Is cwallet.sso really necessary in a Jdeveloper application? - security

In Jdeveloper, what happen if I remove cwallet.sso? what is this for?
I read that it stores security credentials, but I removed it and my secure pages still asked me to login and I was able to log in using the users that I have in jazn-data.xml and the users that I have in my weblogic server.

It's not used for that, and if you are defining the database connection on weblogic server you should not need it, but in development time when you define database connection, or any connection that has password for that matter the cwallet.sso is the one that save and hash this password so that when you copy the project to another person it still works fine.

Related

Do i need HTTPS for Administration Panel? Best way to secure it in node.js?

I am developing a small website with a custom admin page that allow to simply modify and insert contents.
This is how it works: in domain.com/admin there is a page with an autentication form. Of course the only user that know the password is the admin (not me, my client). If the password is right, server send an html page that allow to modify the content of the website. How? Dynamic information are stored in a mongodb database setted up on localhost of server. So, using simple CRUD operation like insert, update and remove, the content of the website will change. In the clientside i simply do same "post" requests to the server, wich makes CRUD operations.
I need to make this system safe. Do i need https for autentication? Do you think that a simple autentication password for admin would be enougth? And what about the way i check if the passwords matches? I was thinking to store the admin password in the database (that have a password too) but maybe is unuseful. i could simply compare two strings cause the password is only one, there are no other registered users different by admin. But i'm not sure, this seems unsafe :D Any idea for the best way to do it??
I'm using node js (NO express). I have a dedicated root VPS.
https will be better, and you can just keep the salt and hash code in database instead of keeping the password directly. likely most of website have a feature to reset password not find the password, they don't keep password directly in file. when someone know the salt and hash code , they can't reverse the password.

xpages on browser repeat login

There is an application that we are using it both on XPiNC and browsers.
Before you can access the application, you must log-in with your user.id from lotus notes. The problem is there are several login msgboxes ( where you must again log in with your username and passwords ) saying:
The server says /xsp/.ibmxspres/dojoroot-1.8.1/dojo.
or
The server says /xsp/.ibmxspres/.mini/dojo/.en-us.
or
The server says /xsp/.ibmxspres/.mini/css.
or
The server says /xsp/.ibmxspres/.extlib/icons.
and so on. Even when I just hit F5 when I'm logged on in application ( there is, also, a computed field which displays the username ) those type of messages are being displayed.
What should I do as a developer? Or there must be some settings at the server?
I have the following ACL rights:
ACL: User type: Person and Access: Manager.
Effective access: all the checkboxes are checked except Full Access Administrator
Thanks for your time!
Ok, this should be straight out of the box ;-)
What I find strange is that the ressources you seem to be asked for access to use are some of the "built in" ressources (Dojo, css, etc.) in XPages...???
So first thing is really to test that this has nothing to do with your application:
Create a new application
Set a proper ACL that will force you to log in (Default reader or higher, a person called "Anonymous" no access)
Create a simple XPage and open it from the browser
What happens?
If everything works, then you need to add some elements that use the ressources (css, Dojo, etc.). Then what happens?
I guess you will see the same problems... If so, you need to have a look at the way you have set up your server for web access. Are you using internet sites? Do you use basic or session based authentication?
What does the ACL of your application look like?
What you experience could be caused by "realms" i.e. the "path" to which you log in. A simple example:
If you are required to log in to access the ressource /path/db.nsf/view/doc1?openDocument then your realm will be "/path/db.nsf/view/" - if then you try to create a document using /path/db.nsf/newDoc.xsp then you could be asked for access to the realm "/path/db.nsf/".
I must admit that I haven't seen these issues for quite a while - but that may be due to the fact that I control access to the database as a whole - if users need access to something inside the database I implement it using "public access". But first, let us hear a little more about your findings before we chase it as a realm issue ;-)
EDIT:
Ok, so you are using basic authentication. There are lots of good reasons to use session based authentication instead. However, that does not explain your problem. What OS are you using? An OS with file access in the file structure? Could it be that the user running Domino does not have access to the ressources? Have any (file) restrictions to these directories been set up? You really should not be prompted to login for these ressources....
Did you try another "new" application?
/John
Switch to session based authentication. The multiple prompts point to BASIC where you can't logout unless you close the browser

Is it possible to prevent the web/DB admin from peeking my online content?

