I am the webmaster for a small, growing industrial association. Soon, I will have to implement a restricted, members-only section for the website.
The problem is that our organization membership both includes big companies as well as amateur “clubs” (it's a relatively new industry…).
It is clear that those clubs will share the login ID they will use to log onto our website. The problem is to detect whether one of their members will share the login credentials with people who would not normally supposed to be accessing the website (there is no objection for such a club to have all it’s members get on the website).
I have thought about logging along with each sign-on the IP address as well as the OS and the browser used; if the OS/Browser stays constant and there are no more than, say, 10 different IP addresses, the account is clearly used by very few different computers.
But if there are 50 OS/Browser combination and 150 different IPs, the credentials have obviously been disseminated far, and there would be then cause for action, such as modifying the password.
Of course, it is extremely annoying when your password is being unilaterally changed. So, for this problem, I thought about allowing the “clubs” to manage their own list of sub-accounts, and therefore if abuse is suspected, the user responsible would be easily pinned-down, and this “sub-member” alone would face the annoyance of a password change.
Question:
What potential problems would anyone see with such an approach?
Any particular reason why you can't force each club member to register (just straight-up, not necessarily as a sub or a similar complex structure)? Perhaps give each club some sort of code to use just when the users register so you can automatically create their accounts and affiliate them with a club, but you then have direct accounting of each member without an onerous process that the club has to manage themselves. Then it's much easier to determine if a given account is being spread around (disparate IP accesses in given periods of time).
Clearly then you can also set a limit on the number of affiliated accounts per club, should you want to do so. This is basically what you've suggested, I suppose, but I would try to keep any onerous management tasks out of the hands of your users if at all possible. If you can manage club-affiliated signups, you should, rather than forcing someone at the club to manage them for you.
Also, while some sort of heuristic based on IP and credentials is probably fine, I would stay away from incorporating user-agent, or at least caring too much about it. Seeing a few different UAs from the same IP - depending on your expected userbase, I suppose - isn't really that unusual. I use several browsers in the course of my day due to website bugs, etc. and unless someone is using a machine as a proxy, it's not evidence of anything nefarious.
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i trying make an internet voting service but the problem is internet is just so easy to cheat by creating multiple accounts and vote same thing. capcha and email is not helping as take just 3 second to pass by human. IP can be changed by proxy. if we put some cookie on voter browser he just clean it next time.
i created this question to ask help for methods we can use with basic futures that all browsers have (javascript etc)to prevent our service being cheated easily.
the first idea i have myself is that possible my website access all cookies user have on his browser by just visiting my site ? because when they clean everything by CCleaner for new accounts then i can understand the browser is empty so the person is perhaps a cheater as most of real users when come to my site always have at least several cookie from different sites
There is no way to address the issue of uniquely identifying real-world assets (here: humans) without stepping out of your virtual system, by definition.
There are various ways to ensure a higher reliability of the mapping "one human to exactly one virtual identity", but none of them is fool-proof.
The most accessible way would be to do it via a smartphone app. A human usually only has one smartphone (and a phone number).
Another way is to send them snail mail to their real address, with a secret code, which you require them to enter in your virtual system.
or the social insurance number
or their fingerprints as log in credentials
The list could go on, but the point is, these things are bound to the physical world. If you combine more such elements, you get a higher accuracy (but never 100% certainty).
After the Sony PSN debacle, I am trying to find examples of secure hardware tethering to a network. There are two use cases in particular:
1- computer downloads a piece of software that then uniquely and securely labels it to a cloud service
2- a hardware manufacturer uniquely labels a hardware device that then negotiates membership on the network.
Given the fact that the hardware device might have to change (revoke or service enhancements) it feels like #2 becomes #1.
The broad outline is this:
- connect to the service via HTTPS to protect against man in the middle
- device generates a GUID and presents it via HTTPS to service
- service records GUID against account
- on success, service 'enables' device
But how do you protect the GUID so that it cannot be stolen?
