I follow the toctrl explain (http://www.thesprawl.org/research/tor-control-protocol/) on how to create really fast one hop circuits , i success to create circuit of one , but i didnt success to use firefox with tor after doing this.
i also try to use in "tor auto circuit project" , but i got error from tor that he didnt able to connect to node (each time different node), so he give up.
i also try to download the tortunnel project , but i didnt success to compile it.
Does any one has experience with this?
Thank you
Tor relays reject single hop circuits unless specifically allowed via the AllowSingleHopExits option in their torrc. Tor is an anonymity network, not a pool of single hop proxies. If you don't care about your anonymity then you should direct your traffic through a shell server somewhere.
Related
Question regarding the traffic coming out from the TOR exit node:
I have been reading on a forum of people arguing the capabilities and risks of using TOR network. I have never used TOR before, nor would I have the need to use it, but I still want to know more about it.
I understand TOR uses randomly selected relays for traffic to travel through, but the traffic eventually comes out of an exit node somewhere. I have read that such traffic can be used to trace the user.
What i don't understand is if this traffic can be analysed, wouldn't it just show the requests are coming from the last relay instead of the original IP? Or does it show the entire trail including all the relay nodes that the traffic has passed through?
Say, this traffic can indeed be traced, does using encryption makes any difference? IF i was running an exit node (I'm not, I know the risks) and analyse the exiting traffic that is encrypted, can I still trace the original IP?
What if the user:
*is on open Wifi > connects to it with a laptop with dual NICs > is using live USB OS with say...a squid box as proxy > connects to it with another laptop > > connects to VPN > uses TOR with encryption
Is there a way for a normal user or a researcher, without ample resources like the government/law enforcement has, to still analyse the exiting traffic and trace the original IP?
Thanks in advance.
Since an exit relay is responsible for relaying source traffic out to the internet, if that traffic uses an unencrypted protocol (e.g. http), it can see the contents of that traffic.
For that reason, you shouldn't send sensitive data over Tor unencrypted when possible. The guard (entry), and middle (relay) nodes can't see the actual traffic, only the exit can. Only the guard node can see your true IP address.
The exit (while it can see the actual traffic and the destination) has no way of knowing your IP. If it could, you'd be much less anonymous when using Tor.
The threats here are if an adversary controls many relays. One of the worst case scenarios for being tracked through Tor would be if you selected a circuit where the guard node and exit node were controlled by the same adversary.
In this scenario, they could see your actual source IP address and your exit traffic (if unencrypted) or at the very least the destination for your exit traffic.
The other tricky part is correlating your entry traffic with the exit traffic. Whether or not entry traffic to a relay they control is also related to exit traffic from another relay they control is strictly up to timing and traffic analysis.
To understand more, you first need to understand how Tor works on a basic level, for that see the documentation page and the overview. Then, search for things like "Tor traffic analysis", "Tor traffic fingerprinting", "Tor timing attacks", and "Tor traffic correlation" to understand more and the research being done to defend against it.
More recent versions of Tor have started padding all cells to make smaller and larger traffic indistinguishable from eachother, and much past research has been done into relay selection
to prevent the chances of randomly selecting malicious exits or guards.
Hope that helps.
I want to connect more than 5 bouncers to my favourite irc network.
Unfortunately, server accepts only up to five connections from one IP.
How can i do it and is it real?
I have only one server with one IP but i have a domain with an unlimited number pf subdomains.
You could use a proxy server.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxy_server
Either ask the network for a connection limit exemption (which a network should be able to give you if you explain why you need it), or you'll need a second IP or a second server - there's no way around this.
With a second machine, you could set up a bouncer on that machine (such as irssi with irssi-proxy), then connect ZNC to irssi. Alternatively, you could use SSH tunnelling to route your IRC connection through another machine.
Neither method is particularly good, multiple ZNC instances on multiple machines, or an exemption is probably the best way. Talk to the network staff about it and see what they can do.
I'm performing some latency measurements over the Tor network. TO avoid congesting the relays, each run of my test lasts about 15 to 20 minutes, consuming an average bandwidth of 2 kbps.
