JWT Authentication system in webpage using nodejs - node.js

Recently I'm trying to build an JWT authentication system with an admin panel to manage login-ed users for simple purpose like RESTFUL API or realtime database(Socket.io) used in both mobile or web.But there are few issue that trips me over.
The status right now is i'm able to use nodejs to create a a JWT token and past it to the front end.
However after that i've no idea what to do with that token in the front end. And here are the questions
If i'm using React, Redux or ReactNative, is it alright to save the token in Redux status, and call it through ajax(Axios) request , if not where should it be store?
If i just wanna to use it HTML instead of any kind of single page app framework, where should i store the token (local storage, cookies, window sessionStorage, anything thing else ?)
I heard that session and cookies are not a good location to store the token due to they are vulnerable to different attack , how can i prevent that?
This is the biggest point where i'm stuck, I've create a Form for the user to login, after pressing the login button, i'll do an ajax request to ask for a token, after the token is received, how should i save the token (according to q2) and redirect the user to a protected route by setting the header {'x-access-token': token}?
if i would want to allow the user to logout, what is the proper way to do that? (just delete the token from client storage?)
I found quite a lot of tutorial about creating and refreshing the token, but i cant find any tutorial about what to do after obtaining the token? are there any good recommendations that i could follow along?
I know this is weird but i feel i'm missing some of the core concept on the whole authentication flow. Could anyone try to point it out according to the questions that I've asked above?
Sorry for my bad english, i've try my best to phrase it out in a correct way.
And this is my github repo for the questions
https://github.com/xylops/backend
And Thank you for the time to read this

Storing the Token:
Use localStorage for storing the token, So even when user
refreshes the page the token still be present., You can add your
token to axios header so it gets passed for every request you make.
Logging out User:
Yes just deleting works for simple apps.
You should specify
expiration while creating tokens and when a user logs out, store that
token in Database (usually Redis)
Every time a user makes a request, check if the exact same token is stored in Redis, if yes this means this is a logged out user.. return proper response back to the user.
Run a cron job which will keep on removing expired tokens from Redis so your redis database will not have expired tokens and at the same time your app itself will reject expired tokens.
After obtaining the Token
Do what you want to do, The token will contain the information you provide, Like user id, name and other details you choose, Based on this you can show different data in the frontend and find user specific records in the backend.
You're not missing much of anything, Logging out is not easy to implement in Token based authentication, The beauty of Token Based Authentication is your app doesn't depend on cookies, sessions and you can truly make an Stateless distributed application.
Code Example
This is how i use the token with localStorage and Axios
import axios from 'axios';
const setToken = (token) => {
// if token is provided, save it in localStorage and add it to axios header as well.
if ( token ) {
localStorage.token = token
axios.defaults.headers.common['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${token}`;
}
// if token is empty, just remove it from localStorage and axios..
// set empty token when you logout the user.
else {
delete localStorage.token;
delete axios.defaults.headers.common['Authorization'];
}
}
When the application loads for the first time and on every refresh do
if ( localStorage.token ) {
setToken( localStorage.token );
}
And to decode the token you can use, JWT
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
const decodedToken = jwt.decode(localStorage.token);
Hope this helps a little.

Related

How to refresh token after expiry in django knox authentication?

I am running django application with django knox token authentication. I was able to do login with the package.
But after the token expired, url response are throwing " Invalid Token".
I don't understand how to refresh the token after expiry? whether i need to login again? if it is, the user will get irritated.
How to do it in proper way?
Which is the best token authentication for django rest framework?
What worked for me is:
#setting.py
REST_KNOX = {
'TOKEN_TTL': timedelta(hours=10), #time to live (without refresh)
'TOKEN_LIMIT_PER_USER': None,
'AUTO_REFRESH': True,
'MIN_REFRESH_INTERVAL': 60 #number of seconds
}
You can of course change the settings. If you don't specify the 'MIN_REFRESH_INTERVAL' it doesn't work.
The advantage of knox IMOP is that the token refresh is done automatically, and you don't have to do it yourself (unlike JWT, where you need to specifically ask for a new token with the refresh token).
It's less secure than JWT. But the plus is that you have less work to do on the client side.

