I need some help on the best way to secure this situation.
Here is the background
This all runs on the internal network.
there is several small web sites with classic asp that runs on iis. they all pass username/pw through a form and call this class that is a dll on the server. Which then authenticates against active directory and returns back. now obviously it is not secure passing through the form to the dll. is it then not secure as well from the dll to active directory?
what would be the easiest way to secure this. ssl? any other ideas and please answer that other dll question if you know
thanks
The problem with the word "secure" is that it ia a highly subjective term. What is or isn't "secure" really depends on the type of app and the damage that could be wrought if security measures are breached.
In some sense it isn't "secure" to have the password appear in memory in its unencrypted or even encrypted form. However I will risk the wrath of the security fanatics and suggest that having a users password in your servers volatile memory is not going to risk thermo-nuclear war and therefore an acceptable risk.
As to communicating it to the AD well that doesn't actually happen, the password does not leave the servers memory to go elsewhere. Instead AD formulates a challenge that the security API running locally in your server is able to build a response to armed with the password. The response to the challenge is sent back to AD, this response does not carry the password but carries proof that the correct password was present.
Having said that, in an intranet environment going to all this trouble (and troubling the user to yet again enter their username and password) seems a bit execessive. It would be better to just rely on Windows Integrated Security.
I've read your commens to SLaks re the "advised not to use NTLM". Yes its true that with modern machines NTLM is not as secure as we might like but is it really too lax for your requirement? Perhaps it is but integrated security can also use Kerberos.
So my suggestion would be ditch your dll, turn off NTLM in IIS leaving only Kerberos to handle the authentication. This way you never transport the password anywhere, the user isn't troubled to re-enter their password, you need do nothing in code and you avoid using NTLM.
I have a webapp that requires security beyond that of a normal web application. When any user visits the domain name, they are presented with two text fields, a username field, and a password field. If they enter a valid user/pass, they get access to the web application. Standard stuff.
However, I'm looking for additional security beyond this standard setup. Ideally it would be a software solution, but I'm also open for hardware solution as well (hardware=key fobs), or even procedural changes (one time use passwords on a password pad for example).
The webapp is unique in that we know all our users ahead of time, and we create their username and password and give it to them. In this sense, we can be assured that the username and password are "strong".
However, our clients have requested additional security beyond this. Anyone have any ideas on how to add another layer of complexity to the security?
Our company used PhoneFactor and we absolutely love it.
We've also used Safeword Tokens in the past.
However, it's notthe only game in the book. I'd start by googling "Two factor authentication"
The OWASP guide to authentication is another good place to start. Actually, OWASP is the first place I'd look for ANY web security question.
Another option for additional security is to use a piece of physical 'evidence' such as a Smart Card: Protect Your Data Via Managed Code And The Windows Vista Smart Card APIs
There are lots of different areas that web apps can have their security improved on. Before getting started you need to determine what, exactly, your problem areas might be and what you want to focus on.
You might start this process by having a third party do Penetration Testing (PEN Testing) on your application. This should give a quick hit list of things you can take care of and, when you have a passing grade, is something to use in your sales literature.
Next you'll want to talk to your customers to understand what they mean by "more secure". Is it simply two factor authentication like David and Mitch mentioned or are they more concerned about things such as data in motion (ARP Poisoning, SSL, and the like), data at rest (everything from hard drive encryption to database encryption), authorization, impersonation (cross site and replay), personnel (ongoing background checks on who has access to the machines), etc..
The concept of security covers a lot of ground.
I got very concerned reading this genius post by Aza Raskin.
What are the non-browsers solutions to defend against TabNabbing? Are there any?
"Tab Nabbing" is not a new attack, Mr Raskin is ripping off other researchers work. PDP from GnuCitizen discovered this back in 2008.
The biggest threat as I see it is Phishing. To be honest I don't think there is a good solution to stop phishing. This particular issues I think should be fixed by the browser. Eventually Firefox and Chrome will get around to fixing it. To be honest SSLStrip is a bigger threat that all browsers face, which can be used along side this redirection attack. Currently chrome has a fix in the form of STS and Firefox in the form of HTTPs Everywhere. Using noscript will also help mitigate this redirection attack attack.