Because of the way the relay works, my measurements get disrupted because the identity automatically changes every few minutes. I wonder if someone knows how to do these:
Specify the time interval between identity changes. Alternatively, disabling the automatic identity change and allowing me to use vidalia's control panel to change identities manually
Specify an IP address as an exit relay. I edited torrc, setting ExitNodes to an ipaddress, and StrictNode to 1, but after an initial connection to that specific exit relay and 1 http connection to the outside world, no subsequent traffic is routed out of tor.
I unfortunately can't seem to find an answer to my dilemma looking at previous questions. :-/ My setup consists of ubuntu 12.04 lts, installing vidalia and tor using apt-get and firefox connecting to tor using socks via localhost:9050
1) Specify the time interval between identity changes.
Hi Nina, thanks for being careful about the load you put on the network! By default Tor cycles your circuits every ten minutes. You can customize this with the MaxCircuitDirtiness option in your torrc.
2) Specify an IP address as an exit relay.
Tor does not make this particularly easy. Probably the best option would be to extend one of your existing circuits to the desired endpoint. You can do this via stem using the extend_circuit() method.
Tough question. It has to do mainly with security, but also computers. Probably not been done yet.
I was wondering, is it possible to host for example a web application, yet be able to hide *where* the actual server is, and, or who is the originator, making it very very hard ( practically impossible ) for some one to track the origin of the server, and who is behind it?
I was thinking that this might be possible through a third party server, preferably with an owner unrelated to the proxy sites. But the question then also becomes an issue of reliability *of* the third party.
Does the TOR network have support for registering for recieving incoming requests rather than outgoing ones? How secure would that be? Might it be possible that the TOR network has been infiltrated by for example a big goverment ( read USA ) ( dont get angry, please enlighten me as I do not know much of how the TOR network is hosted ).
How can one possibly create such a secure third party server, that preferably does not even know who the final recipient of the request is? Third party companies might be subjected *to* pressure from goverments, either directly from powerful *nations* such as USA, or by the USA applying pressure on the goverments of the country where the server is, applying pressure on the company behind it, and force you to enable a backdoor. ( Just my wild fantasy, think worst case scenario is my motto :) ).
I just came with the idea, that being that this is probably *impossible*, the best way would be to have a bunch of distributed servers, across several nations, make it as hard as possible to go through each and one of them to find the next bouncing server. This would have to be in a linked list, with one public server being registered on a DNS. If compromised, the public server needs to be replaced with another one.
request from user0 -> server1 -> server2 -> server3 -> final processing server -> response to user0 or through the incoming server chain.
When sending a response to someone, could it be done using UDP rather than TCP and hide who the sender was ( also in a web application ) ? So that a middle man listening on user0 computer incoming responses ( and outgoing requests ) do not figure *out who the final* processing server is, if we decide to respond directly to user0 from the final processing server?
The IP of server1 will be public and known to anyone, server1 will send the message to server2 and it is possibly to figure out by listening directly behind server1 traffic node, but perhaps it could hide its own origin if not being listened to directly, so that if big goverments have filters on big traffic nodes or routers, they wouldn't be able to track who it came from, and therefore what the message to server2 is intended for. It would blend in with all other requests.
Anyhow, if you have followed my thoughts this far I think you should know by now what I am thinking about.
Could this be possibly through a P2P network, with a central server behind it, and have the P2P network deliver it to the final server respond in some pattern? The idea is to have one processing server, and then have "minor", "cheaper" servers that acts as proxys?
Why I keep saying central server, is that I am thinking web. But any thoughts on the matter is interesting.
For those that wonders, why... I am looking into creating as secure as possible, and that could withstand goverment pressure ( read BlackBerry, Skype and others ).
This is also a theoretical question.
PS.
I would also be interested in knowing how one have a distributed SECURE database ( for keeping usernames, friendlists and passwords for example ) but this time, it is not neccessery for it to be on the web. A P2P software with a distributed secure database.
Thanks!
Yes, you're reinventing Tor. You should research Tor more fully before going further. In particular, see Hidden Service Protocol. Tor is not perfect, but you should understand it before you try to reinvent it.