Next.js Authentication with JWT

I am moving a project from React to Next.js and was wondering if the same authentication process is okay. Basically, the user enters their username and password and this is checked against database credentials via an API (Node.js/Express). So, I am not using Next.js internal api functionality, but a totally decoupled API from my Next.js project.
If the login credentials are correct, a JWT token is sent back to the client. I wanted to store that in local storage and then redirect the user. Any future HTTP requests will send the token in the header and check it is valid via the API. Is this okay to do? I ask because I see a lot of Next.js auth using cookies or sessions and don't know if that is the 'standard' approach which I should rather adopt.
My answer is purely based on my experiences and things I read. Feel free to correct it if I happened to be wrong.
So, my way is to store your token in HttpOnly cookie, and always use that cookie to authorize your requests to the Node API via Authorization header. I happen to also use Node.js API in my own project, so I know what's going on.
Following is an example of how I usually handle authentication with Next.js and Node.js API.
In order to ease up authentication problems, I'm using Next.js's built in getServerSideProps function in a page to build a new reusable higher order component that will take care of authentication. In this case, I will name it isLoggedIn.
// isLoggedIn.jsx
export default (GetServerSidePropsFunction) => async (ctx) => {
// 1. Check if there is a token in cookies. Let's assume that your JWT is stored in 'jwt'.
const token = ctx.req.cookies?.jwt || null;
// 2. Perform an authorized HTTP GET request to the private API to check if the user is genuine.
const { data } = await authenticate(...); // your code here...
// 3. If there is no user, or the user is not authenticated, then redirect to homepage.
if (!data) {
return {
redirect: {
destination: '/',
permanent: false,
},
};
}
// 4. Return your usual 'GetServerSideProps' function.
return await GetServerSidePropsFunction(ctx);
};
getServerSideProps will block rendering until the function has been resolved, so make sure your authentication is fast and does not waste much time.
You can use the higher order component like this. Let's call this one profile.jsx, for one's profile page.
// profile.jsx
export default isLoggedIn(async (ctx) => {
// In this component, do anything with the authorized user. Maybe getting his data?
const token = ctx.req.cookies.jwt;
const { data } = await getUserData(...); // don't forget to pass his token in 'Authorization' header.
return {
props: {
data,
},
},
});
This should be secure, as it is almost impossible to manipulate anything that's on server-side, unless one manages to find a way to breach into your back-end.
If you want to make a POST request, then I usually do it like this.
// profile.jsx
const handleEditProfile = async (e) => {
const apiResponse = await axios.post(API_URL, data, { withCredentials: true });
// do anything...
};
In a POST request, the HttpOnly cookie will also be sent to the server, because of the withCredentials parameter being set to true.
There is also an alternative way of using Next.js's serverless API to send the data to the server. Instead of making a POST request to the API, you'll make a POST request to the 'proxy' Next.js's serverless API, where it will perform another POST request to your API.
there is no standard approach. You should be worried about security. I read this blog post: https://hasura.io/blog/best-practices-of-using-jwt-with-graphql/
This is a long but an awesome blog post. everyhing I post here will be quoted from there:
If a JWT is stolen, then the thief can keep using the JWT. An API
that accepts JWTs does an independent verification without depending
on the JWT source so the API server has no way of knowing if this was
a stolen token! This is why JWTs have an expiry value. And these
values are kept short. Common practice is to keep it around 15
minutes.
When server sends you the token, you have to store the JWT on the client persistently.
Doing so you make your app vulnerable to CSRF & XSS attacks, by
malicious forms or scripts to use or steal your token. We need to save our JWT token somewhere so that we can forward it to our API as a header. You might be tempted to persist it in localstorage; don’t do it! This is prone to XSS attacks.
What about saving it in a cookie?
Creating cookies on the client to save the JWT will also be prone to XSS. If it can be read on the client from Javascript outside of
your app - it can be stolen. You might think an HttpOnly cookie
(created by the server instead of the client) will help, but cookies
are vulnerable to CSRF attacks. It is important to note that HttpOnly
and sensible CORS policies cannot prevent CSRF form-submit attacks and
using cookies requires a proper CSRF mitigation strategy.
Note that a SameSite cookie will make Cookie based approaches safe
from CSRF attacks. It might not be a solution if your Auth and API
servers are hosted on different domains, but it should work really
well otherwise!
