Just to be on the safe side, what's the best practice to ensure that only my application has access to my webservice, which is hosted on a public server? Should I implement I shared key or something?
My webservice is hosted on Googles App Engine and my Application runs on iPhones and iPads.
If you need further information, just ask.
Thanks,
Henrik
some sort of challenge/response authentication would be your best bet, but you could use something as simple as a key that's sent with every request. it might be quite easy for someone with a packet sniffer to reverse engineer that security though - i guess the amount of time you spend on it will relate to how much you really care :)
If you require your iphone app users to enter a loginid/password, then it is trivial to achieve what you want. But I assume you don't want that ..
Without that, there is no way to ensure you app has exclusive access to your web-services. People can always sniff HTTP traffic and spoof it. People can decompile/reverse-engineer your app to figure out the key/password.
See other discussions on StackOverflow - How to restrict access to my web service? and How can I create and use a web service in public but still restrict its use to only my app?
You could program your app to only serve requests that include your iPhone's unique identier - see StackOverflow question [Unique identifier for an iPhone app]. The id could still be sniffed, so depending on your needs, you may need methods to counter that.
Well, i had similar problem. What i realized, there is no 100% solution. What i did is, i used different approach. I have implemented OAuth and SSL, of course and than make algorithm for my web service to learn behavior of my app.
I try to put that algorithm in some kind of pattern, template, so it can be used in more scenarios. It's still in developing, so here is code of simple console app that will simulate that algorithm. Hope this can help:
https://github.com/vjeftovic/LearningRESTSimulation
Related
Is there any way to restrict post requests to my REST API only to requests coming from my own mobile app binary? This app will be distributed on Google Play and the Apple App Store so it should be implied that someone will have access to its binary and try to reverse engineer it.
I was thinking something involving the app signatures, since every published app must be signed somehow, but I can't figure out how to do it in a secure way. Maybe a combination of getting the app signature, plus time-based hashes, plus app-generated key pairs and the good old security though obscurity?
I'm looking for something as fail proof as possible. The reason why is because I need to deliver data to the app based on data gathered by the phone sensors, and if people can pose as my own app and send data to my api that wasn't processed by my own algorithms, it defeats its purpose.
I'm open to any effective solution, no matter how complicated. Tin foil hat solutions are greatly appreciated.
Any credentials that are stored in the app can be exposed by the user. In the case of Android, they can completely decompile your app and easily retrieve them.
If the connection to the server does not utilize SSL, they can be easily sniffed off the network.
Seriously, anybody who wants the credentials will get them, so don't worry about concealing them. In essence, you have a public API.
There are some pitfalls and it takes extra time to manage a public API.
Many public APIs still track by IP address and implement tarpits to simply slow down requests from any IP address that seems to be abusing the system. This way, legitimate users from the same IP address can still carry on, albeit slower.
You have to be willing to shut off an IP address or IP address range despite the fact that you may be blocking innocent and upstanding users at the same time as the abusers. If your application is free, it may give you more freedom since there is no expected level of service and no contract, but you may want to guard yourself with a legal agreement.
In general, if your service is popular enough that someone wants to attack it, that's usually a good sign, so don't worry about it too much early on, but do stay ahead of it. You don't want the reason for your app's failure to be because users got tired of waiting on a slow server.
Your other option is to have the users register, so you can block by credentials rather than IP address when you spot abuse.
Yes, It's public
This app will be distributed on Google Play and the Apple App Store so it should be implied that someone will have access to its binary and try to reverse engineer it.
From the moment its on the stores it's public, therefore anything sensitive on the app binary must be considered as potentially compromised.
The Difference Between WHO and WHAT is Accessing the API Server
Before I dive into your problem I would like to first clear a misconception about who and what is accessing an API server. I wrote a series of articles around API and Mobile security, and in the article Why Does Your Mobile App Need An Api Key? you can read in detail the difference between who and what is accessing your API server, but I will extract here the main takes from it:
The what is the thing making the request to the API server. Is it really a genuine instance of your mobile app, or is it a bot, an automated script or an attacker manually poking around your API server with a tool like Postman?
The who is the user of the mobile app that we can authenticate, authorize and identify in several ways, like using OpenID Connect or OAUTH2 flows.
Think about the who as the user your API server will be able to Authenticate and Authorize access to the data, and think about the what as the software making that request in behalf of the user.
So if you are not using user authentication in the app, then you are left with trying to attest what is doing the request.
Mobile Apps should be as much dumb as possible
The reason why is because I need to deliver data to the app based on data gathered by the phone sensors, and if people can pose as my own app and send data to my api that wasn't processed by my own algorithms, it defeats its purpose.