I just wanted to comment here:
Sony's PSN issues started with horrible practices with regards to their QA environment.
First, they defaulted to trusting anything that was sent to those servers using their developers toolkit. The reason they did this was that the dev kit used to cost upwards of $10k US and therefore they thought anyone who paid that amount would be on the up and up. However, when they radically lowered the price things changed externally and they didn't account for it.
The second issue with PSN was that the security between QA and live was, well, weak at best and easily circumvented. My understanding is that you could send commands to live using QA credentials. Because QA credentials were used, all chargeable actions were approved without money changing hands and the actions were applied to live accounts. When several people told Sony about this they did nothing.
A third issue was a reliance on hardware based encryption keys. Even hardware encryption keys installed on the devices can be figured out.
Point is, Sony dug their own grave on it so I wouldn't use anything they did as a template for how to do things. Heck, a lot of their websites were open to SQL injection which in today's day and age should get you fired.
Another example here is the iPhone. Each iPhone has a unique identifier that installed apps can grab and send back across the network; similar to a serial number. Some apps use this ID to try and tie a particular device to a person. However, it's trivial to create ID's and broadcast them, so this hasn't worked out so well for the partners. Also Apple does not expose a way to ensure a given ID (UUID) is valid to app producers.
A third example is mobile phone carriers. They use a particular ID baked into your SIM card to identify your account in order to know who to bill when a call is made. This ID is verified whenever the phone checks in with the network. However, we're dealing with radio signals and any device that can broadcast a correct ID can gain access. Point is, honest people think that only AT&T approved devices can get on an AT&T network. Reality is, anything can but they are going to bill the owner of the particular ID...
That said, any software you have running on a remote device that is not under your direct control is likely to be hacked. The popularity of the device will increase the likelihood of it happening sooner rather than later.
Where do we go from here?
On a basic level you associate an ID with an account in your service. PSN, Apple and others have done this. When an ID is broadcast, you need to verify that it exists AND that it's tied to an active account. If both pass then you have two options: either perform the action requested OR request additional verification.
For any actions that require money to be spent, do the additional verification (usually some form of username/password), capture the funds, then perform the action. Go one step further and every time a bad login is entered, send an email to the user on file. Further, automatically send a receipt. These are typically done so that your honest users can tell when something is going on.
Anything else just let through.
Bearing in mind, of course, that QA credentials should NOT work in your Live environment. Those systems should not be tied to each other under any condition and, quite frankly, should even live on separate hardware. In other words, QA and Live should NOT share a login database.
The thing here is that you shouldn't care about the device itself; just the account. You can't control the device as it's out of your hands; heck you can't even be sure it hasn't been physically tampered with. (XBox has been fighting this one with people adding resistors or burning out certain components to get past physical security features).
So, IMHO, do a bit to keep honest people honest but overall don't worry about it. Now, you should transfer everything via SSL or someother encrypted connection between the device and your cloud so that you don't leak ID's to anyone that wants to grab them. This will help protect those honest people.
Further, you shouldn't have a direct way to query whether an ID is valid or not from the outside. This will make it a bit more difficult for a hacker to find existing valid IDs and take over accounts. If you want to get fancy you could honey pot those and track the hackers down in order to sue them into oblivion, but that takes time and resources companies don't normally have. Also you could log all of the requests that contained bad IDs and use that to track hackers down.
Note that even after the device has been "enabled" I still suggest you have two levels of authentication. The first is for simple actions like downloading free content; the second kicks in anytime there is a fee associated. Again, we're trying to protect your honest subscribers.
For the dishonest ones you will have to apply some statistical analysis on the transactions coming across. Things like the transaction rate can help identify bots that are running and allow you to kill their IDs. There are others but they'll be unique to your application.
This was long winded. But my point is:
You can't secure the ID or anything else you pass out.