One thing that will prevent this sort of thing from happening is two factor authentication using something like an RSA token (unfortunately only one bank in this country provides this method).
The RSA token is a little USB stick sized gadget that has a continuously changing serial/sequence number on it, and it is issued to you (each stick has a different sequence of numbers). When you logon to your bank's website, you have to supply you log/pass, and also the current number on the RSA token - that number changes every two minutes. That means that if the bad guys collect your login details they have less than two minutes to login to your account before the current RSA sequence number changes and the captured login details become impossible to reuse.
This 2 factor authentication is not the silver bullet though, i don't see Google rolling this out for your random Gmail account, and neither will Facebook. It should be mandatory for financial institutions and online government departments, this will cut the scope of this type of attack. It is a commonly used protection mechanism for remote access to company website portals and remote network logins, and it is quite successful for this.
This still hasn't answered your question though - how can you as an website author or owner prevent this? You can't, unless you don't run third party scripts, and regularly check your pages to make sure you haven't been compromised and had a script inserted. You should never consider trying to scan any third party scripts, because they can be obfuscated to an incredible degree which you can't possibly scan for. If you do run third party scripts and feel strongly enough about this, then you might want to setp a machine which all it does is automated UI tests on your web site - it is an easy enough thing to set up with some basic tests and just leave it testing your live site every 30 or 60 minutes looking for unexpected results.
Like he suggests, use the password manager. There are quite a few other problems that can happen if you type your password every time. For sites that the password manager doesn't work, you're screwed. Client certificates ftw.
I just visited the page which you mention and my free virus checker (AVG) immediately detected a threat (I presume that he has an example on the page) and warned me of a Tabnapping Exploit.
So that's one, easy, possibility
I am working on a project that requires user login/registration. I'd like to avoid setting up private SSL since I am using a shared hosting provider and would like to host multiple domains off of the same plan (but since a private SSL certificate requires a dedicated ip, I can only have 1 certificate per plan...but would still like to secure all of my sites).
I am debating between
resorting to OpenID (although for a non-technical audience all the complaints I found on SO would be further multiplied)
using my host's shared SSL (which will pop up those annoying certificate warnings in the browser saying that the sites don't match).
What seems like a better option? Or would you suggest run away from both and just suggest sucking it up and purchasing additional/better hosting plans?
From my experience in dealing with SO and a fairly simple site using Google App Engine (and their authentication system), I'd give the following advice:
Do NOT use OpenID for identification. It can work for authentication with your own identity management, but there are issues as soon as you try to identify a specific user.
Its amazing how many open ids people will have, so be prepared to support multiple OpenID auth URLs (definitely more than 1, probably more than 2)
If high security is a requirement, be very wary of OpenID. Many people will use providers that they normally only use for low-security tasks (and therefore have weak passwords). This particular issue struck Jeff Atwood directly (his account was stolen due to exactly this mistake)!
Keep things simple for your users. If you do go with OpenID, emphasize one or two providers that they likely already have (eg, Google), and then provide a deemphasized selection for generic providers. Don't make the more simple-minded users think about OpenID.
Along with that thinking, a simple "Login with your Google Account" button works surprisingly well. I thought people would find it confusing to login to a third party site with their google account, but in practice this has not been a problem with our .appspot.com domain.
The bottom line is that you shouldn't expect your users to prefer openid, but it can be an acceptable compromise. I don't think that showing an invalid certificate is a reasonable option for many end-users.
Of course, the separate certs option is the cleanest, but you have to decide if thats really worth it for the value gained. I'm a cheapskate and would tend to avoid it myself. :)
Why not roll your own from the ground up? If your database is accessible from each domain, you could keep one user store that every domain could access.
Is there a particular reason you do not want to create your own user model? It's easy to do but you may have other factors that are leaning you towards something like OpenId that I am not aware of.