Where do we save it then?
The OWASP JWT Cheatsheet and OWASP ASVS (Application Security
Verification Standard) prescribe guidelines for handling and storing
tokens.
The sections that are relevant to this are the Token Storage on Client
Side and Token Sidejacking issues in the JWT Cheatsheet, and chapters
3 (Session Management) and 8 (Data Protection) of ASVS.
From the Cheatsheet, "Issue: Token Storage on the Client Side":
Automatically sent by the browser (Cookie storage).
Retrieved even if the browser is restarted (Use of browser localStorage container).
Retrieved in case of XSS issue (Cookie accessible to JavaScript code or Token stored in browser local/session storage).
"How to Prevent:"
Store the token using the browser sessionStorage container.
Add it as a Bearer HTTP Authentication header with JavaScript when calling services.
Add fingerprint information to the token.
By storing the token in browser sessionStorage container it exposes
the token to being stolen through a XSS attack. However, fingerprints
added to the token prevent reuse of the stolen token by the attacker
on their machine. To close a maximum of exploitation surfaces for an
attacker, add a browser Content Security Policy to harden the
execution context.
"FingerPrint"
Where a fingerprint is the implementation of the following guidelines
from the Token Sidejacking issue: This attack occurs when a token has been intercepted/stolen by an attacker and they use it to gain access to the system using targeted user identity.
"How to Prevent":
A way to prevent it is to add a "user context" in the token. A user context will be composed of the following information:
A random string will be generated during the authentication phase. It will be sent to the client as a hardened cookie (flags: HttpOnly +
Secure + SameSite + cookie prefixes).
A SHA256 hash of the random string will be stored in the token (instead of the raw value) in order to prevent any XSS issues allowing
the attacker to read the random string value and setting the expected
cookie.

Logout JWT with nestJS

I'm using JWT passaport to login module:
async validateUser(userEmail: string, userPassword: string) {
const user = await this.userService.findByEmail(userEmail);
if (user && user.password === userPassword) {
const { id, name, email } = user;
return { id: id, name, email };
}else {
throw new UnauthorizedException({
error: 'Incorrect username or password'
});
}
}
async login(user: any) {
const payload = { email: user.email, sub: user.id };
return {
access_token: this.jwtService.sign(payload),
};
}
This part is running.
My question is: how do the logout? I read about creating a blacklist and adding the token to it, but how do I get the user's access token?
Something you should know about token-based authentication is that it is stateless. This means that even the server does not keep track of which users are authenticated, like with session-based authentication. As such, you do not need to do anything on the server side to "log out" a user. You simply need to delete the t\JWT token on the client. If you make a request to the server app, without a valid JWT token, it will be treated as the user is not logged in.
Generally when a logout request would be sent the Authorization header should be present, so you can grab the token from there. Then you can save the token to the database's restrict list table.
When user click to "Log out" btn, you should sent a request which is attached Authorization header with bearer token. In the backend side, you need to extract header and push the token to the blacklist token (as your solution). Basically, you only need remove token in client side, it's so easy to do but in the worst case when the token was stolen by hacker, your token still valid. Using blacklist token is more secure but it can be lead to performance issue and scalable. What is the best solution? it's depend on you.
Read the Nestjs Execution context get the token from the request header and verify this token from JWT.
everything defines in the NESTJS link
//here we check the token from the header is valid or not expired
const tokenVarify = await this.jwtService.verify(token);
my idea is make whitelist every generate new token and remove it when user logout. so u need to check on guard also every user with token access its exist on whitelist or note
You must be refresh expire token to 1ms with:
https://webera.blog/how-to-implement-refresh-tokens-jwt-in-nestjs-b8093c5642a9
Actually there is a workaround for this, but not so straightforward!
The idea is to keep track of the tokens for logged out users (use some sort of black-list) and query provided token against that black-list.
To sum it up, you can follow these 4 steps:
Set a reasonable expiration time on tokens
Delete the stored token from client side upon log out
Have DB of no longer active tokens that still have some time to live
Query provided token against The Blacklist on every authorized request
For detailed explanations, you can check this post: medium
A guide in how to do the implementation is in this youtube video
Code with Vlad
, and there's as well the github source nestjs-jwts. I followed this video and implemented myself as well..

