here is my auth's flow:
The user receives two tokens (access token with expiration time and refresh token without expiration time) after logging in
for each user , The refresh token is stored in the database in a json column called refreshTokens(which is an array).
on the client side, Both access token and refresh token are stored on the local storage.
when user needs to be verified, If the access token is expired, a new access token is created using the refresh token and sent back to the user and keeps the user logged in.
When the user logs out, the refresh token stored in the database (in the refreshTokens list) is removed.
my questions are:
is this flow, secure?
do i need to save refresh token on the cookie or is local storage good enough?
That flow is according to how OAuth works and how tokens can be stored in a secure way, so "yes" to both questions. The part that is missing is how the tokens are obtained in the first place: for that the Authorization Code grant type using PCKE is the preferred way, over the legacy Implicit grant type.
An important part of this flow being secured is that in point 4 you use the list of refresh tokens kept in the database to verify that the RT was not revoked. Other than that it looks ok. You can add more security by adding expiration times to refresh tokens. Then, even if the user doesn't actively log out (you don't clear RTs from the DB), the RT will not be usable after some time.
Keeping the tokens in local storage is good enough in my opinion.
Few stuffs that popped up in my mind while reading this :
Refresh Token also needs expiration time. In fact, I consider refresh tokens as a double edge sword. Imagine a scenario where a person gets access to the refresh token, not only he gets access to the resources, he will practically gain more time with the resources. I prefer to re-generate refresh token along with access token when refresh token is being used to re-generate the access token. And, also set an expiry to it.
It is cool to store the refresh token in database. However. I do have an alternative though, you can easily use RSA algorithm and then do token generation using private key and verify using public key. This is yo mitigate the scenario of needing to store the refresh tokens.
On client side, local storage is a BIG NO from my side. What I prefer is that you use HttpOnly Cookies and set flag as true. HttpOnly Cookies are not rendered in JS and is sent to server securely as per Http protocol. This is fix the chances of compromising tokens.
Your rest concept of it is good enough.
Related
I am currently building a Node.js application and trying to use JWT to handle sessions. In every implementation that I've seen the refresh-token is stored in a fast database like redis. When the token has expired, the client sends the refresh-token to get the new access-token, then the server checks if the refresh-token is in the database, then generates a new token.
But since the refresh-token must be generated by the server, cannot be tampered with, and we can also check if it has expired, why do we need to store it. If it is for logout then can't we just store the user_id in the database for the people who have been logged in without storing the refresh-token.
I was also thinking along the lines of storing the newest access-token instead of refresh-token in redis as value for the user_id. The reason being that we will generate a new access-token only when the previous one has expired. So the following scenario cannot happen,
User logs in, gets access-token and refresh-token.
Immediately refreshes their token while the previous one is still valid.
Logs out, and uses their old access token.
Since most implementations blacklist only the access-token provided by the client during logout, I believe this scenario can be possible if the REST API is used by the client.
So what is the use of storing the refresh-token, and would storing the access-token instead be beneficial in any way. Some more information regarding the application,
I am using redis for logged in users, and blacklisted access-token (provided during logout).
I am storing both refresh and access tokens in httpOnly cookies, and sending access tokens as bearer tokens.
refresh-token is sent in POST body while refreshing the access token.
I am not using https
Let me answer each of your questions:
"But since the refresh-token must be generated by the server, cannot be tampered with, and we can also check if it has expired, why do we need to store it":
Refresh tokens are meant to have very long expiration times (possibly months), so that users do not have to log into the application frequently (especially in the case of mobile applications). Therefore, if a malicious person steals a user's refresh token, the user's protected information will be exposed for a long time. In case this happens, a considerably secure application should have mechanisms to, for example, detect sudden changes in the IP address of its users and report them. Now, if a user confirms the existence of strange behavior in his account, it is necessary to revoke all his refresh tokens to protect his information, and to do this, it is necessary to have control of the refresh tokens that a certain user has, so they have to be stored.
"If it is for logout then can't we just store the user_id in the database for the people who have been logged in without storing the refresh-token":
You need to store both, both the "user_id" and the refresh tokens, in such a way that you can have a control of all the refresh tokens of a certain "user_id" (as stated above). If you only want to store the "user_id" of the logged in users (without storing refresh tokens), I don't know how you will check if a user is authorized to renew an access token without having to make the user log in.
"I was also thinking along the lines of storing the newest access-token instead of refresh-token...":
By doing this you are losing advantages of the "stateless" approach offered by JWTs (https://restfulapi.net/statelessness), since you are storing a state of them. If you really want something like this, it's probably best to use a "stateful" approach like sessions.