Let's say, there is a website for an online diary. Users upload their secrets to the web server and stored in the database. Normally, a user without the password can't see the diary items. However the web admin or DB admin could still can connect to the DB and see everything.
Is there a solution to prevent this? I mean a solution for the whole web application, not only for a single user.
Client-side javascript can encrypt the content, using a key known only to the client and never sent to the server, prior to saving.
However, the server can at any time start serving up malicious JS that would send the keys back down to the server. The only way to make this impossible is to make your application an installable client-side app (via an extension or whatever - but nothing that auto-updates). Additionally, all of this paranoia is pointless unless the user can verify what the app is doing, so it would need to be open-source.
At this point you're basically writing GnuPG, so you might as well just use that.

Security web login architecture?

I've implemented an login on a site (didnt use asp.net default). When a user logged in I save his ip in the db. If he doesnt doing anything in X min his ip get deleted. Whenever a user trying to enter a page that is restricted I check if his ip is on the db. If so he can continue.
The problem is that if the logged on user is on a wifi network or any other shared network, all the other users will have the same ip, and thats not good. How can I overcome this problem? Is cookies the best answer?
How is the user logging in? Username/Password? I'm assuming the password is stored as a salted hash in the database, so why not pass a cookie back with the user's username and hashed password? Whenever they try and access a restricted area check that username/password hash against your database. Make sure to sanatize the cookie values before checking them against your database to prevent injection. Or, depending on the language this is in, you could use session tracking.
I'm assuming by the tags that you're using WebLogic Server for your solution, although your comment about ASP.net makes me wonder. (although no ASP tags set for the question?)
The short answer is that you're making life harder than it needs to be - if I understand your problem correctly - that you want an idle user's session to be timed out after a certain period of inactivity for security reasons - then you can do this via application configuration with the session-timeout parameter:
http://download.oracle.com/docs/cd/E13222_01/wls/docs81/webapp/web_xml.html#1017275
Wherever possible when security's involved, I always prefer to avoid rolling my own solution. Just not smart enough to trust it. :-)
Apologies if I'm off in my understanding here.

How to verify an application is the application it says it is?

Here's the situation: we have a common library which can retrieve database connection details from a central configuration store that we have setup. Each application uses this library when working with a database.
Basically, it will call a stored procedure and say "I am {xyz} application, I need to connect o " and it will return the connection details for that applications primary database (server, instance, database, user, and password).
How would one go about locking that down so that only application {xyz} can retrieve the passwords for {xyz} databases (there is a list of database details for each application... i just need to secure the passwords)?
The usual way is to have a different config store per app and give each app a different user/password to connect to the config store.
That doesn't prevent anyone from changing the app and replacing the user/password for app X with the values from app Y but it's a bit more secure, especially when you compile this data in instead of supplying it via a config file.
If you want to be really secure, you must first create a secure connection to the store (so you need a DB drivers that supports this). This connection must be created using a secure key that is unique per application and which can be verified (so no one can just copy them around). You will need to secure the executable with hashes (the app will calculate its own hash somehow and send that to the server who will have a list of valid hashes for each app).
All in all, it's not something trivial which you can just turn on with an obscure option. You will need to learn a lot about security and secure data exchange, first. You'll need a way to safely install your app in an insecure place, verify its integrity, protect the code against debuggers that can be attached at runtime and against it running in the virtual machine, etc.
Off the top of my head, try PKI.
Are you trying to protected yourself from malicous programs, and is this a central database that these applications are connecting to? If so you should probably consider a middle layer between your database and application.
I'm not sure this applies to your case, depending on how what your answers to the abovementioned would be, but by the comments it sounds like you are having a similar case to what this question is about.
Securing your Data Layer in a C# Application
The simplest/most straightforward way would be to store the passwords in encrypted format (storing passwords in plaintext is just plain bad anyhow, as recently demonstrated over at PerlMonks) and make each application responsible for doing its own password encryption/decryption. It would then not matter whether an app retrieved another app's passwords, as it would still be unable to decrypt them.
One possibility is to keep the passwords in the database in an encrypted form, and convey the encryption key to the allowed application(s) in a secure connection.Then, only the application with the encryption key can actually get the passwords and not others.

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