It sounds to me that you are saying that you have algorithms running on the phone to process data from the device sensors and then send them to the API server. If so then you should reconsider this approach and instead just collect the sensor values and send them to the API server and have it running the algorithm.
As I said anything inside your app binary is public, because as yourself said, it can be reverse engineered:
should be implied that someone will have access to its binary and try to reverse engineer it.
Keeping the algorithms in the backend will allow you to not reveal your business logic, and at same time you may reject requests with sensor readings that do not make sense(if is possible to do). This also brings you the benefit of not having to release a new version of the app each time you tweak the algorithm or fix a bug in it.
Runtime attacks
I was thinking something involving the app signatures, since every published app must be signed somehow, but I can't figure out how to do it in a secure way.
Anything you do at runtime to protect the request you are about to send to your API can be reverse engineered with tools like Frida:
Inject your own scripts into black box processes. Hook any function, spy on crypto APIs or trace private application code, no source code needed. Edit, hit save, and instantly see the results. All without compilation steps or program restarts.
Your Suggested Solutions
Security is all about layers of defense, thus you should add as many as you can afford and required by law(e.g GDPR in Europe), therefore any of your purposed solutions are one more layer the attacker needs to bypass, and depending on is skill-set and time is willing to spent on your mobile app it may prevent them to go any further, but in the end all of them can be bypassed.
Maybe a combination of getting the app signature, plus time-based hashes, plus app-generated key pairs and the good old security though obscurity?
Even when you use key pairs stored in the hardware trusted execution environment, all an attacker needs to do is to use an instrumentation framework to hook in the function of your code that uses the keys in order to extract or manipulate the parameters and return values of the function.
Android Hardware-backed Keystore
The availability of a trusted execution environment in a system on a chip (SoC) offers an opportunity for Android devices to provide hardware-backed, strong security services to the Android OS, to platform services, and even to third-party apps.
While it can be defeated I still recommend you to use it, because not all hackers have the skill set or are willing to spend the time on it, and I would recommend you to read this series of articles about Mobile API Security Techniques to learn about some complementary/similar techniques to the ones you described. This articles will teach you how API Keys, User Access Tokens, HMAC and TLS Pinning can be used to protect the API and how they can be bypassed.
Possible Better Solutions
Nowadays I see developers using Android SafetyNet to attest what is doing the request to the API server, but they fail to understand it's not intended to attest that the mobile app is what is doing the request, instead it's intended to attest the integrity of the device, and I go in more detail on my answer to the question Android equivalent of ios devicecheck. So should I use it? Yes you should, because it is one more layer of defense, that in this case tells you that your mobile app is not installed in a rooted device, unless SafetyNet has been bypassed.
Is there any way to restrict post requests to my REST API only to requests coming from my own mobile app binary?
You can allow the API server to have an high degree of confidence that is indeed accepting requests only from your genuine app binary by implementing the Mobile App Attestation concept, and I describe it in more detail on this answer I gave to the question How to secure an API REST for mobile app?, specially the sections Securing the API Server and A Possible Better Solution.
Do you want to go the Extra Mile?
In any response to a security question I always like to reference the excellent work from the OWASP foundation.
For APIS
OWASP API Security Top 10
The OWASP API Security Project seeks to provide value to software developers and security assessors by underscoring the potential risks in insecure APIs, and illustrating how these risks may be mitigated. In order to facilitate this goal, the OWASP API Security Project will create and maintain a Top 10 API Security Risks document, as well as a documentation portal for best practices when creating or assessing APIs.
For Mobile Apps
OWASP Mobile Security Project - Top 10 risks
The OWASP Mobile Security Project is a centralized resource intended to give developers and security teams the resources they need to build and maintain secure mobile applications. Through the project, our goal is to classify mobile security risks and provide developmental controls to reduce their impact or likelihood of exploitation.
OWASP - Mobile Security Testing Guide:
The Mobile Security Testing Guide (MSTG) is a comprehensive manual for mobile app security development, testing and reverse engineering.
No. You're publishing a service with a public interface and your app will presumably only communicate via this REST API. Anything that your app can send, anyone else can send also. This means that the only way to secure access would be to authenticate in some way, i.e. keep a secret. However, you are also publishing your apps. This means that any secret in your app is essentially being given out also. You can't have it both ways; you can't expect to both give out your secret and keep it secret.
Though this is an old post, I thought I should share the updates from Google in this regard.
You can actually ensure that your Android application is calling the API using the SafetyNet mobile attestation APIs. This adds a little overhead on the network calls and prevents your application from running in a rooted device.
I found nothing similar like SafetyNet for iOS. Hence in my case, I checked the device configuration first in my login API and took different measures for Android and iOS. In case of iOS, I decided to keep a shared secret key between the server and the application. As the iOS applications are a little bit difficult to reversed engineered, I think this extra key checking adds some protection.