You can't ensure the requests are coming from your devices or your own approved devices.
You better take actions to keep QA and production separate for those building software for these devices using your services.
You better take actions to protect your normal honest users.
Trust NOTHING.
Due to the above you should evaluate your business model so that you don't care what device was used and instead focus on the individual accounts themselves; which you do have control over.
I am not sure I entirely understand the question, but I think you want some sort of device to hold on to a GUID assigned to it by a web service, and you don't want someone finding out what that GUID is, correct?
If so, there isn't a lot you can do. You have already mentioned one option... using HTTPS during the assigning of the ID. That is a good start, but remember that anyone who has physical access to the device can do a lot of things to look up this ID.
In short, it is impossible to completely hide. Someone can always reverse engineer it. There are folks out there reading data right out of memory with hardware.
The talk of internet town today is the SNAFU that led to dozens of Facebook users being led by Google search to an article on ReadWriteWeb about the Facebook-AOL deal. What ensued in the comments tread is quickly becoming the stuff of internet legend.
However, behind the hilarity is a scary fact that this might be how users browse to all sites, including their banking and other more important sites. A quick search for "my bank website login" and quickly click the first result. Once they are there, the user is willing to submit their credentials even though the site looks nothing like the site they tried to reach. (This is evidenced by the fact that user's comments are connected to their facebook accounts via facebook-connect)
Preventing this scenario is pretty much out of our control and educating our users on the basics of internet browsing may be just as impossible. So how then can we ensure that users know they are on the correct web site before trying to log in? Is something like Bank of America's SiteKey sufficient, or is that another cop-out that shifts responsibility back on the user?
The Internet and web browsers used to have a couple of cool features that might actually have some applicability there.
One was something called "domain names." Instead entering the website name over on the right site of your toolbar, there was another, larger text field on the left where you could enter it. Rather than searching a proprietary Google database running on vast farms of Magic 8-Balls, this arcane "address" field consulted an authoritative registry of "domain names", and would lead you to the right site every time. Sadly, it sometimes required you to enter up to 8 extra characters! This burden was too much for most users to shoulder, and this cumbersome feature has been abandoned.
Another thing you used to see in browsers was something called a "bookmark." Etymologists are still trying to determine where the term "bookmark" originated. They suspect it has something to do with paper with funny squiggles on it. Anyway, these bookmarks allowed users to create a button that would take them directly to the web site of interest. Of course, creating a bookmark was a tedious, intimidating process, sometimes requiring as many as two menu clicks—or worse yet, use of the Ctrl-key!
Ah, the wonders of the ancients.
The site could "personalize" itself by showing some personal information,
easy recognizable by the user, on every page.
There are plenty of ways to implement it. The obvious one:
under first visit, the site requires user to upload some avatar,
and adds user's id to the cookies. After that, every time the user browses
the site, the avatar is shown.
When I set up my online bank account, it asked me to choose from a selection of images. The image I chose is now shown to me every time I login. This assures me that I am on the right website.
EDIT: i just read the link about the BoA SiteKey, this is apparently the same thing (it sounded from the name like a challenge-response dongle)
I suppose the best answer would be a hardware device which required a code from the bank and the user and authenticated both. But any of these things assume that people are actually thinking about the problem, which of course they don't. This was going on before internet banking was common - I had a friend who had her wallet stolen back in the 90s, and theif phoned her pretending to be her bank and persuaded her to reveal her PIN...
When the user first visits the site and logs in, he can share some personal information (even something very trivial) that imposter sites couldn't possible know - high school mascot, first street lived on, etc.
If there's ever any question of site authenticity, the site could share this information back to the user.
Like on TV shows/movies with the evil twin. The good twin always wins trust by sharing a secret that only the person who's trying to figure out who the good twin is would know.
You cannot prevent phishing per-se but you can take several steps each of which do a little bit to mitigate the problem.
