 100% safe. You just avoid malicious stuff as much as you can !!
In fact, you should follow whitelist approach rather than blacklist approach when it comes to security.
There's a lot of security advice out there to tell programmers what not to do. What in your opinion are the best practices that should be followed when coding for good security?
Please add your suggested security control / design pattern below. Suggested format is a bold headline summarising the idea, followed by a description and examples e.g.:
Deny by default
Deny everything that is not explicitly permitted...
Please vote up or comment with improvements rather than duplicating an existing answer. Please also put different patterns and controls in their own answer rather than adding an answer with your 3 or 4 preferred controls.
edit: I am making this a community wiki to encourage voting.
Principle of Least Privilege -- a process should only hold those privileges it actually needs, and should only hold those privileges for the shortest time necessary. So, for example, it's better to use sudo make install than to su to open a shell and then work as superuser.
All these ideas that people are listing (isolation, least privilege, white-listing) are tools.
But you first have to know what "security" means for your application. Often it means something like
Availability: The program will not fail to serve one client because another client submitted bad data.
Privacy: The program will not leak one user's data to another user
Isolation: The program will not interact with data the user did not intend it to.
Reviewability: The program obviously functions correctly -- a desirable property of a vote counter.
Trusted Path: The user knows which entity they are interacting with.
Once you know what security means for your application, then you can start designing around that.
One design practice that doesn't get mentioned as often as it should is Object Capabilities.
Many secure systems need to make authorizing decisions -- should this piece of code be able to access this file or open a socket to that machine.
Access Control Lists are one way to do that -- specify the files that can be accessed. Such systems though require a lot of maintenance overhead. They work for security agencies where people have clearances, and they work for databases where the company deploying the database hires a DB admin. But they work poorly for secure end-user software since the user often has neither the skills nor the inclination to keep lists up to date.
Object Capabilities solve this problem by piggy-backing access decisions on object references -- by using all the work that programmers already do in well-designed object-oriented systems to minimize the amount of authority any individual piece of code has. See CapDesk for an example of how this works in practice.
DARPA ran a secure systems design experiment called the DARPA Browser project which found that a system designed this way -- although it had the same rate of bugs as other Object Oriented systems -- had a far lower rate of exploitable vulnerabilities. Since the designers followed POLA using object capabilities, it was much harder for attackers to find a way to use a bug to compromise the system.
White listing
Opt in what you know you accept
(Yeah, I know, it's very similar to "deny by default", but I like to use positive thinking.)
Model threats before making security design decisions -- think about what possible threats there might be, and how likely they are. For, for example, someone stealing your computer is more likely with a laptop than with a desktop. Then worry about these more probable threats first.
Limit the "attack surface". Expose your system to the fewest attacks possible, via firewalls, limited access, etc.
Remember physical security. If someone can take your hard drive, that may be the most effective attack of all.
(I recall an intrusion red team exercise in which we showed up with a clipboard and an official-looking form, and walked away with the entire "secure" system.)
Encryption ≠ security.
Hire security professionals
Security is a specialized skill. Don't try to do it yourself. If you can't afford to contract out your security, then at least hire a professional to test your implementation.
Reuse proven code
Use proven encryption algorithms, cryptographic random number generators, hash functions, authentication schemes, access control systems, rather than rolling your own.
Design security in from the start
It's a lot easier to get security wrong when you're adding it to an existing system.
Isolation. Code should have strong isolation between, eg, processes in order that failures in one component can't easily compromise others.
Express risk and hazard in terms of cost. Money. It concentrates the mind wonderfully.
Well understanding of underlying assumptions on crypto building blocks can be important. E.g., stream ciphers such as RC4 are very useful but can be easily used to build an insecure system (i.e., WEP and alike).
If you encrypt your data for security, the highest risk data in your enterprise becomes your keys. Lose the keys, and data is lost; compromise the keys and all your data is compromised.
Use risk to make security decisions. Once you determine the probability of different threats, then consider the harm that each could do. Risk is, by definition
R = Pe × H
where Pe is the probability of the undersired event, and H is the hazard, or the amount of harm that could come from the undesired event.
Separate concerns. Architect your system and design your code so that security-critical components can be kept together.
KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid)
If you need to make a very convoluted and difficult to follow argument as to why your system is secure, then it probably isn't secure.
Formal security designs sometimes refer to a thing called the TCB (Trusted Computing Base). But even an informal design has something like this - the security enforcing part of your code, the part you can't avoid relying on. This needs to be well encapsulated and as simple and small as possible.