How to destroy JWT Tokens on logout?

I am using jwt plugin and strategy in hapijs.
I am able to create jwt token while login user and authenticate other API using the same token through 'jwt' strategy.
I am setting the token in request.state.USER_SESSION as a cookie where USER_SESSION is a token name. Also, I am not saving these token in the database.
But how can I destroy jwt token at the time of logout?
Please suggest a way.
The JWT is stored on browser, so remove the token deleting the cookie at client side
If you need also to invalidate the token from server side before its expiration time, for example account deleted/blocked/suspended, password changed, permissions changed, user logged out by admin, take a look at Invalidating JSON Web Tokens for some commons techniques like creating a blacklist or rotating tokens
You cannot manually expire a token after it has been created. Thus, you cannot log out with JWT on the server-side as you do with sessions.
JWT is stateless, meaning that you should store everything you need in the payload and skip performing a DB query on every request. But if you plan to have a strict log out functionality, that cannot wait for the token auto-expiration, even though you have cleaned the token from the client-side, then you might need to neglect the stateless logic and do some queries. so what's a solution?
Set a reasonable expiration time on tokens
Delete the stored token from client-side upon log out
Query provided token against The Blacklist on every authorized request
Blacklist
“Blacklist” of all the tokens that are valid no more and have not expired yet. You can use a DB that has a TTL option on documents which would be set to the amount of time left until the token is expired.
Redis
Redis is a good option for blacklist, which will allow fast in-memory access to the list. Then, in the middleware of some kind that runs on every authorized request, you should check if the provided token is in The Blacklist. If it is you should throw an unauthorized error. And if it is not, let it go and the JWT verification will handle it and identify if it is expired or still active.
For more information, see How to log out when using JWT. by Arpy Vanyan(credit and reference)
On Logout from the Client Side, the easiest way is to remove the token from the storage of browser.
But, What if you want to destroy the token on the Node server -
The problem with JWT package is that it doesn't provide any method or way to destroy the token.
So in order to destroy the token on the serverside you may use jwt-redis package instead of JWT
This library (jwt-redis) completely repeats the entire functionality of the library jsonwebtoken, with one important addition. Jwt-redis allows you to store the token label in redis to verify validity. The absence of a token label in redis makes the token not valid. To destroy the token in jwt-redis, there is a destroy method
it works in this way :
1) Install jwt-redis from npm
2) To Create -
var redis = require('redis');
var JWTR = require('jwt-redis').default;
var redisClient = redis.createClient();
var jwtr = new JWTR(redisClient);
jwtr.sign(payload, secret)
.then((token)=>{
// your code
})
.catch((error)=>{
// error handling
});
3) To verify -
jwtr.verify(token, secret);
4) To Destroy -
jwtr.destroy(token)
Note : you can provide expiresIn during signin of token in the same as it is provided in JWT.
If you just want to remove the token, it will be simple as removing it from the front end application, In you case clear the cookies that stores the token
On the other hand if you mean to invalidate the token, there is couple of ways to do it, below are some ways
(1) If all the token ever generated is stored in backend, It will be just simple as clearing that storage, if tokens have been mapped to users you can just clear tokens for a particular user.
(2) You can add a date field like "invalidate_before" along with user which should be updated at a event of changing password, logout from all devices etc.
Simply update the invalidate_before to currentTime() on such events.
Every time a new token is created, add the created time in token payload,
to validate the token on incoming request just check if the created time in payload is greater than invalidate_before time for that user in db
(3) When you create a new user, create a secret for just that user, then you can sign every user token with that specific secret, and just like in (2) events like changing password, logout from all devices etc, Should create a new secret.
This way also you can invalidate by checking the token signature.
overhead with (2) and (3) is that, validation will be a 2 step process and it involves db reading
EDIT: For (3) you may use a salt instead (final secret will be common secret + salt for particular user), So that you hava a way to invalidate either a single user's token by changing salt or the all user's token by changing common secret
You can add "issue time" to token and maintain "last logout time" for each user on the server. When you check token validity, also check "issue time" be after "last logout time".
While other answers provide detailed solutions for various setups, this might help someone who is just looking for a general answer.
There are three general options, pick one or more:
On the client side, delete the cookie from the browser using javascript.