I don't see the reason to do this. Suppose you have a web application and a mobile application connected to a RESTful API, if the user logs into both applications he will have multiple valid access tokens and refresh tokens, so it is perfectly normal for a user to have multiple valid tokens at the same time.
If a user logs out, simply remove the access token and the refresh token from his device, additionally, remove the refresh token from the database. Use short expiration times on access tokens (15 minutes is very common), and so you have no need to store them as they will expire quickly. That's it.
I've been doing a lot of reading on this subject and I can see that there are many different opinions and approaches to authenticating using JWT.
My understanding is as follows:
In its simplest form, a JWT authentication mechanism should:
Verify username and password.
Create a signed JWT access token containing information (depending on the app's needs) on the user.
Send that token in the response.
The client then stores the token (which from my understanding there is some debate whether a secure cookie or localStorage is more secure), and sends it with each request's headers.
The server can then authorize the user using middleware verifying the JWT. No state, all information in contained within the JWT.
Assuming the JWT has no expiration (or perhaps a very long expiration date, maybe a couple of months), it sounds good because I can provide the user a persistent logged in state for a long time. The concern is, to my understanding, if the JWT was to be stolen, it is essentially an unlimited access card and a huge security breach.
So that's where the refresh token enters, the server issues both refresh and access tokens (refresh token with a long/unlimited expiration and the access token short).
The server database holds some kind of table of valid refresh tokens (so that if one is stolen it can be invalidated easily) and when issuing a new access token, validates the refresh token.
This also adds the need to add some sort of countdown mechanism on the front end where a refresh request is to be sent to the server prior to the access token expiration date so that the user won't be logged out.
And my question:
Why? If we go through all the trouble of creating a db table for refresh tokens, why not just make a table of valid access tokens and invalidate them if needed? How is that less secure than using refresh tokens?
Thank you
Access tokens aren't primarily used to provide extra security, but to provide efficiency and decoupling.
An access token can have a very short lifetime - maybe even less than a minute - but be used to authenticate multiple requests to different services within that time. Those services don't need to have any access to the authentication database, because they can trust the access token until its expiry date; that makes them faster and simpler.
For instance, if you're using a dynamic page with lots of AJAX requests, that might run in very quick succession. Those AJAX calls might be implemented as serverless functions (e.g. AWS Lambda), or as standalone scripts in different programming languages on different servers, or you might just want to make them as efficient as possible, and avoid any database access. The only information that needs to be shared between them is a public key to verify the signature on the JWTs they receive.
From a security a point of view, this is a trade-off: on the one hand, an access token for a user whose access has been revoked can still be used until it expires; on the other hand, the long-lived refresh token is transmitted much less than a traditional session token, so there are fewer chances for it to be intercepted.
To address your concrete concern:
This also adds the need to add some sort of countdown mechanism on the front end where a refresh request is to be sent to the server prior to the access token expiration date so that the user won't be logged out.
No "countdown" is needed. The code that has access to both tokens simply looks at its current access token before using it; if it has expired, or is about to expire, it requests a new one using the refresh token. It then gets a new access token, and probably a renewed refresh token - the expiry date on the refresh token represents how long the user can be idle before they are automatically logged out.
We don't need to make a table of access tokens and it is dangerous to secure.
We have to save only refresh token and add one field for valid/invalid in the table. And send access token and refresh token to the client side.
The clients send access token with each request's headers.
The server can authorize the user using middleware verifying the JWT.
After some time, the access token will be expired(access token's expired time is shorter than the refresh token's expired time).
The client sends refresh token to server.
Then the client will get new access token using refresh token(refresh token should be recreated, in other words, we can use only one-time refresh token, we have to update table of refresh token with new refresh token).
The client can get new access token and refresh token.
I hope it will be help you.
I have an application that doesn't have user accounts so doesn't need a login. I'm currently authenticating using JWT via a /get-token endpoint in my api that's called as soon as the UI starts and returns a bearer token that's used for the calls for the calls moving forwards/
When that token expires, i'm a little confused at how to handle that. I was thinking using a refresh token but all the tutorials i've seen are passing the refresh token back to the UI, isn't that unsafe? I was always under the idea that the refresh token was internal and is only used on the server to refresh expired tokens.
What's the best way to handle this?
Refresh tokens carry the information necessary to get a new access token. In other words, whenever an access token is required to access a specific resource, a client may use a refresh token to get a new access token issued by the authentication server. Common use cases include getting new access tokens after old ones have expired, or getting access to a new resource for the first time. Refresh tokens can also expire but are rather long-lived. Refresh tokens are usually subject to strict storage requirements to ensure they are not leaked. They can also be blacklisted by the authorization server.