Of course, in both cases, you need to communicate over HTTPS.
As the other answers and comments imply, you cant truly restrict API access to only your app but you can take different measures to reduce the attempts. I believe the best solution is to make requests to your API (from native code of course) with a custom header like "App-Version-Key" (this key will be decided at compile time) and make your server check for this key to decide if it should accept or reject. Also when using this method you SHOULD use HTTPS/SSL as this will reduce the risk of people seeing your key by viewing the request on the network.
Regarding Cordova/Phonegap apps, I will be creating a plugin to do the above mentioned method. I will update this comment when its complete.
there is nothing much you can do. cause when you let some one in they can call your APIs. the most you can do is as below:
since you want only and only your application (with a specific package name and signature) calls your APIs, you can get the signature key of your apk pragmatically and send is to sever in every API call and if thats ok you response to the request. (or you can have a token API that your app calls it every beginning of the app and then use that token for other APIs - though token must be invalidated after some hours of not working with)
then you need to proguard your code so no one sees what you are sending and how you encrypt them. if you do a good encrypt decompiling will be so hard to do.
even signature of apk can be mocked in some hard ways but its the best you can do.
Someone have looked at Firebase App Check ?
https://firebase.google.com/docs/app-check
Is there any way to restrict post requests to my REST API only to requests coming from my own mobile app binary?
I'm not sure if there is an absolute solution.
But, you can reduce unwanted requests.
Use an App Check:
The "Firebase App Check" can be used cross-platform (https://firebase.google.com/docs/app-check) - credit to #Xande-Rasta-Moura
iOS: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicecheck
Android: https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2013/01/verifying-back-end-calls-from-android.html
Use BasicAuth (for API requests)
Allow a user-agent header for mobile devices only (for API requests)
Use a robots.txt file to reduce bots
User-agent: *
Disallow: /
Let's say you set up a custom protocol handler to run an application with some startup data, right?
myapp:\\somedata
How secure is that data? I'm having trouble finding any resources talking about:
Do browsers cache this data?
Can other applications see this information get passed and how?
I've found resources talking about obvious problems, like attacking sites can abuse your protocol if they find you have one.
Otherwise, for developers looking to use their website to launch an app in this way, what do we need to be concerned about if we don't want anyone else seeing "somedata"? More specifically, how is the data accessible to attackers?
Any MDN or other official references would be much appreciated!
This question might sound trivial, but even after reading a number of tutorials, I still don't get how the REST security should be implemented.
I have a webpage and soon-to-be-ready mobile app. Both of them will be using the REST API (written in node.js), and the question is - how can I prevent users from modyfing those requests? It's very easy to see the network traffic in the browser, and all the GET/POST requests that are made to the server. It also seems very easy to copy such a request, modify its parameters and/or payload and send it to the server.
How do I make sure that's my webpage or the app who made the request, and not someone else?
Sisyphus is absolutely correct: your focus should be on securing the channel (TLS, SSH, etc) and authentication (e.g. OAuth2).
You should absolutely familiarize yourself with the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). In particular, start with:
OWASP Top 10 Cheat Sheet
OWASP REST Security Cheat Sheet
Here is an excellent "hands on" tutorial that gives you a great overview of all the different pieces you need to worry about:
Authenticate a Node.js API with JSON Web Tokens
Once you've gone through the tutorial and scanned the OWASP cheat sheets, you'll have a much better idea of what kinds of things you need to worry about, what options/technologies are available to mitigate those risks, and what might work best for your particular scenario.
Good luck!
Typically, security these days uses a combination of Transport Layer Security and OAuth2. OAuth2 provides authentication and authorisation, ensuring appropriate access to resources, with TLS both securing data over the network and preventing the kind of replay attacks which you're concerned about. Neither are really specific to Restful APIs and you can find them being used in non-Rest contexts also.
Here is my requirements:
Usable by any mobile application I'm developing
I'm developing the mobile application, therefore I can implement any securing strategies.
Cacheable using classical HTTP Cache strategy
I'm using Varnish with a very basic configuration and it works well
Not publicly available
I don't want people be able to consume my API
Solutions I think of:
Use HTTPS, but it doesn't cover the last requirements because proxying request from the application will show the API KEY used.
Is there any possibility to do this? Using something like a private/public key for example?
Which fits well with HTTP, Apache, and Varnish.
There is no way to ensure that the other end of a network link is your application. This is not a solvable problem. You can obfuscate things with certificates, keys, secrets, whatever. But all of these can be reverse-engineered by the end user because they have access to the application. It's ok to use a little obfuscation like certificates or the like, but it cannot be made secure. Your server must assume that anyone connecting to it is hostile, and behave accordingly.