1) If you have something like site-key or a sign-in seal, please ensure that these cannot be iframed on a malicious website. Just javascript framebusting may not be enough as IE has security="restricted".
2) Be very consistent about how you ask for user credentials - serve the login form over SSL (not just post-back over SSL). Do not ask for login on several places or sites. Encourage third parties who want to work with user data stored on your site to use OAuth (instead of taking your user's password).
3) You should never ask for information via email (with or without link).
4) Have a security page where you talk about these issues.
5) Send notification on changes to registered phone, email, etc.
Apart from above, monitor user account activity - such as changes to contact information, security Q&A, access, etc (noting time, ip, and there are several subtle techniques).
We would like to run a wireless access point for public use. However, in case of misbehavior, we would like some personal information to be able to pass on to law enforcement.
The proposed solution involves a captive portal where users enter their email addresses, and are then given ten minutes to check their email and verify, after which they are given unrestricted access.
The problem, as I see it, is that once a user is authenticated, anyone can come along, spoof the MAC or IP, and then have access. If they commit a crime or copyright infringement, the user who entered the email address is now blamed.
Now, we could solve that by using WPA and requiring users to preregister. But as I said, we would like to allow anyone to just drive up and use it, and we don't want to provide any technical support.
The other alternative is not collecting email addresses, but then in case of an investigation or lawsuit, we wouldn't have anything to hand over, and thus risk the possibility of being shut down.
Is there any way out of this dilemma?
Collecting email would also be futile since you have no good way of confirming it without also providing compromised access. You should simply log the traffic that the user generates.
The answer is to not care about unsatisfiable demands from law enforcement for the personal information of your users. If that's not an acceptable answer, then the answer is to stop trying to provide a public access point. If that's not an acceptable answer either, then the answer is the proposed solution you already have. How you go about living with yourself afterward, for collecting personal information from law abiding people that will only ever be used by criminals to cover their tracks, is a personal matter and out of scope for this site. Good luck.
Having the end-user accept a legal disclaimer that you (the provider) are not responsible and they (the end-user) is responsible, and that they should not do illegal things is usually good enough. Just log that they clicked "I agree" and their IP and MAC at the time. They should have to do this every time they connect.
Asking for an email is basically worthless; many will use a made-up email, or enter a typo, then complain they never got it - many will use a disposable email - many will use a junk account they create with one of the free webmail providers.
A system that sends their mobile phone a TXT message with a unique (random) code, and having that entered on the captive portal page to gain access is a better system IMHO. I've done this before and it works OK, except for kids who have mommy's iPad or another tablet but no phone. You save all this data for 90+ days, or however long your lawyers tell you.
Realize that implementing any of this significantly decreases the actual use of your hotspot, users don't have the patience and will be frustrated and abandon the process.
Most captive portal products can log the MAC and IP lease every client gets, and where they go on the Internet (at least that's how I do it) so if a legal request comes along, you can give law enforcement the data you have. It's up to law enforcement to then steak out or track down the device with that MAC, which depending on their competency level is possible, or impossible for them, either way it's not your job to do their job for them.
I also advocate filtering the obvious porn and malware domains, not just to save on bandwidth, but to limit your liability. Any good captive portal product can do this.
Your public wireless network should at the least be NAT'd to a separate static IP, so you can differentiate legal requests that reference that IP, as opposed to say your private office network. You can do this with separate firewalls, or a firewall that supports multiple LAN interfaces.
I'm planning to add some vote up/vote down buttons to a website I run. This seems easy enough but I want to stop people voting multiple times. One solution would be to make them register before allowing them to vote but I'd prefer not to have to force them to register.
Is there are a reasonably straightforward way of doing this? Checking the IP address doesn't seem like a good solution, since it's possible that multiple users may come from the same IP address.
Cookies might be the answer, but a savvy user could delete the cookie. Any better ideas?
Sorry I don't have a useful answer, I just want to share my experience.