If you want to find an ant's nest, follow the ants. If you want to find the original server, follow the ip packets. If you meet a proxy server not willing to provide their path, call the server administrator and have your men in black put a gun on his head. If he does not comply, eliminate the administrator and the server. Carry on following the ants in their new path. Repeat the operation until server is reached or server can't communicate anymore.
So no, you can't protect the origin and keep your server up and running when your men in black can reach any physical entity.
i dont want to do something illegal with it(e.g. vote continuously, in fact, somebody is doing it), but i only feel curious about it. For i have learned TCP/IP, and i found there are many software such like "IP changer",using which you can submit a website with different IP. WOW it is really magic! so i analysed some possible mechanism about it. But every possible way was denied by me.
i thought that they might connect and disconnect the internet continuously. because each time they connect the Internet, the ISP will dispatch a new IP address, and the hacker can make use of the new IP to submit the website, and disconnected after submitting successfully, and then connect for the next time...But it is impossible to some extent, for if do like this, every submitting will last a long time, and it doesn't work in some areas.
Modify TCP/IP data packets.For some time i did think it might be all right. but then i denied it. Assuming that i would submit a website, and i changed the IP address of the data packet which i will submit to the web site. it seems that everything is OK, but the web server will send message to the fake IP, so i wont get any information from the website. but in some circumstances where we only needn't reply it should work. Right? netfilter and iptables in linux may realize it, but i am not sure because i dont know the tools very well.
Using proxy server. i also think it is impossible to some extent.is there any method to get lots of free proxy servers? and most free proxy servers is very unstabitily, for there is a possible circumstance that you cannot use the proxy server in one day.Of course, paid proxy server may be permanent. but with these money you can do something better.
IMO the three methods all have disadvantages. and the realization may be none of them. Can anybody tell me the real mechanism of the technique?
Use lots of proxy servers. That will do the trick and since they can be harvested quite easily that's not very hard. Proxy's can be installed on hacked websites for example.
The added question:
Using proxy server. i also think it is impossible to some extent.is there any method to get lots of free proxy servers?
By simply hacking lots of webservers, totally automated, this is possible. For example searching for bad Joomla installs could allow you to install software at each webserver. Also normal computers can be used off course. Like a botnet.
and most free proxy servers is very unstabitily, for there is a possible circumstance that you cannot use the proxy server in one day. Of course, paid proxy server may be permanent. but with these money you can do something better.
Stability is off course important but in this case not really actually. You just send out lots and lots and lots of requests. Don't care which one succeeds and which one doesn't. It doesn't matter for your target.
1. ISP reconnect
This will not work for some (most?) ISPs which will reassign the same IP on a reconnect (as my provider does). Even if it works, you are likely to get the same IP address after some reconnects.
2. IP spoofing
That's the term describing your second method. You change the src-address of the outgoing IP packet. There are two problems with that:
Most ISP's routers don't allow it. They detect that the src address can't come from inside their network, so they simply drop it.
If you have a machine that is allowed to do this (maybe a dedicated server), you can only fake exactly one IP frame. This allows you to, e.g. spoof a DNS request but as you said, you will never get the response. Especially you cannot establish a connection within a stateful protocol like TCP, because this requires a bidirectional handshake. So you can't, e.g., fake a HTTP request using this (even if you don't need the answer)
Proxying
This is the only method that works. You have several options here:
Use open proxy servers (can be found using a search engine, although some will identify themselves as proxies and provide the original IP in the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header, which makes them basically useless for this use case)
Use hacked servers/desktop machines as proxies (maybe from a botnet)
Use free networks like JAP or TOR (the latter of which is probably your best bet, because you can change the exit nodes using some trickery)
If you are going to do something illegal, you might as well go all the way in. There ARE people who run "botnets" which are basically just armies of a few hundred to a few thousand indfected computers (that's what most viruses do). The people who run these armies, actually can charge people a certain amount of money for their "slaves" to visit a website for you (and rate/vote whatever) so you get a few hundred or a few thousand more ratings...
I can't exactly tell where or how much these services cost, since I haven't done it myself, but I know for sure that people over at "H#ckf0rums.net" will do it for you.