If you use the shared SSL's URL, you shouldn't get the popups. That's the whole point of shared SSL. What you is the identity of your site's URL when the user jumps to the secure connection.
I would talk to your hosting provider about your options when it comes to private SSL. They're really not that expensive (even free if you're ok with poor IE support). I've been with shared providers in the past that would allocate you a dedicated IP for use with SSL for a tiny extra fee (like $2/mo).
To me, the extra $54 per year ($30 for the cert + $24 for the IP) was well worth the peace of mind for me and my users.
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OpenID is a great idea in principle, but the UI and the explanation as to why it is good are currently not tailored for general use -- what do you think it would take to make OpenID work for the general public? Can this be solved with technology, or is the problem so intrinsically hard that we are stuck with difficult explanations/multi-step registration procedures, numerous accounts, or poor security?
It needs to be much simpler: involve less knowledge of the concepts, and require fewer steps - preferably zero. When the technology works with little or no assistance, it'll take off.
The mechanics of OpenID credentials, providers and suppliers shouldn't need to be exposed to the user. People talk about educating the masses of internet users, but that's never going to happen - the masses never stop being stupid. If you want to appeal to the masses, you need to bring the technology down to meet their level instead. When a Google-affiliated site picks up that you're logged into Google and silently uses that account, it works without you ever having to tell it who you are. The fact that OpenID is so clumsy in comparison is why the big providers like Google are still avoiding it, and why the general public won't adopt it.
I think the developers of OpenID messed up when they used a URL rather than an email address for the IDs. People know what email addresses are, they already have one that's associated with them (or can get one easily), and email providers like Google and Microsoft are happy to adopt a role as portals. In fact, an automatic translation from email address to URL is all it would take:
myname#example.com -> http://www.example.com/openid/myname
I think it'll take a huge buy-in from a site that millions of people use; for example, MySpace is soon supporting OpenID, so now the number of users that OpenID supports has just jumped by a huge amount. If more of the high activity sites on the net follow this lead, there you go!
ISPs should provide openIds to all their customers that mimic their e-mail addresses. Perhaps openID needs to support automatic translation of foo#example.com into http://openid.example.com/foo so that ISPs can easily set this up on a separate server.
It will take all the popular sites supporting it and making it transparent to the user.
"You can make a useraccount here, or if you use MySpace, Google Mail, Hotmail, etc then you can sign in using OpenID."
Don't sell it as a new service, sell it as being able to sign in using a different ID from another site.
The issue, however, is that with everyone supporting it each user will now have a myspace id, google id, etc. Now if they sign onto stackoverflow with their myspace id then later with google they may be perplexed that stackoverflow doesn't recognize them.
I wonder if openid has a solution for linking openid accounts so they are one and the same - I doubt the technology allows for it, since they are essentially independant signing authorities. Google would have to share data with Myspace and vice versa to enable that...
I don't think it will become mainstream. I think Ted Dziuba gets it right when he says it solves a "problem" that most people don't consider to be worth solving.
http://teddziuba.com/2008/09/openid-is-why-i-hate-the-inter.html
It will have to get a hell of a lot simpler, with easier-to-remember IDs.
You mean it isn't already? ;)
Obviously a lot of currently-popular applications would need to offer it and make it obvious that it was a good alternative.
If Google and Facebook made it an obvious option, that would help.
Ultimately, user education will really be the thing that does it. I doubt most people would care though...dumb sheeple.
Many of the responses so far seem to boil down to two options:
user education, and
forcing adoption (lots of sites changing to openid from in-house auth.)
Is that all we can do? What about distributed tools to make it easy for casual users to do openid delegation? (Say, something integrated with OS X / Windows / Ubuntu) Are there technological barriers that make this infeasible?
If client-side (and vendor-issued) applications could let you manage your on-line security preference, then we'd possibly be able to combat some of the risks associated with giving random sites your passwords -- since the "login area" would be some local program sitting in your systray, or what not. Of course, the integration of web apps with the desktop (such as that provided by Chrome) may make such a distinction impossible in practice, so it may be a moot point.