On the server side, set the cookie value to an empty string or something useless (for example "deleted"), and set the cookie expiration time to a time in the past.
On the server side, update the refreshtoken stored in your database. Use this option to log out the user from all devices where they are logged in (their refreshtokens will become invalid and they have to log in again).
OK so I tried something that I wanna share I think it's a really easy and effective method so basically instead of destroying your token or blacklist it we can simply append a random value to it in the middle in a random index or even in the end of it like a random number (or a random hashed number) to make it harder for anyone to reverse it and obtain the previously valid token, Doing so makes this token invalid so the user won't go anywhere and from the front-end you can redirect the user to login again (or even from the back-end however I prefer if the front-end did it) so the user logs out they get redirected to the login page and it's all good, Here's my code. first of all I have an auth middleware that if the token(password & username) is OK it appends the token to req.token so whenever I call this middleware the user's token will be save to req.token
router.post('/logout', auth, async(req, res) => {
try{
let randomNumberToAppend = toString(Math.floor((Math.random() * 1000) + 1));
let randomIndex = Math.floor((Math.random() * 10) + 1);
let hashedRandomNumberToAppend = await bcrypt.hash(randomNumberToAppend, 10);
// now just concat the hashed random number to the end of the token
req.token = req.token + hashedRandomNumberToAppend;
return res.status(200).json('logout');
}catch(err){
return res.status(500).json(err.message);
}
});
right now it will concat the the hashed random number to the end of the token which means it's no longer valid so the user will have to login again as they will be redirected to the login page

JWT (JSON Web Token) automatic prolongation of expiration

I would like to implement JWT-based authentication to our new REST API. But since the expiration is set in the token, is it possible to automatically prolong it? I don't want users to need to sign in after every X minutes if they were actively using the application in that period. That would be a huge UX fail.
But prolonging the expiration creates a new token (and the old one is still valid until it expires). And generating a new token after each request sounds silly to me. Sounds like a security issue when more than one token is valid at the same time. Of course I could invalidate the old used one using a blacklist but I would need to store the tokens. And one of the benefits of JWT is no storage.
I found how Auth0 solved it. They use not only JWT token but also a refresh token:
https://auth0.com/docs/tokens/refresh-tokens
But again, to implement this (without Auth0) I'd need to store refresh tokens and maintain their expiration. What is the real benefit then? Why not have only one token (not JWT) and keep the expiration on the server?
Are there other options? Is using JWT not suited for this scenario?
I work at Auth0 and I was involved in the design of the refresh token feature.
It all depends on the type of application and here is our recommended approach.
Web applications
A good pattern is to refresh the token before it expires.
Set the token expiration to one week and refresh the token every time the user opens the web application and every one hour. If a user doesn't open the application for more than a week, they will have to login again and this is acceptable web application UX.
To refresh the token, your API needs a new endpoint that receives a valid, not expired JWT and returns the same signed JWT with the new expiration field. Then the web application will store the token somewhere.
Mobile/Native applications
Most native applications do login once and only once.
The idea is that the refresh token never expires and it can be exchanged always for a valid JWT.
The problem with a token that never expires is that never means never. What do you do if you lose your phone? So, it needs to be identifiable by the user somehow and the application needs to provide a way to revoke access. We decided to use the device's name, e.g. "maryo's iPad". Then the user can go to the application and revoke access to "maryo's iPad".
Another approach is to revoke the refresh token on specific events. An interesting event is changing the password.
We believe that JWT is not useful for these use cases, so we use a random generated string and we store it on our side.
In the case where you handle the auth yourself (i.e don't use a provider like Auth0), the following may work:
Issue JWT token with relatively short expiry, say 15min.
Application checks token expiry date before any transaction requiring a token (token contains expiry date). If token has expired, then it first asks API to 'refresh' the token (this is done transparently to the UX).
API gets token refresh request, but first checks user database to see if a 'reauth' flag has been set against that user profile (token can contain user id). If the flag is present, then the token refresh is denied, otherwise a new token is issued.
Repeat.
The 'reauth' flag in the database backend would be set when, for example, the user has reset their password. The flag gets removed when the user logs in next time.
In addition, let's say you have a policy whereby a user must login at least once every 72hrs. In that case, your API token refresh logic would also check the user's last login date from the user database and deny/allow the token refresh on that basis.