It is possible to authenticate users, since they can have accounts. So you can certainly ensure that only valid users may use your service. But you cannot ensure that they only use your application. If your current architecture requires that, you must redesign. It is not solvable, and most certainly not solvable on common mobile platforms.
If you can integrate a piece of secure hardware, such as a smartcard, then it is possible to improve security in that you can be more certain that the human at the other end is actually a customer, but even that does not guarantee that your application is the one connecting to the server, only that the smartcard is available to the application that is connecting.
For more on this subject, see Secure https encryption for iPhone app to webpage.
Even though it's true there's basically no way to guarantee your API is only consumed by your clients unless you use a Hardware secure element to store the secret (which would imply you making your own phone from scratch, any external device could be used by any non official client App as well) there are some fairly effective things you can do to obscure the API. To begin with, use HTTPS, that's a given. But the key here, is to do certificate pinning in your app. Certificate pining is a technique in which you store the valid public key certificate for the HTTPS server you are trying to connect. Then on every connection, you validate that it's an HTTPS connection (don't accept downgrade attacks), and more importantly, validate that it's exactly the same certificate. This way you prevent a network device in your path to perform a man in the middle attack, thus ensuring no one is listening in in your conversation with the server. By doing this, and being a bit clever about the way you store the API's parameters general design in your application (see code obfuscation, particularly how to obfuscate string constants), you can be fairly sure you are the only one talking to your server. Of course, security is only a function of how badly does someone want to break in your stuff. Doing this doesn't prevent a experienced reverse-engineer with time to spare to try (and possibly succeed) to decompile your source code and find what it is looking for. But doing all of this will force it to look at the binary, which is a couple of orders of magnitude more difficult to do than just performing a man in the middle attack. This is famously related to the latest snap chat flurrry of leaked images. Third party clients for snapchat exist, and they were created by reverse engineering the API, by means of a sniffer looking at the traffic during a man in the middle attack. If the snapchat app developers would have been smarter, they would've pinned their certificate into their app, absolutely guaranteeing it's snapchat's server who they're talking to, and the hackers would need to inspect the binary, a much more laborious task that perhaps given the effort involved, would not have been performed.
We use HTTPS and assign authorized users a key which is sent in and validated with each request.
We also use HMAC hashing.
Good read on this HMAC:
http://www.thebuzzmedia.com/designing-a-secure-rest-api-without-oauth-authentication/
We're trying to implement the Gatekeeper Design pattern as recommended in Microsoft Security Best Practices for Azure, but I;m having some trouble determining how to do that.
To give some background on the project, we're taking an already developed website using the traditional layered approach (presentation, business, data, etc.) and converting it over to use Azure. The client would like some added security built around this process since it will now be in the cloud.
The initial suggestion to handle this was to use Queues and have worker roles process requests entered into the queue. Some of the concerns we've come across are how to properly serialize the objects and include what methods we need run on that object as well as the latency inherent in such an approach.
We've also looked setting up some WCF services in the Worker Role, but I'm having a little trouble wrapping my head around how exactly to handle this. (In addition to this being my first Azure project, this would also be my first attempt at WCF.) We'd run into the same issue with object serialization here.
Another thought was to set up some web services in another web role, but that seems to open the same security issue since we won't be able to perform IP-based security on the request.
I've searched and searched but haven't really found any samples that do what we're trying to do (or I didn't recognize them as doing so). Can anyone provide some guidance with code samples? Thanks.
Please do not take this the wrong way, but it sounds like you are in danger of over-engineering a solution based on the "requirement" that 'the client would like some added security'. The gatekeeper pattern that is described on page 13 of the Security Best Practices For Developing Windows Azure Applications document is a very big gun which you should only fire at large targets, i.e., scenarios where you actually need hardened applications storing highly sensitive data. Building something like this will potentially cost a lot of time & performance, so make sure you weigh pro's & con's thoroughly.
Have you considered leveraging SQL Azure firewall as an additional (and possibly acceptable) security measure? You can specify access on an IP address level and even configure it programmatically through stored procedures. You can block all external access to your database, making your Azure application (web/worker roles) the only "client" that is allowed to gain access.
To answer one of your questions specifically, you can secure access to a WCF service using X.509 certificates and implement message security; if you also need an SSL connection to protect data in transit you would need to use both message and transport security. It's not the simplest thing on earth, but it's possible. You can make it so only the servers that have the correct certificate can make the WCF request. Take a look at this thread for more details and a few more pointers: http://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/windowsazuresecurity/thread/1f77046b-82a1-48c4-bb0d-23993027932a
Also, WCF makes it easy to exchange objects as long as you mark them Serializable. So making WCF calls would dramatically simplify how you exchange objects back and forth with your client(s).