In any case, it seems like there should be something we could do now to make openid more palatable to the general public, and speed adoption in addition to making the system more user friendly.
As someone who primarily programs web apps in Java, I can't/won't use OpenID because the library support isn't there. JOID and openid4java are the only two that I know of. JOID is apparently not actively maintained, not including really important patches that have been on the mailing list for months; and openid4java requires >40 megabytes of external dependencies, including some that need to go into the endorsed classpath, which is, as one user commented, ridiculous:
Comment by witichis, Apr 28, 2008
46MB download for a simple redirect and de/encryp - are you f****n' drunk?
In my opinion, OpenID is not bad. It consolidates login credentials. It does solve a real problem, while it may not be the optimal solution The only two problems I can see are that you must trust the identity provider not to allow someone else to claim to be you, and that relying parties (web sites you log in to) can collude to link your identity on multiple sites together.
I think we need to see OpenID offered as a login method more consumer oriented websites. There are a lot of big consumer sites that can be used as OpenID providers, but the only place I recall seeing OpenID available as a login before Stackoverflow is to comment on Blogger. Being a provider is great and all, but it's pretty much invisible to consumers. Seeing an actual place to use OpenID, on the other hand, will probably garner somewhat more interest.
It would certainly help if more OpenID consumers were also OpenID providers. As a developer, I'm comfortable going through a few contortions to figure out that I can create a new ID on openid.org, but the more mainstream consumer could easily be put off by the process.
The fact that big sites will accept OpenID isn't, on it's own, enough to make it mainstream. The closest I've seen so far was having LiveJournal both accept and provide OpenID authentication (which I believe it has been doing for quite some time).
But I think that just accepting OpenID isn't enough. What we really need is more sites like this one that refuse to make their own authentication system, and require OpenID authentication. If the "next big thing" said you have to use your OpenID to log in (with a really simple wizard to set up a new ID with someone else), I believe that it will start the ball properly rolling.
Browsers should auto-fill OpenID login boxes so that you don't have to remember your ID.
Web frameworks should come with it as the default, unless you take lots of extra time to configure a simple username/password combination.
Sites that use OpenID need to put it front and center on the login page. I have seen many sites hide it behind a link under the standard login/registration page like this:
Username:
Password:
or use your OpenID
Choosing a provider needs to be much simpler.
At present there's no way to know how reliable, trustworthy or secure any of them are, or which will still be around in 6 months time.
It won't be mainstream, as it's too much effort and is too confusing for those used to email address and password.
For example:
To login to stackoverflow with Opera I have to click login, select myOpenID from the list, type my username, hit enter, press Ctrl+Enter to autofill the password on the myOpenID site, then press the continue button.
To login into any normal site with Opera I just press Ctrl+Enter to autofill the saved user/pass combo.
Im looking into OpenId right now to integrate into a start up site so it can manage the login process for my site.
I think to make this main stream they need to make this super simple. Copy, paste code into your site and it loads the login form that gives you pretty much what Stackoverflow.com does.
I think you can style up the layout of the form to be more recognizable as well.
Personally I don't think it needs to be mainstream at all, it was an interesting idea, but it is no longer relevant.
When I create a normal login, I type in my username, master password and click on the SuperGenPass bookmarklet. That is it, when I had to sign up to stackoverflow I had to find an openId provider, sign up there (which took forever) login to my website and setup delegation, then add stackoverflow to my list of sites.
And yesterday I couldn't login because I had removed the file from my webhost and they had some security issue.
Conclusion: Don't use openid.
I'd use it if I could do it per-site and aggregate the identity later on my own time and terms. As it is, it's a giant pain in the ass to even find a decent OpenID provider; by decent I mean stackoverflow.com isn't one so I'm not going to bother.
Make it less open.
i do not want the same identity on multiple sites.
i do not want to have to create a flickr account before StackOverflow will let me post.
i do not have to have to create a new flickr account for each website that i want to register with.