Below are the steps to do revoke your JWT access token:
1) When you do login, send 2 tokens (Access token, Refresh token) in response to client .
2) Access token will have less expiry time and Refresh will have long expiry time .
3) Client (Front end) will store refresh token in his local storage and access token in cookies.
4) Client will use access token for calling apis. But when it expires, pick the refresh token from local storage and call auth server api to get the new token.
5) Your auth server will have an api exposed which will accept refresh token and checks for its validity and return a new access token.
6) Once refresh token is expired, User will be logged out.
Please let me know if you need more details , I can share the code (Java + Spring boot) as well.
I was tinkering around when moving our applications to HTML5 with RESTful apis in the backend. The solution that I came up with was:
Client is issued with a token with a session time of 30 mins (or whatever the usual server side session time) upon successful login.
A client-side timer is created to call a service to renew the token before its expiring time. The new token will replace the existing in future calls.
As you can see, this reduces the frequent refresh token requests. If user closes the browser/app before the renew token call is triggered, the previous token will expire in time and user will have to re-login.
A more complicated strategy can be implemented to cater for user inactivity (e.g. neglected an opened browser tab). In that case, the renew token call should include the expected expiring time which should not exceed the defined session time. The application will have to keep track of the last user interaction accordingly.
I don't like the idea of setting long expiration hence this approach may not work well with native applications requiring less frequent authentication.
An alternative solution for invalidating JWTs, without any additional secure storage on the backend, is to implement a new jwt_version integer column on the users table. If the user wishes to log out or expire existing tokens, they simply increment the jwt_version field.
When generating a new JWT, encode the jwt_version into the JWT payload, optionally incrementing the value beforehand if the new JWT should replace all others.
When validating the JWT, the jwt_version field is compared alongside the user_id and authorisation is granted only if it matches.
jwt-autorefresh
If you are using node (React / Redux / Universal JS) you can install npm i -S jwt-autorefresh.
This library schedules refresh of JWT tokens at a user calculated number of seconds prior to the access token expiring (based on the exp claim encoded in the token). It has an extensive test suite and checks for quite a few conditions to ensure any strange activity is accompanied by a descriptive message regarding misconfigurations from your environment.
Full example implementation
import autorefresh from 'jwt-autorefresh'
/** Events in your app that are triggered when your user becomes authorized or deauthorized. */
import { onAuthorize, onDeauthorize } from './events'
/** Your refresh token mechanism, returning a promise that resolves to the new access tokenFunction (library does not care about your method of persisting tokens) */
const refresh = () => {
const init = { method: 'POST'
, headers: { 'Content-Type': `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` }
, body: `refresh_token=${localStorage.refresh_token}&grant_type=refresh_token`
}
return fetch('/oauth/token', init)
.then(res => res.json())
.then(({ token_type, access_token, expires_in, refresh_token }) => {
localStorage.access_token = access_token
localStorage.refresh_token = refresh_token
return access_token
})
}
/** You supply a leadSeconds number or function that generates a number of seconds that the refresh should occur prior to the access token expiring */
const leadSeconds = () => {
/** Generate random additional seconds (up to 30 in this case) to append to the lead time to ensure multiple clients dont schedule simultaneous refresh */
const jitter = Math.floor(Math.random() * 30)
/** Schedule autorefresh to occur 60 to 90 seconds prior to token expiration */
return 60 + jitter
}
let start = autorefresh({ refresh, leadSeconds })
let cancel = () => {}
onAuthorize(access_token => {
cancel()
cancel = start(access_token)
})
onDeauthorize(() => cancel())
disclaimer: I am the maintainer
Today, lots of people opt for doing session management with JWTs without being aware of what they are giving up for the sake of perceived simplicity. My answer elaborates on the 2nd part of the questions:
What is the real benefit then? Why not have only one token (not JWT) and keep the expiration on the server?
Are there other options? Is using JWT not suited for this scenario?
JWTs are capable of supporting basic session management with some limitations. Being self-describing tokens, they don't require any state on the server-side. This makes them appealing. For instance, if the service doesn't have a persistence layer, it doesn't need to bring one in just for session management.