I followed this tutorial for using JWT token. The token expiry is set to only 5 minutes, but what if I wanted to invalidate the token after 1 minute of use? I want to be able to make an API call to /api/logout and that should delete my token.
I'm using Express and Node.
It seems like from what I could gather to do my option is to have a token db that stores the token. When I want to expire my token, I then expire/remove the token from the DB.
I've also seen people casually say "remove" the token from the physical hard space, but I cannot figure out where the token is physically stored for me to remove it.
The general benefit of a JWT token authentication is that the tokens can contain all the session information you would normally keep in your session store. This saves considerable resources, especially in request-to-response times, because you do not have to look up session data on each and every request - the client gives you all that.
However, it comes at the cost of not being able to revoke a JWT token at a time of your choosing, because you lost track of state.
The obvious solution of keeping a list of invalidated tokens somewhere in your database kind of removes the above-described benefit because you again have to consult the database on every request.
A better option would be to issue short-lived JWT tokens, i.e. tokens valid only one minute. For a web application, an average user may perform several requests in a minute (a user navigating around your app). You can give each user a JWT token that will last a minute and when a request with expired token arrives, you simply issue them a new one.
Update: Issuing a new access token after presenting an expired token is a very bad idea - you should treat an expired token as invalid, as if it has been forged. Better approach is to have the client present a refresh token which will prove the user's identity, and only then issue new access token. Note that verifying a refresh token must be a stateful operation, ie. you must have a list of all valid refresh tokens per user somewhere in your database, because if the refresh token is compromised, the user must have a means of invalidating that token.
1) Simply remove the token from the client
2) Create a token blacklist
3) Just keep token expiry times short and rotate them often
Please have a look at Invalidating JSON Web Tokens
Invalidating JSON Web Tokens
I am building a token based authentication (Node.js using passport/JWT with an angular client).
After the user enter his credentials he gets an access token, which he sends in every request inside the header (header: bearer TOKEN).
I don't want to prompt a login request everytime his access token expires (about everyday I guess),
I've heard about the Refresh Tokens. The refresh token never expires (or rarely expires) and able to renew tokens indefinitely.When the access token is about to expire, the client can send a renew request to get a new access token by sending his refresh token.
I don't understand few things, I might be missing something:
How a long-living/never expiring refresh tokens don't ruin the security of having short-living
access tokens.
Cookies can be stole and be used until they expire. Tokens are short living so they more secured,
but if I provide a long-living refresh token I lose the advantage of using tokens.
NOTE: I am aware that the refresh tokens are sent at the initial login, so cann't be spoofed in every request, but if they are spoofed at the initial request they are vulnerable.
The refresh token is presented on a different path than the access token: the access token is only ever presented to the Resource Server, the refresh token is only ever presented to the Authorization Server. The access token can be self-contained so that it does not need costly calls to the Authorization Server to check its validity, but to mitigate loss and to increase accuracy (it cannot be revoked in case something goes wrong) it is short-lived. The refresh token is long lived and gets validated on each call to the Authorization Server and as such it can be revoked. The combination of the two makes the system secure.
I use the following approach:
Tables/indexes:
User table (just has the user ids and all the user related meta-data)
JWT table (three fields : user_id, access_token, refresh_token)
Authentication Flow
1.When a previously unauthenticated user signs in, issue a JWT which contains an access token, and a refresh token. Update the refresh token in the JWT table, together with the user_id, and the access token.
2.Make sure that the JWT has an expiration time that is something small/comfortable for your users. Usually less than an hour.
4.When a client makes a request with a JWT
a. Check expiry of the access token. If the token has not expired -> continue without hitting any db tables.
b. If the access token has expired, lookup the user_id in the JWT table, and check if the refresh token and access tokens match, whatever the client has provided,
If yes, issue a new JWT with the response and update the new refresh token,access token into the JWT table.
if no, return 401. The client is forced to ask the user to then sign in.
END.
To summarize,
1.DB calls are required only to check if the refresh token is valid.
2.This system allows for a user to sign in from any number of devices, with any number of JWT's
3.All JWT's related to a user can be invalidated, by wiping the refresh tokens related to that user from the JWT table, this can be done, for eg: when a user changes his/her password. This, in effect, narrows down the window of compromise to the expiration time of the access token/JWT.
I believe this is the intention behind JWT's. The percentage of DB calls/user depends on your expiration time, the duration a user is usually on your website, etc.