About 8 years ago I worked for a site that ran online polls. We once got hacked by some bots voting on some of our questions several hundred votes a minute.
I had to implement some emergency checks: IP address, cookies, and I really don't remember what else.
At the end of the day we decided to take the polls down. Those damn robots just didn't care. IP adresses were spoofed, cookies were being deleted, etc.
If you really really need the polls to be unhackeable I don't see any other way that requiring registration and using captchas to avoid bots signing up for new accounts.
And the sad thing is that this was just an entertainment site with polls on what's your favorite color and things like that.
The only thing we didn't tried was using captchas because they didn't exist at the time. That might have reduced non-human cheating a good deal.
Don't take this as any kind of expert advice on the matter, because that was the only time I had anything to do with online polls, but I remembered my story and wanted to share.
I think it really comes down to the nature of your website, and how accurate your results needed to be.
Using a cookie seems like the best option, but it depends on the target audience of your website. Would they be tech-savvy enough to try and beat the system to allow them to vote multiple times? If not, the risk should be fairly low and this would seem like the best approach.
Checking against an IP address, as you said, may be too restrictive. But if it's critical for all votes to be from unique individuals, this might be the better approach even if it means some legitimate voters won't get to vote.
I thought of another option, but I'm not sure if it's possible or feasible. If you could combine the IP address approach with a hardware based check (e.g. MAC address of NIC) this would eliminate the IP address approach being too restrictive due to NAT within a LAN. But it wouldn't help the situation where you have a computer in an Internet cafe used by different individuals.
You should also use captcha (for non registered accounts) to reduce the likelihood of voting bots. If someone wants to maliciously cast multiple votes, making it more difficult for them to automate the voting process through bots will help to hopefully reduce the occurrence of such behaviour.
So, you want to have each unique person have only one vote on each item. When a person tries to vote who has already voted before, you want to detect this. This means that you have to identify the person. There are no tricks to get around that.
Now, since persons can log in from any computer, identifying the computer doesn't help. This rules out IP checks and cookies, as well as anything else based on the user's hardware.
How to identify a person? You can't. You can only force them to identify themselves, by providing unique credentials, like a social security number (I think this is often used in Korea), a passport number, or similar. This, of course, doesn't help if you don't check it, since anyone can make up a 10 digit number with little chance of collision.
Even having the user register doesn't really help per se -- they can just register another account.
I wonder if you could make it a multi-step process, to make it more difficult for BOTs.
Registering, or some similar task, gets you Cookie-A, and then when you vote you get Cookie-B, but if you have Cookie-B and don't have a suitable matching Cookie-A your vote doesn't count. If you try to re-register on the same machine that can be detected by you already having Cookie-A. Going through the steps too fast is treated as a BOT.
We had a psychometric test, with many questions, and users had to make thoughtful answers. An answer in sub-N seconds was someone just pressing buttons to get through it. We never told them that their answer was too quick, we just marked the data as "suspect".
So anyone trying to go straight to the Vote Button won't work. They would have to do Step-A, then Step-b then Step-C in order.
To re-vote I would have to clear cookies, re-register, read the blurb-page (whatever) and finally re-vote, all in the right order, and not too fast.
Requiring JavaScript to be enabled may help, as may a Captcha system. Captcha could have some sort of delay - "Please watch as the two words appear" so that there are two words, shown one after another, but "real words" so that they can be easily memorised, and then typed in. Any response that is "too fast" is not valid.
At some point people will just become annoyed and not bother though.
Obviously you need to identify the user so he can only vote once. But identify the user does'nt mean you have to pop up a login screen. As said above you can ask for the email
address, ans use it as an identfier.
No one mention the way stackoverflow works, if the user has something to win (here reptutation) when becoming a register user and if the login process is as simple as giving an email address, then that's a win-win situation in wich the user is happy to login and vote, and you're happy to have him registered and voting things (and only once per question).
