It's not a common question, but I wonder if any tricks or upcoming standards exist.
Belows are a flow and what I want to implement.
Web application loaded from server-side
Client-side script loads some secure contents (not from #1) that need to be protected from web application provider. It could be shown to a user visually.
Web application provider knows where are the secure contents (in Dom path) and possibly may try to catch it by putting a script
However the secure contents shouldn't be hijacked from servers (even from the same origin) or from external application (even from developer tools if possible)
EDIT:
For better understanding, it's for use case where web application doesn't hold user data in their DB but loads the data from somewhere else. In case, I need to protect the data from web application, which is uncommon in regular web application.
You should use a content security policy (CSP) which would enable the browser to deny injection attacks. These can be a little tricky to setup correctly so I would use Report URI to help you get it going. The trick is to use report only mode first until you have validated the settings then switch to enforce.
Related
No matter how I reason about it, it seems as if there is no secure way of implementing a client side rendered single-page-application that uses/accesses information on sessions for authentication, either via cookies, without severe compromise in security. I was mainly looking to building a React app, but it seems as if I will need to build it with SSR for a relatively secure version of authentication.
The use case that I'm especially thinking of is where the user logs in or registers and then gets a cookie with the session id. From there, in a server side implementation, I can simply set up conditional rendering depending on whether the server stored session has an associated user id or not and then pull the user information from there and display it.
However, I can't think of a client-side rendered solution where the user can use the session id alone on the cookie that isn't easily spoofable. Some of the insecure implementations would include using browser storage (local/session). Thanks.
I think the major issue here is that you are mixing the two parts of a web page (at least according to what HTML set out achieve) and treating them both as sensitive information.
You have two major parts in a web page - the first being the display format and the second being the data. The presumption in client side rendering / single page applications is that the format itself is not sensitive, and only the data needs to be protected.
If that's the case you should treat your client-side redirect to login behavior as a quality of life feature. The data endpoints on your server would still be protected - meaning that in theory an unauthenticated user could muck about the static HTML he is being served and extract page layouts and templates - but those would be meaningless without the data to fill them - which is the protected part.
In practice - your end product would be a single page application that makes requests to various API endpoints to fetch data and fill in the requested page templates. You wouldn't even need to go as far as storing complex session states - a simple flag notifying the client if it is authenticated or not would suffice (that is beyond what you would normally use for server-side authentication such as cookies or tokens)
Now let's say I'm a malicious user who is up to no good - I could "spoof" - or really just open the browser dev tools and set the isAuthenticated flag to true letting me skip past the login screen - now what would I do? I could theoretically navigate to my-service/super-secret without being redirected locally back to the login page on the client side - and then as soon as the relevant page tries to load the data from the server with the nonexistent credentials it would fail - best case displaying an error message, worst case with some internal exception and a view showing a broken template.
So just to emphasize in short:
A. If what you want to protect is your TEMPLATE then there is no way to achieve this clientside.
B. If what you want to protect is your DATA then you should treat gating/preventing users from navigating to protected pages as a quality of life feature and not a security feature, since that will be implemented on the server when serving the data for that specific page.
I'm in the process of making a portal website and I wanted to include an iframe which would route people to an intranet. Is there any downsides to this as far as security is concerned?
I think that maybe there's a misunderstanding on your side regarding the function of IFrames: An <iframe> will not route anything. It just tells the user's browser which URL to fetch and show inside it. This means that
People need access to the intranet to actually load the contents of the <iframe>, which might not be what you expected.
It's not a security risk per se.
It is no more or less secure than giving those people direct web access to that intranet.
If you really want to know whether something is "secure" or not, you need to specify the types of threat that you need to protect against, what your tolerance is for breaks in that security, and what additional mechanisms that you have taken to secure your site (for example password authentication, NTLM, SSL, etc).
I have a page that contains sensitive information that I would like to require reauthentication in order to load. I am using Classic authentication mode, not forms.
The first method i looked at was the PrincipalContext.ValidateCredentials method, but that would require sending login details in plain text (i think).
I have thought about using javascript to turn off cookies so they would have to log back in, but I haven't thought of a way of doing this well.
Has anyone done this before with SharePoint?
what i ended up with:
a web part on the page with sensitive material which forces an HTTP 401, and then redirects to another page.
this other page has a second web part, which then redirects back to the original page after setting some session variable.
You could use something along the lines of this if you're using IE6/8 but other browser may have issues with it (look into http-keep-alives).
<script type='text/javascript'>
document.execCommand("ClearAuthenticationCache");
</script>
That said, it doesn't seem like friendliest UI option to forcibly clear someones authentication. I suspect a better option would depend on the audience and if they are on a trusted domain or coming from an external source. If they are on the trusted domain and don't normally login anyway, this approach likely wont please them much.
Like a lot of developers, I want to make JavaScript served up by Server "A" talk to a web service on Server "B" but am stymied by the current incarnation of same origin policy. The most secure means of overcoming this (that I can find) is a server script that sits on Server "A" and acts as a proxy between it and "B". But if I want to deploy this JavaScript in a variety of customer environments (RoR, PHP, Python, .NET, etc. etc.) and can't write proxy scripts for all of them, what do I do?
Use JSONP, some people say. Well, Doug Crockford pointed out on his website and in interviews that the script tag hack (used by JSONP) is an unsafe way to get around the same origin policy. There's no way for the script being served by "A" to verify that "B" is who they say they are and that the data it returns isn't malicious or will capture sensitive user data on that page (e.g. credit card numbers) and transmit it to dastardly people. That seems like a reasonable concern, but what if I just use the script tag hack by itself and communicate strictly in JSON? Is that safe? If not, why not? Would it be any more safe with HTTPS? Example scenarios would be appreciated.