However, statelessness is also the leading cause of their shortcomings. Since they are only issued once with fixed content and expiration, you can't do things you would like to with a typical session management setup.
Namely, you can't invalidate them on-demand. This means you can't implement a secure logout as there is no way to expire already issued tokens. You also can't implement idle timeout for the same reason. One solution is to keep a blacklist, but that introduces state.
I wrote a post explaining these drawbacks in more detail. To be clear, you can work around these by adding more complexity (sliding sessions, refresh tokens, etc.)
As for other options, if your clients only interact with your service via a browser, I strongly recommend using a cookie-based session management solution. I also compiled a list authentication methods currently widely used on the web.
Good question- and there is wealth of information in the question itself.
The article Refresh Tokens: When to Use Them and How They Interact with JWTs gives a good idea for this scenario. Some points are:-
Refresh tokens carry the information necessary to get a new access
token.
Refresh tokens can also expire but are rather long-lived.
Refresh tokens are usually subject to strict storage requirements to
ensure they are not leaked.
They can also be blacklisted by the authorization server.
Also take a look at auth0/angular-jwt angularjs
For Web API. read Enable OAuth Refresh Tokens in AngularJS App using ASP .NET Web API 2, and Owin
I actually implemented this in PHP using the Guzzle client to make a client library for the api, but the concept should work for other platforms.
Basically, I issue two tokens, a short (5 minute) one and a long one that expires after a week. The client library uses middleware to attempt one refresh of the short token if it receives a 401 response to some request. It will then try the original request again and if it was able to refresh gets the correct response, transparently to the user. If it failed, it will just send the 401 up to the user.
If the short token is expired, but still authentic and the long token is valid and authentic, it will refresh the short token using a special endpoint on the service that the long token authenticates (this is the only thing it can be used for). It will then use the short token to get a new long token, thereby extending it another week every time it refreshes the short token.
This approach also allows us to revoke access within at most 5 minutes, which is acceptable for our use without having to store a blacklist of tokens.
Late edit: Re-reading this months after it was fresh in my head, I should point out that you can revoke access when refreshing the short token because it gives an opportunity for more expensive calls (e.g. call to the database to see if the user has been banned) without paying for it on every single call to your service.
I solved this problem by adding a variable in the token data:
softexp - I set this to 5 mins (300 seconds)
I set expiresIn option to my desired time before the user will be forced to login again. Mine is set to 30 minutes. This must be greater than the value of softexp.
When my client side app sends request to the server API (where token is required, eg. customer list page), the server checks whether the token submitted is still valid or not based on its original expiration (expiresIn) value. If it's not valid, server will respond with a status particular for this error, eg. INVALID_TOKEN.
If the token is still valid based on expiredIn value, but it already exceeded the softexp value, the server will respond with a separate status for this error, eg. EXPIRED_TOKEN:
(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) > decoded.softexp)
On the client side, if it received EXPIRED_TOKEN response, it should renew the token automatically by sending a renewal request to the server. This is transparent to the user and automatically being taken care of the client app.
The renewal method in the server must check if the token is still valid:
jwt.verify(token, secret, (err, decoded) => {})
The server will refuse to renew tokens if it failed the above method.
How about this approach:
For every client request, the server compares the expirationTime of the token with (currentTime - lastAccessTime)
If expirationTime < (currentTime - lastAccessedTime), it changes the last lastAccessedTime to currentTime.
In case of inactivity on the browser for a time duration exceeding expirationTime or in case the browser window was closed and the expirationTime > (currentTime - lastAccessedTime), and then the server can expire the token and ask the user to login again.
We don't require additional end point for refreshing the token in this case.
Would appreciate any feedack.
Ref - Refresh Expired JWT Example
Another alternative is that once the JWT has expired, the user/system will make a call to
another url suppose /refreshtoken. Also along with this request the expired JWT should be passed. The Server will then return a new JWT which can be used by the user/system.
The idea of JWT is good, you put what you need in JWT and go stateless.
Two problems:
Lousy JWT standardization.
JWT is impossible to invalidate or if created fast-expiring it forces the user to log in frequently.
The solution to 1. Use custom JSON:
{"userId": "12345", "role": "regular_user"}
Encrypt it with a symmetric (AES) algorithm (it is faster than signing with an asymmetric one) and put it in a fast-expiring cookie. I would still call it JWT since it is JSON and used as a token in a Web application. Now the server checks if the cookie is present and its value can be decrypted.