Jeff Atwood wrote an article about the "login barrier", wich may give you clues.
I once created a voting system for a contest. I was restricted from limiting votes by IP due to the fact that multiple people would be legitimately voting from the same IPs. As such, I went with the email confirmation method, requiring each voter to input an email address which a confirmation link was sent to, which, once clicked, would activate their vote and prevent additional votes using that address.
It did not work well. People created hundreds of false email addresses on various free sites.
What did work in the runoff vote, somewhat surprisingly, was adding the email address/vote pairs to a database but not immediately sending the confirmation emails out. Instead, I had a cron job send the batch of them every 15 minutes or so. This adds an additional complication for people registering many addresses, as they have to either leave them all open or remember the login info for each of them at some point in the future.
Of course, still easily bypassed for someone motivated enough, but it seemed to work well in this case.
I've never used a system like this, but try to identify a user by their browser's fingerprint. This jQuery plugin combines screen size, color depth, user timezone, and installed plugins to create a unique ID of a user. Definitely not foolproof, but it's a different approach.
There's no accurate way to avoid multiple votes from the same user, even if they don't delete cookies, they can use another browser, or another computer.
I think you should register user before he up / down vote. You can get a little piece of information from the user to get registered, so he does not bored or break his registeration. Afterwards he can update his account if he wants. IMHO this is the best solution.
As has been said there is no 'perfect' solution.
As an attempt at an imperfect solution, how about storing a hash of the IP address and the User agent.
This would mean that different users from a given IP, which have different browser user agents, can still vote.
Use a cookie-based approach, it is accurate enough for most entertainment-grade polls on the web. Stay away from IP restrictions. This would mean that only one person from larger companies gets to vote and that only one person in a family gets to vote.
Also a possibility:
let the user vote and fill out his emailaddress.
The user receives a confirmationemail with a link he needs to click in order to confirm his vote.
But this way, the user also has quite some overhead.
Or do this in combination with registered userss (who will not be forced to confirm)
I know that this is an old thread. In any case I suggest to use evercookie (http://samy.pl/evercookie/) to track a user that have already voted!
It's matter of how many identities a single person can control. The more harder you make for a single person to control multiple identities the more secure your poll will be.
For entertainment grade polls where the results doesn't matter, single cookie approach is enough. Very easy to circumvent if the user opens icognito windows.
Better protection can be obtained if you put a registration barrier, you can use OAuth based logins for seamless authentication, it would take some effort to switch accounts for more votes. But this doesn't stop the desperate ones to vote multiple times.
Even better if you send confirmation code in SMS. Though people may own multiple phone numbers, it's not common to have a considerable number of phone numbers to execute a fraud. But this approach costs money for you and can be abused by DoSing the server to exhaust all the SMSes.
If you want goverment-grade polls, where the votes can decide an election.
Then you should have the voters show up in the registration office to apply for the poll and let them choose one from the prepared PIN envelopes, which contains a long hash they can enter when casting the vote.
So unless the organizers commit a fraud then voters can't. This also ensures anonymity.
An old question but for to touch on new ways - these days there are many Poll services out there who work tirelessly to implement numerous measures to avoid dupe votes, and constantly tweak their systems to counter new ways people introduce to circumvent etc. Doing this yourself is a job in itself.
They even offer branding. And large corporations use them, so it's not like your company will look bad for outsourcing a poll.
If you need to do it yourself.
As has been said, registration is the only sure fire way. If it's really important to avoid dupe votes (i.e. it's not just fave colour or something trivial/fun) then you can also limit voting to a link you send to their email they registered with.
While still not fool proof (nothing is) at least you force them to have a genuine email address which they have access to.
This isn't too much trouble for users voting, but makes it fiddly to make many dupe votes - registering, waiting for email, using the link, etc.
You already named all usable solutions. ;) It's your task to decide now.
I'd recommend combining an IP and cookie check.