Addendum: Support for IE6 is required. Third-party browser extensions are not an option. Let's stick with addressing the merits and risks of the script tag hack, please.
Currently browser venders are split on how cross domain javascript should work. A secure and easy to use optoin is Flash's Crossdomain.xml file. Most languages have a Cross Domain Proxies written for them, and they are open source.
A more nefarious solution would be to use xss how the Sammy Worm used to spread. XSS can be used to "read" a remote domain using xmlhttprequest. XSS isn't required if the other domains have added a <script src="https://YOUR_DOMAIN"></script>. A script tag like this allows you to evaluate your own JavaScript in the context of another domain, which is identical to XSS.
It is also important to note that even with the restrictions on the same origin policy you can get the browser to transmit requests to any domain, you just can't read the response. This is the basis of CSRF. You could write invisible image tags to the page dynamically to get the browser to fire off an unlimited number of GET requests. This use of image tags is how an attacker obtains documnet.cookie using XSS on another domain. CSRF POST exploits work by building a form and then calling .submit() on the form object.
To understand the Same Orgin Policy, CSRF and XSS better you must read the Google Browser Security Handbook.
Take a look at easyXDM, it's a clean javascript library that allows you to communicate across the domain boundary without any server side interaction. It even supports RPC out of the box.
It supports all 'modern' browser, as well as IE6 with transit times < 15ms.
A common usecase is to use it to expose an ajax endpoint, allowing you to do cross-domain ajax with little effort (check out the small sample on the front page).
What if I just use the script tag hack by itself and communicate strictly in JSON? Is that safe? If not, why not?
Lets say you have two servers - frontend.com and backend.com. frontend.com includes a <script> tag like this - <script src="http://backend.com/code.js"></script>.
when the browser evaluates code.js is considered a part of frontend.com and NOT a part of backend.com. So, if code.js contained XHR code to communicate with backend.com, it would fail.
Would it be any more safe with HTTPS? Example scenarios would be appreciated.
If you just converted your <script src="https://backend.com/code.js> to https, it would NOT be any secure. If the rest of your page is http, then an attacker could easily man-in-the-middle the page and change that https to http - or worse, include his own javascript file.
If you convert the entire page and all its components to https, it would be more secure. But if you are paranoid enough to do that, you should also be paranoid NOT to depend on an external server for you data. If an attacker compromises backend.com, he has effectively got enough leverage on frontend.com, frontend2.com and all of your websites.
In short, https is helpful, but it won't help you one bit if your backend server gets compromised.
So, what are my options?
Add a proxy server on each of your client applications. You don't need to write any code, your webserver can automatically do that for you. If you are using Apache, look up mod_rewrite
If your users are using the latest browsers, you could consider using Cross Origin Resource Sharing.
As The Rook pointed out, you could also use Flash + Crossdomain. Or you could use Silverlight and its equivalent of Crossdomain. Both technologies allow you to communicate with javascript - so you just need to write a utility function and then normal js code would work. I believe YUI already provides a flash wrapper for this - check YUI3 IO
What do you recommend?
My recommendation is to create a proxy server, and use https throughout your website.
Apologies to all who attempted to answer my question. It proceeded under a false assumption about how the script tag hack works. The assumption was that one could simply append a script tag to the DOM and that the contents of that appended script tag would not be restricted by the same origin policy.
If I'd bothered to test my assumption before posting the question, I would've known that it's the source attribute of the appended tag that's unrestricted. JSONP takes this a step further by establishing a protocol that wraps traditional JSON web service responses in a callback function.
Regardless of how the script tag hack is used, however, there is no way to screen the response for malicious code since browsers execute whatever JavaScript is returned. And neither IE, Firefox nor Webkit browsers check SSL certificates in this scenario. Doug Crockford is, so far as I can tell, correct. There is no safe way to do cross domain scripting as of JavaScript 1.8.5.
I read the question here in SO "jQuery Linking vs. Download" and I somehow don't get it.
What happens if you host a page on http://yourserver.com, but load jQuery library from http://ajax.googleapis.com and then use the functions defined in jQuery script?
Does "same origin policy" not count in this case? I mean, can you make AJAX calls back to http://yourserver.com?
Is the JavaScript being executed considered as coming from yourserver.com?
My point here is, you do not know what the user has downloaded from some third party server (sorry, Google), and still the code executing on his computer is as good as the one he would download from your server?
EDIT: Does it mean _that if I use a web statistics counter from a 3rd party I don't know very well, they might "inject" some code and call into my web services as if their code was part of mine?
The owner of site http://yourserver.com/ should trust the content it references from other servers (in this case, Google's). The same origin policy doesn't apply to "script" tags.
Of course, the scripts of the foreign servers (once loaded) have access to the whole DOM: so, if the foreign content is compromised, there can be security exposures.
As with many things in the web world, it comes down to trust and continuous management.
Edit:
Does it mean _that if I use a web
statistics counter from a 3rd party I
don't know very well, they might
"inject" some code and call into my
web services as if their code was part
of mine?
Yes.
Answering the Edit comment: Yes. Unless the counter was wrapped in an iframe tag, it is as if it was a part of your web site and can call into your web services, access your cookies, etc.
Yes, the policy doesn't apply to <script> tags.
If someone was able to hack google's script store, it would affect every page served from every domain, that uses google.com as their host for scripts.