The solution to 2. Use refresh token:
Take userId as 12345, encrypt it, and put it in the long-expiring cookie. No need to create a special field for the refresh token in DB.
Now every time an access token (JWT) cookie is expired server checks the refresh token cookie, decrypts, takes the value, and looks for the user in DB. In case the user is found, generate a new access token, otherwise (or if the refresh token is also expired) force the user to log in.
The simplest alternative is to use a refresh token as an access token, i.e. do not use JWT at all.
The advantage of using JWT is that during its expiration time server does not hit DB. Even if we put an access token in the cookie with an expiration time of only 2 min, for a busy application like eBay it will results in thousands of DB hits per second avoided.
I know this is an old question, but I use a hybrid of both session and token authentication. My app is a combination of micro-services so I need to use token-based authentication so that every micro-service doesn't need access to a centralized database for authentication. I issue 2 JWTs to my user (signed by different secrets):
A standard JWT, used to authenticate requests. This token expires after 15 minutes.
A JWT that acts as a refresh token that is placed in a secure cookie. Only one endpoint (actually it is its own microservice) accepts this token, and it is the JWT refresh endpoint. It must be accompanied by a CSRF token in the post body to prevent CRSF on that endpoint. The JWT refresh endpoint stores a session in the database (the id of the session and the user are encoded into the refresh JWT). This allows the user, or an admin, to invalidate a refresh token as the token must both validate and match the session for that user.
This works just fine but is much more complicated than just using session-based auth with cookies and a CSRF token. So if you don't have micro-services then session-based auth is probably the way to go.
If you are using AWS Amplify & Cognito this will do the magic for you:
Use Auth.currentSession() to get the current valid token or get new if the current has expired. Amplify will handle it
As a fallback, use some interval job to refresh tokens on demand every x minutes, maybe 10 min. This is required when you have a long-running process like uploading a very large video which will take more than an hour (maybe due to a slow network) then your token will expire during the upload and amplify will not update automatically for you. In this case, this strategy will work. Keep updating your tokens at some interval.
How to refresh on demand is not mentioned in docs so here it is.
import { Auth } from 'aws-amplify';
try {
const cognitoUser = await Auth.currentAuthenticatedUser();
const currentSession = await Auth.currentSession();
cognitoUser.refreshSession(currentSession.refreshToken, (err, session) => {
console.log('session', err, session);
const { idToken, refreshToken, accessToken } = session;
// do whatever you want to do now :)
});
} catch (e) {
console.log('Unable to refresh Token', e);
}
Origin: https://github.com/aws-amplify/amplify-js/issues/2560
services.Configure(Configuration.GetSection("ApplicationSettings"));
services.AddMvc().SetCompatibilityVersion(CompatibilityVersion.Version_2_2);
services.AddDbContext<AuthenticationContext>(options =>
options.UseSqlServer(Configuration.GetConnectionString("IdentityConnection")));
services.AddDefaultIdentity<ApplicationUser>()
.AddEntityFrameworkStores<AuthenticationContext>();
services.Configure<IdentityOptions>(options =>
{
options.Password.RequireDigit = false;
options.Password.RequireNonAlphanumeric = false;
options.Password.RequireLowercase = false;
options.Password.RequireUppercase = false;
options.Password.RequiredLength = 4;
}
);
services.AddCors();
//Jwt Authentication
var key = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(Configuration["ApplicationSettings:JWT_Secret"].ToString());
services.AddAuthentication(x =>
{
x.DefaultAuthenticateScheme = JwtBearerDefaults.AuthenticationScheme;
x.DefaultChallengeScheme = JwtBearerDefaults.AuthenticationScheme;
x.DefaultScheme = JwtBearerDefaults.AuthenticationScheme;
}).AddJwtBearer(x=> {
x.RequireHttpsMetadata = false;
x.SaveToken = false;
x.TokenValidationParameters = new Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens.TokenValidationParameters
{
ValidateIssuerSigningKey = true,
IssuerSigningKey = new SymmetricSecurityKey(key),
ValidateIssuer = false,
ValidateAudience = false,
ClockSkew = TimeSpan.Zero
};
});
}

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